The international presence in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict zone is once again expanding, with an EU monitoring mission set to join Russian peacekeepers there. Since the Europeans were invited by Armenia, they will only be able to work on the Armenian side of the border: they won’t be permitted to enter Azerbaijan, including the Armenian-controlled part of the contested Nagorno-Karabakh region.

But following the hostilities of 2020, the internationally recognized Armenia-Azerbaijan border also deserves close attention. Several serious clashes resulting in numerous casualties have occurred there as Baku seeks to demonstrate what could be in store for Yerevan if Armenia doesn’t sign a peace agreement on Azerbaijan’s terms.

The EU mission scheduled to be deployed in the next month is modest in size and powers, consisting of just 100 unarmed monitors. That said, they are to stay for two years, which will likely prove decisive for the future of the region. The EU mission will be winding down in 2025, at about the same time the fate of the 2,000-strong Russian peacekeeping mission in Nagorno-Karabakh will be decided. 

Yerevan considers the EU involvement a major diplomatic victory, since if the situation at the border escalates again and Azerbaijan attacks internationally recognized Armenian territory, it will need an independent party to corroborate that.

Yerevan needs outside monitors because despite their alliance obligations to Armenia, Russia and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) have repeatedly refused to take on this role, taking a demonstratively neutral stance on the border conflict and refusing to confirm or deny the occupation of Armenian territory. 

At the same time, pro-government analysts in Azerbaijan make no bones about the real reasons behind these escalations: Baku needs them to force Yerevan to sign a peace agreement on Azerbaijan’s terms. The Azerbaijani authorities and public see nothing wrong with such tactics: after all, Armenia previously occupied far more of its enemy’s territory than Azerbaijan is doing right now.

In this context, cooperation with the EU is a rare opportunity for Yerevan to strengthen its positions. The first, almost symbolic European mission arrived in the conflict zone after the Armenia-Azerbaijan summit in Prague last October. More of a consolation prize for the Armenian side, it consisted of just forty monitors and lasted for two months.

Back then, Yerevan and Baku were discussing the possibility of formulating a peace agreement by the end of 2022, and the presence of European monitors was meant to give more confidence to the Armenians. But with no quick agreement in sight and the European monitors leaving in December that year, Yerevan began to worry that border skirmishes that left 197 troops dead last September might be repeated.

Despite Azerbaijan’s disagreement, Armenia managed to convince the EU to deploy another monitoring mission to the region, this time consisting of 100 monitors for two years. The Azerbaijani blockade of the Lachin Corridor from Armenia to Karabakh that has been in place since the end of last year was likely an additional factor in Brussels’ decision. 

Turning two months of breathing space into two years is a considerable success for the Armenians. After all, it is Baku that is urging the signing of a peace agreement, while Yerevan has always tried to postpone any decision in the hope of getting better terms in the future.

While Moscow is losing Armenia’s trust through its unwillingness to pressure Azerbaijan, it makes sense for the European Union to increase its presence in the region. The new mission of 100 monitors is not the boldest move Brussels could make, but it’s sufficient to fuel pro-Western sentiment in Armenia. The EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell has openly called the mission “a new phase of EU engagement in the South Caucasus.”

Moscow’s reaction was predictable. The Russian Foreign Ministry accused the EU of carrying out U.S. policy that “can only bring geopolitical confrontation and escalate existing disagreements in the region.” Moscow’s statement also contained a veiled threat that the Russian border troops deployed to the Armenian border since 1992 “will react to the behavior of the EU monitors considering the developments on the ground.”

In fact, Russian border troops had plenty of chances to react to the situation on the ground last September, but they chose not to. The Armenian Defense Ministry claims that a Russian border post was damaged in the shooting, and media published photos appearing to prove those claims, but the Russian authorities deny the allegations. 

Like Moscow, the EU cannot be completely unbiased in its dealings in the South Caucasus. The Europeans will keep in mind the volatility of their gas and oil markets following reduced shipments from Russia. If the need arises, Azerbaijan could supply the required volumes (in fact, it could even be Russian gas that Baku would resell, or Russian oil products refined in Azerbaijan: a scheme recently exempted from sanctions).

Nevertheless, the EU could become a more reliable advocate for Armenia, and not just out of humanitarian and legal considerations. The EU mission is yet another opportunity to sideline Moscow in the South Caucasus. At the end of last year, Russia and the West each put forward their own peace agreement proposal to the parties to the conflict. Armenia preferred the Russian draft, since it postponed the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh question, while Azerbaijan gravitated toward the West’s proposal. If the EU ends up securing relative peace for Armenia and corroborates Azerbaijan’s border encroachments, it will be undeniable that Russia is not the only force Yerevan can rely on.

Work on the peace agreement has now slowed. The Armenians believe—not without reason—that it would be imprudent to make such a critical decision while the world is preoccupied with Ukraine. The West and Russia may offer the South Caucasus something new once they free up their resources.

Armenia hopes that the world will be more predictable in two years’ time: that the Ukraine conflict may have deescalated, and that Turkey may have entered a period of greater stability, regardless of whether President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wins the upcoming elections.

Of course, these hopes can hardly be described as a well thought-out strategy, but Armenia has long learned not to make far-reaching plans. In November and December, the presence of just forty European observers helped to reduce shooting and avoid the need to make new concessions. The chances are that that might just work again.