Ukraine’s continued drone attacks on Russian oil refineries have rocked not only Russia’s fuel market, but also those of Central Asia. While those countries have their own oil production and refining capacity, for decades it has been both easier and cheaper for them to purchase processed fuel from Russia. Now that the old model is no longer working, the clock is ticking to solve the problem before a full-scale fuel shortage occurs.

The fuel export restrictions imposed by Russia in April 2026 due to Ukraine’s strikes swiftly impacted Central Asian markets. Retail gasoline prices in dollar terms rose by 15–25 percent year on year, depending on the country. As in Russia, the fuel shortage has created additional risks for agriculture ahead of the fall harvest. Uninterrupted supplies of diesel fuel are particularly important during this period.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are trying to offset the decline in imports by ramping up their own refining capacity. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have far fewer options, as their refining capacity is minimal. Both countries have already turned to China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus for potential assistance. 

Problems have also spread to the aviation fuel market. Looking for new suppliers is no easy task amid rising global prices and tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. In June, shortages and the rising cost of jet fuel forced Uzbekistan Airways to reduce the frequency of flights on a number of routes to Russia.

For Central Asian governments, fuel shortages are more than just an economic problem—they are a significant political risk. Energy-related issues—ranging from fuel and electricity shortages to rising utility rates—have often sparked mass protests and escalated into political crises, including the January 2022 protests in Kazakhstan, discontent with the government during the unusually cold winter of 2022–2023 in Uzbekistan, the 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and social tension in Tajikistan.

Even Turkmenistan, which is rich in its own resources and not dependent on Russian supplies, has faced chronic fuel shortages for years. A significant portion of petroleum product production is geared toward export, but there is not always enough fuel for the domestic market. 

When faced with fuel shortages in the past, Central Asian governments could always count on additional supplies from Moscow to alleviate the economic and political strain. That safety net no longer exists, and the source of the problem is now Russia itself.

Ukraine launched its campaign of strikes against Russian oil refineries two and a half years ago, so Central Asian countries have had time to build up fuel reserves and prepare for disruptions. However, the idea that Russia—the main supplier of cheap fuel for decades—could itself face a shortage probably seemed like a stretch to local elites. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan drew additional confidence from their membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which grants them duty-free access to Russian gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel, and marine fuel.

It is now becoming clear just how risky this dependence was. In Kyrgyzstan, more than 90 percent of the gasoline consumed comes from Russia. Due to a shortage of raw materials, existing mini-refineries are unable to produce sufficient volumes of fuel. Amid Russia’s fuel crisis, the Kyrgyz authorities have announced plans to build a new oil refinery in partnership with China. But if there isn’t enough raw material for existing facilities, what will power the new plant?

Tajikistan is an illustrative example in this regard. In 2024, the relatively large Dangara Oil Refinery, with a capacity of 1.2 million tons of crude oil per year—also built in partnership with Chinese investors—began trial operations. However, the project cannot operate at full capacity due to a shortage of feedstock. Fuel supplies from Russia were also a longtime lifeline for the country. In 2025, Russia accounted for 84 percent of Tajikistan’s petroleum product imports.

The larger economies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also purchased Russian fuel. Dependence was particularly high for certain types of petroleum products: Russian supplies accounted for about 40 percent of jet fuel consumption in Kazakhstan, and more than a quarter of gasoline consumption in Uzbekistan. 

Kazakhstan’s oil refineries, built during the Soviet era, require constant upgrades and regularly face production constraints. The Shymkent refinery has faced a shortage of feedstock in recent years due to its historical dependence on the Kumkol Group fields, whose reserves are gradually being depleted. The Pavlodar refinery depends on Russian oil from western Siberia, which creates additional risks amid the war in Ukraine. The Atyrau Refinery, although located closest to Kazakhstan’s Tengiz and Kashagan fields, periodically reduces production due to maintenance work. Kazakhstan has covered the annual shortfall through imports from Russia, purchasing up to 1.5 million tons of petroleum products.

A similar situation has arisen in Uzbekistan. The Ferghana, Altyaryk, and Bukhara oil refineries have a combined annual refining capacity of up to 11 million tons of crude oil, but due to a shortage of feedstock in recent years, their utilization rate has not exceeded 60 percent. Tashkent purchased more than 500,000 tons of gasoline from Russia annually and was prepared to increase the volume of these shipments. These imports were supported by an intergovernmental agreement on the supply of crude oil and petroleum products.

Russian fuel underpinned not only domestic markets, but also an informal system of regional mutual assistance. Central Asian countries often purchased more Russian fuel than they needed and, when a shortage hit one of their neighbors, resold a portion of the fuel they had received. In 2025, Kazakhstan supplied about 120,000 tons of motor fuel to Uzbekistan. Similar resale arrangements existed between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Even at the height of the crisis, Moscow formally maintained exemptions from its fuel export ban for Central Asian countries. Intergovernmental agreements remain in effect. In practice, however, this changes little: Russia has no surplus fuel, which means it can no longer fulfill its commitments.

Russia’s fuel crisis has exposed yet another problem in Central Asia: Shared risks still fail to compel the region’s countries to act in unison. Kazakhstan, for instance, has focused on increasing its own production. The government is requiring oil producers to divert more raw materials to the domestic market to maximize utilization at national refineries. The effect of this measure so far appears negligible. Even at KazMunayGas, the country’s largest energy company, supplies of oil and gas condensate to the domestic market only rose from 8.3 million to 8.7 million tons between 2023 and 2025.

The government has also restricted the transport of fuel by rail to prevent re-export, and foreigners coming to Kazakhstan for cheaper gasoline—primarily residents of Russian regions bordering Kazakhstan—may no longer take fuel out of the country in jerry cans. 

Astana, likely betting on supplies from China, has also eliminated import duties on fuel from countries outside the EAEU for one year. In the long term, the authorities plan to construct a fourth major refinery, but that will still take at least four years to bring online.

Uzbekistan is also trying to bring its refineries up to full capacity, but its capabilities are limited. In 2023, the country—which had previously exported natural gas—became a net importer of the fuel. To prevent shortages, Tashkent is gradually phasing out state price controls in favor of market-based pricing. The government is also building up a winter reserve of 120,000 tons of gasoline. However, with consumption exceeding 100,000 tons of gasoline per month, that reserve will last only a few weeks.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are in the biggest bind. Without their own large-scale production facilities, they must seek fuel abroad. China has already agreed to supply Kyrgyzstan with 3,000 tons of jet fuel and may supply another 5,000 tons of diesel. However, the volume of Chinese aid is a drop in the bucket compared to Kyrgyzstan’s fuel consumption: some 125,000 tons per month.

Even if Beijing decides to support every Central Asian country in need of fuel, rapidly increasing supplies will prove a challenge. Only Kazakhstan has a direct rail link with China. Fuel would have to be delivered to other countries in the region via Kazakhstan’s territory or by road, which has significantly lower capacity. The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway could partially solve the problem, but its construction is incomplete.

Stable alternative supply chains via neighboring countries require coordinated trade rules, well-developed transportation infrastructure, and additional agreements on tariffs, routes, and customs procedures, which would take time. The region faces major hurdles in these areas. Turkmenistan has significant oil refining capacity, but the isolated country is poorly integrated into the regional economy. There are no direct transport corridors from Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, so fuel would have to be transported through Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. Exports of petroleum products are channeled through the State Commodity and Raw Materials Exchange, which slows down the process.

Azerbaijan, which has been strengthening its ties with Central Asia in recent years, could become an alternative fuel supplier for the region. However, the Caspian Sea lies between them, making it more difficult to establish a reliable supply chain than it would be by land.

Currently, freight transport is provided by the Baku–Aktau (Kazakhstan) and Baku–Turkmenbashi (Turkmenistan) ferry routes, which are part of the Middle Corridor system. Yet their capacity is limited by a shortage of vessels, underdeveloped port infrastructure, and poor connections between Caspian ports and the region’s rail networks. 

None of the alternative routes can replace Russian supplies in the near future. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, there is no reason to expect a rapid resumption of those supplies. The countries in the region therefore have two options: expand their own refining capacity or learn to reach agreements with one another.

Not everyone has the necessary resources for the first option, and as for the second option, despite constant statements about their growing rapprochement, a common regional plan to address shared challenges has yet to emerge. Russia’s fuel crisis is proof that, even in the face of a shared risk, each country still insists on acting alone.