While there is a long list of candidates in Moldova’s October presidential election, there are no serious challengers to the incumbent president, Maia Sandu. Most of the pro-EU Sandu’s opponents are linked to Russia in one way or another, though it would be inaccurate to call all of them Russia cheerleaders. Amid the war in Ukraine, many of them have toned down their rhetoric and try to hide their contacts with Moscow.
The Kremlin does not appear to have picked a favorite, but it’s possible that Russian officials will provide post-election support to a candidate who does well. Moldova has parliamentary elections next year, which are far more important in determining the country’s future.
Despite the war in neighboring Ukraine and weakening support for Russia in Moldova, the essence of the upcoming presidential elections remains about geopolitics: those who want closer ties to the European Union versus those who want a good relationship with Moscow.
Of all the candidates, only those supported by exiled oligarch Ilan Shor are openly pro-Russian. Despite Shor being banned from standing in the elections over financial violations, those loyal to him are campaigning hard, trying to persuade Moldovans that joining the EU is the first step to NATO membership, which will ultimately lead to Moldovans being sent off to fight NATO’s wars. Shor is supported by Moscow. According to Moldovan police, about $15 million was transferred from Russia in September alone, and then funneled to around 130,000 Moldovans.
Convicted in Moldova of stealing over $1 billion of state money, Shor did not immediately win Moscow’s trust. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, he has proved able to organize opposition protests in Moldova and even win some regional elections for pro-Russian candidates. As a result, Moscow seems to have embraced the oligarch.
Shor himself cannot run in presidential elections because of his criminal conviction, reputation as a fraudster, and unpopularity. Accordingly, Moscow was expected to back former president Igor Dodon, leader of the Party of Socialists, against Sandu. But Dodon’s party instead decided to put forward the more moderate, less pro-Russian Alexandr Stoianoglo.
For Russian officials, Stoianoglo is an unknown quantity. He was made prosecutor general in 2019 only to be removed on corruption charges after Sandu came to power. Stoianoglo took his case to the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that his right to a fair trial had been violated. Ever since, he has enjoyed a reputation as an honest official who suffered unfairly at the hands of Moldova’s pro-EU government.
It’s difficult to know what the Kremlin made of the Party of Socialists’ decision to nominate Stoianoglo instead of Dodon. Stoianoglo has never been seen as an openly pro-Russian figure, and he supports Moldova’s integration with the EU. In recent months, he’s condemned the war in Ukraine and said that Crimea and the eastern Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and Donetsk are under Russian occupation. On the other hand, Stoianoglo stresses that good relations with Russia are important, and concedes that Moldova is dependent on Russian energy exports.
For the moment, the Kremlin apparently prefers to stand back and consider its options. It appears to be looking at Stoianoglo, as well as all the other candidates who are calling for a normalization of relations with Russia.
One of those candidates is Irina Vlah, the former head of Moldova’s autonomous southern region of Gagauzia. While Vlah is running as an independent, she has traditionally been pro-Russian, and has been to Moscow many times. Now, however, Vlah says she is not opposed to EU integration. Her election campaign so far has focused on criticizing Sandu, whom she accuses of dragging Moldova into the Ukraine war. She has promised to be a president of peace, and have a referendum on neutrality.
The sources of funding for Vlah’s election campaign are unclear. Informally, she has said she is partially supported by Turkey, which has traditionally been an ally of the Gagauz people, a Turkic ethnic group. Yet Ankara has good relations with the current Moldovan leadership, and it seems unlikely that it would be financing Sandu’s opponents. Tellingly, Vlah has visited Moscow several times since the start of the fighting in Ukraine (even posting a photo with a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin). Photos have also emerged of Vlah meeting with representatives of Shor, who apparently promised to help her collect enough signatures to register as a presidential candidate.
Despite her efforts, Vlah is not polling at more than 6 percent, which means she stands little chance of reaching a second round runoff. That sort of result would be enough, however, to use as a launchpad for parliamentary elections.
The presidential candidate from the Future of Moldova party, Vasile Tarlev, is also running on a platform of friendship with Russia. In the early 2000s, Tarlev served as prime minister under the communist president Vladimir Voronin, and has since headed a group called “Friends of Russia in Moldova.”
In the current campaign, Tarlev is seen as Shor’s protégé. The oligarch has effectively taken control of the little-known Revival party founded by Tarlev in 2012. After Shor’s party was banned, many of its members joined Revival. Tarlev himself visits Moscow regularly, and has been seen among those close to Shor. However, his chances of getting a decent result are minimal: he’s currently polling under 2 percent.
Other presidential candidates include the head of Our Party, Renato Usatîi (polling at 6.8 percent); former prime minister Ion Chicu, who has been nominated by the Party of Development and Consolidation of Moldova (polling at 3 percent); and journalist Natalia Morari (polling under 1 percent). In the past, all of them have had contacts with the Russian elite, but there’s no evidence they’re being directly assisted by the Kremlin this time.
Even if the election does go to a second round, Sandu is still expected to win. She’s currently supported by about 40 percent of Moldovans, which is more than all her opponents combined. However, the electoral battle will not end with the presidential vote, and the parliamentary elections in 2025 are of greater long-term political significance. The nature of Moldova’s ties with Russia are likely to be front and center in that vote, too.
Even those political parties that get around 6 percent in the parliamentary elections can form their own factions in the legislature, and if pro-Russian forces are able to boost their representation in parliament, it will be much harder for Sandu to form a new government committed to moving forward with EU integration. The biggest challenges for Moldova’s pro-EU politicians are still ahead.
