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Evolution of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

In order to improve security and stability in Yemen, U.S. policy should focus on addressing the systemic sources of instability in the country.

published by
Orient IV
 on November 1, 2011

Source: Orient IV

Evolution of al-Qaeda in the Arabian PeninsulaSince its creation in January 2009, the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has eclipsed ‘core al-Qaeda’ as the primary terrorist threat to US national security. Since last year, numerous senior US security officials have commented that AQAP has emerged as the organization most likely to kill American nationals and to attack U.S. interests. In an address at the Carnegie Endowment in December 2010, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism John Brennan termed AQAP “the most operationally active node of the al-Qaida network.” In Congressional testimony in early 2011, then National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter referred to AQAP as the most significant risk to the US homeland. 

Without a doubt, Yemen presents a complex challenge for policy makers. Numerous governments have grappled with implementing an integrated policy toward Yemen. There is near unanimity on what the international community wants to avoid in Yemen: the collapse of the state and greater operational space for al-Qaeda to plan and launch attacks against western and allied interests. A key obstacle, however, is that no one can very well articulate what a ‘failed’ Yemen looks like, much less the triggers that might lead to state failure. It has therefore been extremely difficult for policy makers to design a policy when they do not know what they want to avoid and do not know how it might happen. Rather than concentrating on state failure in Yemen, a more useful approach may be to focus on the notion of ‘regime failure’. 
 
In large part, US policy toward Yemen has focused almost exclusively on the issues of terrorism, counter-terrorism, and al-Qaeda. To be sure, terrorism and security are major issues with regards to Yemen; however, the United States should not allow these issues to dominate the relationship. Terrorism and al- Qaeda may be the current issues of most concern for Washington (and London, Brussels, and Riyadh), but they are not the greatest threats to Yemeni stability. 
 
In order to improve security and stability in Yemen, US policy should be focused on addressing the systemic sources of instability in the country. These include a collapsing economy, rampant corruption, widespread unemployment, rapid resource depletion, and a series of political and socio-economic challenges that have manifested themselves as security challenges for the current government. A policy centered on counter-terrorism to the near exclusion of other issues will ultimately prove counterproductive. While initial gains may be seen, they could be short lived. Improvement in American and allied security will come when conditions in Yemen for all Yemenis improve.
 
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