Armenak Tokmajyan
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}Source: Getty
Bashar al-Assad of Syria Has Been Ousted From Power
Spot analysis from Carnegie scholars on events relating to the Middle East and North Africa.
What Happened?
Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad has been forcibly removed from office. The chain of events leading to this outcome began with an offensive in Idlib by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, formerly the Al-Qaeda franchise in Syria, which rapidly dismantled longstanding front lines and took control of the city of Aleppo within days, as regime forces retreated. However, the regime’s fate was sealed in the city of Hama, where its forces regrouped and tried to resist the offensive, before ultimately failing to do so, leading to a collapse on all fronts.
After the takeover of Homs, Assad fled from Damascus without further battles, while various rebel groups entered the capital. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s leader, Abou Mohammed al-Golani, entered the Syrian capital on December 8, declaring a historic victory. Assad has reportedly been granted asylum in Russia. With battles ongoing between Türkiye-backed forces and the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces in the northeast, an Israeli incursion in southern Syria, and a somewhat chaotic situation in Damascus, the conflict is far from over, leaving a highly fluid state of affairs in place, marked by a mixture of hope and fear about what lies ahead.
Why Is It Important?
Bashar al-Assad was long seen as the primary obstacle to a political transition in Syria. With him gone, Syrians now have an opportunity to establish a new national framework for their country’s future. Assad’s intransigence was the result of his belief that he had won the conflict in Syria, bolstered by his and his allies’ military gains between 2016 and 2020, and favorable diplomatic shifts thereafter. This drove him to seek a return to the pre-2011 order rather than embrace a transition.
However, today nothing is guaranteed. Syria is likely to grapple with numerous challenges. These include competing local and foreign interests, factionalism, localism, and external interference. Assad’s disorderly departure has only amplified those challenges. The ensuing dynamics will undoubtedly clash, making the task of reestablishing a unified national framework for Syria immensely challenging for the Syrian people.
Regionally, this marks the end of an era in which the dominant power in Damascus was Iran, whose conflict with Israel shaped developments in Syria. Assad’s downfall also signifies the collapse of Iranian ascendency in the Levant, which Tehran had expanded significantly during the so-called Arab Spring. It used the opportunity of the regional uprisings to expand its social, economic, and political influence and establish a corridor to the Mediterranean that encompassed Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Efforts by Arab states, Türkiye, and Israel to counter this regional order largely failed—that is until October 7, 2023, when Israel declared war on Iran and its proxies. The loss of Gaza, the defeat and marginalization of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and now Assad’s political demise collectively signal that this project has folded, at least for the moment.
What Are the Implications for the Future?
Syria’s future remains uncertain, with several paths possible for the country. A power struggle could erupt among the different factions nationwide, or a more united force, likely led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, could take the reins of power. Regardless, Syria is likely to remain weak and preoccupied with internal struggles for the foreseeable future. The country’s vulnerability to foreign interference will further complicate its recovery and stabilization.
These changes also create an opening for political Islam to reclaim a central role in Syria’s political landscape, though its shape and form remain uncertain. While Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham has evolved from its origins as Jabhat al-Nusra into a more pragmatic, tolerant, and mature organization, at the leadership and grassroots levels it still advocates for a project rooted in political Islam as an alternative system of governance for Syria. With Türkiye and Qatar (both supporters of political Islam) acting as key backers, this political agenda, which was born out of Syria’s conflict before being marginalized in the past couple of years, may gain renewed influence.
On the Israel-Syria front, the implications are profound. The collapse of the Axis of Resistance in Syria represents a major victory for the Israelis, breaking the so-called “ring of fire” that had surrounded Israel and severing Hezbollah’s weapons supply lines from Iran and Iraq. Israel has invaded the demilitarized zone in southern Syria that was created in 1974 by the disengagement agreement between the two countries, thereby imposing a buffer zone near the occupied Golan Heights. The Israelis have also declared the agreement to be no longer valid. This is likely aimed at creating new facts on the ground, eliminating current threats, and preventing the emergence of new ones, while closely monitoring Syria’s unfolding situation.
Among the regional actors, Türkiye is emerging as one of the biggest winners, and its influence is set to grow. With a strong network of allies and proxies—both military and political—and millions of Syrians in the north who have benefited from Turkish assistance, Ankara holds a significant strategic advantage over other states. Combined with Qatar’s financial backing, it is well-positioned to shape local and regional developments related to Syria in the coming months and years.
About the Author
Nonresident Scholar Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Armenak Tokmajyan is a nonresident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut. His research focuses on borders and conflict, Syrian refugees, and state-society relations in Syria.
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