For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy vis-à-vis Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, its growing dependence on Moscow, and the absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decision-making.
As far as the Belarusian regime is concerned, the threat comes not from its own society, but from external enemies who will use every opportunity to repeat the mass unrest of 2020. That means that every possible weak spot must be shored up.
The Belarusian authorities have taken steps to limit Russian businesses from buying up too many local companies.
Just the appearance of a body like the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly after the elections will legitimize conversations about succession within the ruling elite.
Belarus’ democratic forces recognise the sad reality: the connection between them and the majority of Belarusians inside the country is broken.
By imagining an attack or even an invasion, Lukashenko is increasing the risks of war coming to Belarus.
If Putin changes his mind about Prigozhin and initiates some sort of revenge, Minsk will not be able to protect the Wagner leader, who knows that full well. Lukashenko in turn cannot believe the promises of Prigozhin, a warlord who has just betrayed his patron, to diligently follow Belarusian rules.
