Armenak Tokmajyan and Kheder Khaddour have just published a Carnegie paper titled “A Fractured Border: Syria, Türkiye, and Cantonization.” Tokmajyan is an El Erian fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. His research focuses on borders and conflict, Syrian refugees, and state-society relations in Syria. Khaddour is a nonresident scholar at the center, whose research is focused on civil military relations and local identities in the Levant, with a concentration on Syria. In their paper, the authors examine Syria’s northern border areas and the interplay between Syria and Türkiye in the region. Diwan met with Tokmajyan and Khaddour in mid-April to ask them about their paper.
Michael Young: You’ve just written a Carnegie paper titled “A Fractured Border: Syria, Türkiye, and Cantonization.” What do you argue in it?
Armenak Tokmajyan and Kheder Khaddour: We essentially argue that more than a decade of war in Syria has led to a new demographic, social, and economic reality along the whole of the Syrian-Turkish border. This reality cannot be undone, nor can it be resolved by war. The way forward is bargaining between Türkiye and Syria’s Assad regime, with a pivotal role being played by Russia. This will contribute to redrawing the map of the border region to the two parties’ liking. We think that this process will lead to adjustments of the cantons that have emerged on the border—the areas under the control of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, in Afrin, in areas occupied by Türkiye in its “Euphrates Shield” and “Peace Spring” military operations, in addition to areas under the control of the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The recent Russian-mediated talks between Türkiye and the regime have only underlined the continuity of this process.
MY: Can you define “cantonization” for readers in the Syrian context? And what are the main characteristics of the cantons you see in Syria?
AT and KK: Cantonization in a conflict setting is not well-theorized and can mean different things in different contexts. Here are some of the main characteristics of Syria’s cantons. First, the canton is a space that lies beyond the control of the center, in other words the regime in Damascus, and necessarily has channels to the outside world. This includes, for instance, access to cross-border humanitarian aid and to global markets. Without those channels, the canton would not be able to survive because it does not have enough local resources to sustain itself.
Second, cantons involve a demographic dilemma. They host segments of the local population, many of them internally displaced persons who have nowhere else to go (either inside or outside the country), who cannot coexist with the regime, and whom the regime cannot or doesn’t want to reintegrate into the country.
Third, the canton is very much part of a broader regional security framework, at the expense of the national framework. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham-ruled Idlib and the Kurdish dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) are not part of the national framework forged by Damascus, but they are part of the regional security framework. In Turkey’s calculations, for example, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham is a buffer and counterweight to the Kurdish presence, while the SDF is Washington’s local ally in its fight against the Islamic State group and AANES provides a foothold for the continued American presence.
Finally, the political weight of a canton is inextricably tied to external political and military support or protection. So, for example, if Turkey were to withdraw its troops from northwest Syria, local actors who rule these cantons would become easy prey for the regime and its allies. The same applies in the northeast. Although the SDF is a large force, what really keeps these areas outside regime control is the deployment of American forces there.
MY: Where do you see negotiations between Syria and Türkiye going, particularly after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad recently said he would not meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan until Türkiye ended its occupation of Syria?
AT and KK: It is likely that Assad won’t procced with Türkiye in improving bilateral negations, through Russian mediation, unless he gets something consequential in return. Finding common ground won’t be easy. We are talking about twelve years of conflict and an accumulation of many intricate demographic and security problems that need to be tackled. So, we are looking at a long process that will include many rounds of negotiations, bargaining, and bartering, which, if they take place, will likely come at the expense of local actors.
MY: You write that cantonization will not soon be reversed, and the process of cantonization may not even have ended. What do you mean, and what would it take to end cantonization in Syria?
AT and KK: Yes, we don’t think cantonization will be reversed. The only actor that could regain more territory is the Syrian regime, which would mean an adjustment of the existing cantons to the regime’s favor. Having said that, the regime does not have the ability, or perhaps even the willingness, to recapture all the areas outside its control, as this may create a host of security, political, administrative, and other challenges. In other words, while the regime is eager to regain access to strategic areas and economic resources in the north, recapturing the whole of Syria remains secondary for it. This means that cantons and cantonization will remain part of the vocabulary in making sense of Syria’s north for some time to come.
MY: How has Russia’s involvement in the Ukraine war affected its ability to mediate between Türkiye and Syria?
AT and KK: The Ukraine war has accelerated the Syria-Türkiye rapprochement, with Russia’s mediation. Overall, the war has weakened Russia’s dominance in Syria. Before February 2022, Russia was the main point of reference for Syria on the regional and international levels. It was both a negotiator and mediator between all relevant parties—local, regional, and even international. So at least initially, and as a result of its venture in Ukraine, Russia has become less dominant in Syria. For instance, when the Ukraine war began, Iran and the Arab countries began pursuing a more independent policy toward Syria, while communications between Russia and the West over Syria decreased significantly. However, Moscow has remained an important player and has even strived to regain the initiative.
Russian efforts to broker an understanding between Syria and Türkiye is perhaps the best example of Moscow’s attempts to maintain a central role in Syria. A Turkish-Syrian agreement will solidify Russia’s presence in the country, and perhaps even allow a long-term Russian role in Syria’s border areas. A rapprochement with a heavyweight such as Türkiye would also bring the regime out of its isolation, meaning it would be a diplomatic achievement for Russia. A handshake with Assad would also likely help Erdoğan in his tough election campaign at a time when Russia needs the Turkish leader in the context of its war in Ukraine. Russia also needs stability in its zones of influence, such as Syria, the Caucasus, and in the post-Soviet space in general. Escalations of existing conflicts in, say, Syria or the Caucasus or Central Asia would divert Russian resources and attention from the cumbersome adventure in Ukraine. All these factors have contributed to Russia’s active role in supporting a Syrian-Turkish rapprochement.
