From the vantage point of 2024, recent relations between Russia and Taiwan look like a distant dream. Although bilateral ties were never a priority for Moscow or Taipei, senior delegations from both sides had exchanged visits, and visa requirements for tourists were abolished.
Today, Russia’s unprecedented dependence on China prevents Moscow from even thinking about its relations with Taipei, while Taiwan, for its part, has no desire to cultivate any such ties: on the contrary, it has used the Ukraine war to draw attention to the threat posed by mainland China. Still, it is too soon to write off bilateral relations entirely.
The relationship between Russia and Taiwan is relatively new, dating back to perestroika. Any prior connection was hindered by ideological disagreements: fighting communism was the foreign policy priority for Taiwan’s ruling Kuomintang party.
A Russian presidential decree on relations between the two countries was signed by Boris Yeltsin in 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even then, it quickly became clear that Moscow had no intention of sacrificing stability in its relations with mainland China for the benefits of friendship with Taiwan. The decree emphasized that relations with Taipei were unofficial. Still, the cautious step toward Taiwan promised economic advantages for Russia, as the island was at that time experiencing a golden era of development.
In the mid-1990s, Taipei and Moscow exchanged official representations, which de facto functioned as embassies. Two-way visits commenced, and in 1995, then mayor of Taipei (and future Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian) visited St. Petersburg, where he met with then deputy mayor Vladimir Putin. Russian theaters toured Taiwan, and Russian students and academics completed internships on the island.
Political contacts at that time developed spontaneously, without a clearly defined strategy. The driving force behind the relationship was primarily economic: in 1992–1995 alone, trade turnover grew from $360 million to $1.8 billion and reached $3.6 billion by 2008.
The growing trade with Taiwan did not alter Moscow’s commitment to the One China principle. Russia supported China’s 2005 anti-secession law, and torpedoed all Taiwanese attempts to regain membership in the UN, WHO, and other international organizations.
Yet that didn’t affect economic relations with Taipei. Following a slight drop caused by the 2008 global financial crisis, Russian-Taiwanese trade kept growing, reaching $4.9 billion in 2014, largely thanks to a rise in Russian hydrocarbon shipments.
This rosy picture began to gradually deteriorate after 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Political contact between Russia and Taiwan virtually ceased, and economically, the island had to reckon with the Western sectoral sanctions against Russia. The “Pivot to the East” announced by the Kremlin at that time did not yield any dividends for Taipei. Instead, it was Beijing that reaped the benefits of the Russian economy’s growing isolation.
Despite this, some positive trends persisted. By 2018, bilateral trade had adapted to the sanctions and risen to $5.3 billion thanks to an increase in Russian exports. That same year, Taiwanese authorities waived visa requirements for Russian tourists. As a result, in 2019 nearly 15,000 Russians visited Taiwan: a fivefold increase on the previous year. Taiwanese nationals, meanwhile, were able to visit Russia on an electronic visa.
The more time passed, however, the more dependent bilateral ties became on external circumstances. Locked in a strategic confrontation with Beijing, Taipei is pursuing a course of closer alignment with the West, while Russia has accelerated its movement in the opposite direction, progressively elevating its relations with mainland China to an “unprecedentedly high level” year by year.
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine conclusively put Taipei and Moscow on opposite geopolitical fronts. Immediately after the start of the war, Taipei expressed unequivocal support for Ukraine and pledged to join Western sanctions. In response, Russia included Taiwan in its list of “unfriendly countries and territories.”
When it comes to sanctions, however, Taiwan shows little initiative, preferring to follow the lead of the United States and its allies. In April 2022, the island restricted the export of high-tech products to Russia, including integrated circuits, chips, and electronics. This particular measure prevents Russia from purchasing its domestically designed Baikal processor, which is produced by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company.
Sanctions were then expanded in January and December 2023. Taiwan’s economic authorities committed to stricter control over the export of industrial equipment, chemical products, and dual-use goods to Russia and Belarus.
Still, imposing sanctions is one thing, and closely monitoring their implementation is another. In January 2024, a joint investigation by Taiwanese publication The Reporter and Russia’s The Insider revealed that Russia continues to import Taiwanese machinery and processing centers, despite all prohibitions.
Up to 50 percent of the banned equipment reaches Russia through Turkey, with the rest arriving through mainland China and other countries. As a result, Russia remains one of the largest buyers of machinery from Taiwan, with some of it destined for military-industrial complex enterprises. On February 3, Taiwanese authorities drastically increased the size of fines for violating sanctions against Russia, but it remains to be seen how efficiently the law will be implemented.
On the political front, the island authorities still refrain from making hostile statements concerning Moscow, other than occasional criticism of the Kremlin’s adherence to the One China principle. In November 2023, the experienced diplomat Luo Jingru was appointed head of the Taipei-Moscow Commission in the Russian capital, indicating Taipei’s desire to continue to develop bilateral relations.
Moscow’s representative in Taiwan since the end of 2021 has been Yury Metelev, the former deputy head of Russia’s cultural outreach organization Rossotrudnichestvo. It cannot be said that he had to deal with any real backlash after the start of the war in Ukraine.
There is no significant anti-Russian sentiment on the island. While dozens of Taiwanese participated in anti-Russian protests after the beginning of hostilities—primarily due to fears that Taiwan could suffer the same fate as Ukraine through its confrontation with mainland China—they soon lost interest.
The Taiwanese education department continues to grant scholarships for its universities to Russians; Russia studies programs are still in place; and the Russian service of Radio Taiwan International is still broadcasting.
None of that prevents the island’s authorities from aiding Ukraine. Taiwan has sent various humanitarian aid, from blankets, clothing, and food to ambulances.
While opportunities for cooperation between Russia and Taiwan have noticeably decreased, Taipei is not trying to sever all ties with Moscow and preemptively align with Western sanctions. In East Asia, the Russia-Ukraine conflict seems far, far away. Taiwan is no exception, and so in some situations, it is prepared to turn a blind eye to violations of export restrictions. Both Moscow and Taipei will likely try to maintain relations at their current level.
