Lina Khatib
{
"authors": [
"Lina Khatib"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center",
"programAffiliation": "MEP",
"programs": [
"Middle East"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Gulf",
"Levant",
"Syria",
"Iraq",
"Middle East",
"Western Europe",
"United Kingdom",
"North America",
"United States"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform",
"Security",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}Source: Getty
Airstrikes Will Not Beat ISIS
The most airstrikes can achieve is the containment of the Islamic State through limiting its ability to expand geographically. They can not lead to its eradication.
Source: CNN Opinion
The UK is set to become the latest Western country to enter the coalition fighting ISIS, with Parliament expected to vote Friday to endorse British military engagement in Iraq through airstrikes.
The vote comes shortly after Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech during the United Nations General Assembly in New York on Wednesday, in which he emphasized the threat posed by ISIS to the UK and endorsed military action based on “careful preparation” while saying “no to rushing to join a conflict without a clear plan.”
In doing so, the UK appears to want to redeem itself after the blunders of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Yet entering the conflict through airstrikes in Iraq is in itself an indication of the lack of a clear plan on part of the UK in particular and the anti-ISIS coalition as a whole. As it currently stands, the coalition’s plan carries a high risk of backfiring.The UK is basing its potential involvement in Iraq on the legitimacy granted by the democratically elected Iraqi government’s request for international intervention to aid it in fighting ISIS, a scenario that cannot be duplicated in Syria.
But ISIS has set roots in both Syria and Iraq, and has erased the border between the two countries in areas under its control. To limit any action against ISIS, whether military or otherwise, to Iraq alone is therefore meaningless.
Focusing on airstrikes as a key method of military engagement is also ineffective. ISIS knew very well that no Western country would want to commit boots on the ground in Syria or Iraq, and prepared to defend itself accordingly.
Before the coalition’s campaign began, ISIS bases in Raqqa and elsewhere were evacuated and the group’s members went underground. The raids that have been conducted to date have led to little actual damage to ISIS’ military capability, according to one of my informants on the ground there. If anything, they have played right into the hands of its strategy.
This strategy is based on engaging in a defensive, asymmetrical war, which, as the examples of Hamas and Hezbollah have shown, is a good bet for militant groups with limited capabilities confronting larger conventional armies.
ISIS also invited military action against it in order to legitimize its narrative of fighting a war against “crusades.” This narrative has now been strengthened, especially with many of those killed during the strikes being civilians. The more civilians die, the higher the resentment against the coalition, and the more attractive ISIS becomes to potential recruits.
Airstrikes will not sever people’s ties with ISIS. The attraction of ISIS to its recruits is not merely ideological. It is based on seeking revenge for economic, social, and political grievances as well as the pursuit of power and money, but also a sense of belonging to a grand project, which is the establishment of a Caliphate.
Now that a Caliphate has been declared, even in rudimentary form, the most airstrikes can achieve is the containment of ISIS through limiting its ability to expand geographically, but not to its eradication.
Without a political and economic plan tackling the motivations driving ISIS sympathizers within Syria and Iraq and globally, limited military action will keep ISIS alive and open the door to retaliation. With an increasing number of ISIS jihadists hailing from the UK, British involvement in the air raid campaign translates into increased threat to UK security. The risk of retaliation extends to all countries involved in the anti-ISIS coalition.
Although the anti-ISIS coalition has been crystalizing for some time, what it’s pursuing is far from a carefully planned strategy. In addition to the risks highlighted above, a glaring gap is a political strategy for Syria that would prevent the country from descending into the kind of chaos witnessed in Libya. Also absent is a regional security strategy for neighboring countries like Jordan and the Gulf states, which have entered the coalition nervously and are worried about their own stability now that they are in direct confrontation with ISIS.
There were several measures—from diplomatic pressure to strengthening the Syrian opposition adequately—that the international community could have taken two years ago, that would have prevented the Syrian crisis from escalating to the alarming level witnessed today.
Military action as currently planned would have been much more effective back when ISIS was still in its infancy. Now that military action is a reality, instead of merely jumping on the bandwagon, the UK should use its position as a major European country and a key ally of the United States to push the coalition towards formulating a long-term strategy that is indeed comprehensive and that offers a realistic plan for what happens in Syria and Iraq the day after ISIS is eradicated. This would bolster the UK’s international standing, better secure coalition countries, as well as prevent the coalition from repeating the mistakes of the past.
About the Author
Former Director, Middle East Center
Khatib was director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. Previously, she was the co-founding head of the Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.
- Syria's Last Best Hope: The Southern FrontIn The Media
- The Islamic State’s Strategy: Lasting and ExpandingPaper
Lina Khatib
Recent Work
Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie India
- What Could a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement Do for U.S.-India Ties?Article
India and the United States are close to concluding a Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement (RDPA) that will allow firms from the two countries to sell to each other’s defense establishments more easily. While this may not remedy the specific grievances both sides may have regarding larger bilateral issues, an RDPA could restore some momentum, following the trade deal announcement.
Konark Bhandari
- India Signs the Pax Silica—A Counter to Pax Sinica?Commentary
On the last day of the India AI Impact Summit, India signed Pax Silica, a U.S.-led declaration seemingly focused on semiconductors. While India’s accession to the same was not entirely unforeseen, becoming a signatory nation this quickly was not on the cards either.
Konark Bhandari
- The Impact of U.S. Sanctions and Tariffs on India’s Russian Oil ImportsCommentary
This piece examines India’s response to U.S. sanctions and tariffs, specifically assessing the immediate market consequences, such as alterations in import costs, and the broader strategic implications for India’s energy security and foreign policy orientation.
Vrinda Sahai
- Military Lessons from Operation SindoorArticle
The India-Pakistan conflict that played out between May 6 and May 10, 2025, offers several military lessons. This article presents key takeaways from Operation Sindoor and breaks down how India’s preparations shaped the outcome and what more is needed to strengthen future readiness.
Dinakar Peri
- India and the Sovereignty Principle: The Disaggregation ImperativeBook
This book offers a comprehensive analysis of India's evolving relationship with sovereignty in a complex global order. Moving beyond conventional narratives, it examines how the sovereignty principle shapes India's behavior across four critical domains—from traditional military power to contemporary data governance.
Rudra Chaudhuri, Nabarun Roy