Russia’s war in Ukraine has underscored the need for NATO to deter and, if necessary, defend against aggression in Europe. Doing so will require investing in military capabilities, capacity, and plans, as well as attending to the health of defense industries. At the same time, the balance of NATO contributions is shifting: as the United States faces increasing challenges in other regions, European NATO members and Canada will need to play a larger role in the defense of the European continent. Indeed, NATO has made considerable progress in the past few years, overhauling its approach to defense and increasing its presence throughout its area of responsibility. However, significant room for progress remains, including in manpower, defense industrial capacity, true interoperability, equipment and munitions acquisition, the communication of plans and strategies, and effective command and control.
The Baltic Sea region (consisting of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Sweden) demonstrates NATO’s challenges and opportunities. Notably, Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO has redefined the military geography of the region, contributing to what one could call the alliance’s “Northeast Quadrant,” the area surrounding the Baltic Sea from northern Poland through the Baltics, the Nordics, and northern Germany. Swedish and Finnish membership has strengthened the capabilities in the Northeast Quadrant and increased the directions from which NATO can impose dilemmas on Russia and flow troops and materiel into frontline states during times of crisis and conflict. Achieving the full promise of these changes will require continued effort and investments.
Dynamics regarding the Baltic Sea region also highlight a potential political tension that could arise within the alliance: the regionalization of military capabilities. While this trend benefits NATO’s overall military strength, it could raise political concerns about the balance among NATO members, as evidenced by early fears of a “Nordic bloc” within NATO, particularly if threat perceptions within the alliance begin to fragment. However, these challenges can be overcome and should not discourage NATO from pursuing the most efficient path to ensuring the security of the region and the alliance more broadly.
Swedish and Finnish Membership: A Sea Change
Sweden’s and Finland’s membership in NATO represents a sea change for the region (and for the countries’ strategic cultures). Both countries bring to the alliance strong capabilities, significant defense industrial capacity and expertise, knowledge about Russia, and commitment to resilience and total defense. Their membership, importantly, also creates new military geography in the region upon which NATO can capitalize.
First, NATO can plan for contingencies that can count on Swedish and Finnish involvement. Before they joined the alliance, NATO could hope for Swedish and Finnish approval to transit through, fly over, or operate from their territory and for Swedish and Finnish engagement in a Baltic Sea area contingency, but it could not depend on it. Now, as allies, Sweden and Finland are firmly committed to support allied efforts—and NATO can now more comprehensively plan and exercise military options enabled by their involvement.
Swedish and Finnish involvement in regional contingencies is especially important when considering the deterrence and defense of the Baltic states, which remain highly vulnerable to Russian military attack due to their geography. The inclusion of Sweden and Finland in the alliance can, if properly capitalized upon, contribute to significantly strengthening the defense of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For example, while previous reinforcement of these countries primarily relied on land transport through the so-called Suwałki Gap, NATO can now plan to flow additional troops and materiel through Norway to Sweden to the front line. The new defense cooperation agreements signed between each of the Nordic states and the United States further underscore the importance of troop and materiel movement into the region.
Second, Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO creates new opportunities to impose dilemmas on Russia. For example, the transformation of Russia’s border with Finland into a border with a NATO member state means that Moscow will need to commit additional units to defending both the St. Petersburg area and its land route to the Kola Peninsula, making it more difficult for Russia to concentrate forces solely facing the Baltic states. NATO could also consider placing new longer-range strike capabilities on Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish territory. The ability to pose dilemmas on Russia from Northern Europe is useful even if Russia were to threaten a more distant part of NATO territory: in such a case, NATO could mobilize Northern European capabilities to increase the alliance’s position to deter and respond to any new threats, with the potential secondary effect of forcing Russia to divert resources and attention away from the region it wished originally to threaten.
Third, Sweden and Finland both contribute capabilities that are built for the unique conditions of the Baltic Sea region. For example, Norway, Sweden, and Finland have a tradition of cooperation in the “Cap of the North” (Nordkalotten in Norwegian and Swedish and Pohjoiskalotti in Finnish), where their territories meet above the Arctic Circle. The region has a subarctic climate with relatively little infrastructure, making it vital that military capabilities operating in the region can not only survive the area’s unique weather, terrain, and light conditions but also operate in the low-infrastructure environment. Each of these countries possesses unique capabilities for this environment. Finland and Sweden also offer strong naval capabilities designed to operate in the Baltic Sea, which has unique geography, depth, and salinity levels. For example, the Swedish submarine fleet—soon to include two new attack vessels—was tailor-made for (and practiced at operating in) Baltic conditions. Although the Baltic Sea may not be a “NATO lake,” these and other naval capabilities will contribute to sea denial and enabling reinforcement flows across the sea.
Fourth, Sweden and Finland help create a new military geography in the Baltic Sea region by filling in the Northeast Quadrant. Sweden and Finland connect the Baltic region with the High North, serving as nodes between the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic and reinforcing the necessity to think about the region holistically. Importantly, both countries contribute an additional ability to project power into the North Atlantic and Arctic, supporting efforts previously led by Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Given the transatlantic reinforcements that are likely to make their way to the Norwegian coastline, protecting the waters around Norway and the North Sea will be vital.
NATO’s Regional Planning
Sweden’s and Finland’s membership comes at a time when NATO has been overhauling how it plans to defend Europe. The year 2014, with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, marked the beginning of a new era for NATO, shifting away from decades of focus on out-of-area operations and moving toward a more concentrated focus on defense of the transatlantic space.
In addition to readiness, spending, and forward deterrence initiatives, NATO has begun to transform the way it does business. The “Concept for Deterrence and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area”—NATO’s strategic framework for competition and defense, also known as DDA or the “Deter and Defend” strategy—contains a family of plans including a strategic plan for the entire area of responsibility, three regional plans (North-West, Central, and South-East), and domain-specific plans (land, air, maritime, cyber, special operations forces, and space), as well as plans for logistics and sustainment. The regional plans, approved at the 2023 Vilnius Summit, are NATO’s most detailed regional defense plans since the Cold War. In addition to detailing how NATO forces would defend allied territory, the plans and other efforts assign readiness levels and preassign specific forces to defend specific allies.
Having concrete plans allows NATO to match plans with requirements. As U.S. European Command Commander and Supreme Allied Commander Europe Christopher Cavoli has said: “This is the first time in more than 30 years that we have an objective plans-based statement of requirements. And that’s a real advantage for all nations in the alliance. It will give focus to their national defense planning for collective defense purposes.”
NATO’s process for setting capability targets—known as the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP)—can thus now move toward determining alliance capability requirements and apportioning those requirements to allies based off actual plans. This not only allows allies’ capability targets to be more directly related to potential military operations, but it also enables NDPP staff to match capability targets with the operations to which each country is likely to contribute. As plans become more regionalized and NATO identifies which countries’ units would go where, capability targets may also become more regionalized.
From a military perspective, specialization in capabilities is logical for defense-focused missions. Each region of NATO—from the High North to the Mediterranean Sea—is different, necessitating different military capabilities. Countries located in or with forces assigned to NATO’s various regions should have core capabilities that are effective in those regions. For example, countries in the Baltic Sea region have deep knowledge of their local geography as well as the local balance of power, and they possess capabilities that are built for the region. In a Baltic area contingency, the frontline states are going to be the first responders and will likely be responsible for much of the first weeks of fighting; their capabilities should match this responsibility. At the same time, countries outside of the immediate region that are assigned to the area should be able to reinforce the fight with regionally optimized forces. Forces assigned to the Cap of the North, for example, need to be both trained and equipped for the cold-weather, low-infrastructure environment.
The Baltic Sea region, like other NATO regions, requires constant exercising, training, and signaling to maintain its deterrence efforts. Members of the Northeast Quadrant have the most tailored capabilities for the region and the greatest drive to keep it secure. The newest member states are already demonstrating their desire to contribute to the security of the region. For example, Sweden, in addition to increases in its national defense, has committed to sending a battalion to the Forward Land Forces in Latvia and has proposed that it lead a new Forward Land Forces in Finland. Both Sweden and Finland have also announced additional contributions to NATO peacetime missions.
Balancing Regionalization with Unity
A move toward regionalizing NATO capabilities may raise political concerns. The alliance is based on the idea that an attack on one is an attack on all and that allies will come to the attacked member’s aid. A demonstrated shared willingness and capability to defend allies from north to south and east to west (a “360-degree approach”) is key to NATO’s deterrence efforts. Consequently, a perceived Nordic or Northern European club could hurt political unity if other members feel that their voices are not being heard.
However, a Northern Europe in NATO that builds off the region’s existing defense cooperation to make the region stronger does not necessarily weaken NATO’s political unity. The Baltic Sea region is perhaps the most vulnerable to Russian military attack. Every NATO member state that shares a border with Russia (now six: Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland) is in the region or the broader Northeast Quadrant. NATO should commit considerable resources to the region. Indeed, by making the Baltic Sea region more secure through increased regional specialization of capabilities, NATO members will be more able to dedicate resources to other challenges. Making Northern Europe stronger (just as making Central Europe and Southern Europe stronger) makes NATO stronger.
Moreover, having military capabilities that are concentrated on a particular region does not mean that a nation will be unable to contribute elsewhere. While some assets and capabilities may be tailor-made for the Baltic Sea region, others (such as air assets, intelligence, space assets, and large sea vessels) are more fungible and can be used in other regions. For example, in 2011, Sweden contributed to NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya through participation in no-fly zone enforcement with JAS-39 Gripens and other supporting aircraft. Outside of military support, countries can also provide diplomatic and economic support.
Furthermore, NATO has historically been able to adapt to new security environments. As the threat environment changes, so too should NATO.
The Job Ahead
A potential regionalization of NATO defense planning raises some challenges. In addition to managing potential political tensions, questions about how to measure fair burden sharing are likely to continue. In particular, ensuring that non-frontline states are proportionally contributing to NATO deterrence and defense will be vital. Frontline states will naturally be most likely to invest in defense capabilities. To avoid political tensions and increase the strength of NATO’s fighting power, non-frontline states will need to ensure they are not just hitting spending targets but also meaningfully contributing to the military capabilities and plans of the alliance.
In the coming years, NATO will also have to ensure the “executability” of its plans, including in the Baltic Sea region. At the national level, as of June 2024, states in the Baltic Sea region on average spent 2.75 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. This average is well above the average of non–Baltic Sea region NATO members (1.97 percent), but more spending may still be necessary for the region. As the states work to reconstitute equipment given to Ukraine, increase stockpiles, and grow their own forces, they may find themselves competing for limited supplies. The defense industrial base will need to grow, but so will regional coordination on defense acquisitions. Building off of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) framework (which brought together the Nordic countries for defense collaboration in 2009) and other efforts, Baltic Sea region states should continue to cooperate on ensuring true interoperability among equipment and forces. Although Northern Europe contains several examples of conscription practices, manpower may also prove a challenge in the coming years, particularly among officers.
NATO will also need to iron out its command and control in the Northeast Quadrant. The decision about whether Sweden and Finland should join Joint Forces Command (JFC) Norfolk or JFC Brunssum has generated significant debate. This decision matters, but at the end of the day, a line must be drawn somewhere. As NATO continues to work on how the command and control of Baltic Sea region operations should be organized, it should ensure that the line between the JFCs looks more like a “bridge than a border” and that any change of operational control (CHOP, or transfer of command) or transfer of authority (TOA) is smooth. Component commands, including the new land command in Finland, and other regional headquarters will play a role. Importantly, CHOPs and TOAs should be exercised and practiced during peacetime.
Conclusion
Swedish and Finnish membership in NATO, driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, represents a sea change for the Baltic Sea region and NATO more broadly. As NATO adapts to its new strategic environment and optimizes for enhanced deterrence and defense, the Baltic Sea region is in a position to be significantly strengthened. A move toward increased regionalization and specialization of capabilities within the alliance can enhance not only the Baltic Sea region but also the alliance as a whole. Work remains to take full advantage of the new NATO membership in the Baltic Sea region, particularly as Russia rebuilds its military, but with sustained progress, the region can become much more secure.