The war in Ukraine has sterilized domestic politics within Russia, making elections an empty ritual propelled by inertia. But even in these circumstances, the upcoming elections for the State Duma this week have created significant difficulties for the Russian regime.

Given the scale of the country’s mounting problems, the Kremlin’s political bloc has done everything within its power to ensure the elections go ahead with minimal fuss and drama. The ballot papers have been purged of the opposition as far as possible, and the remaining candidates have been careful not to raise any contentious issues during the campaign. All of this is being done to make sure that the only people who turn out to vote will be those who depend on the state and who can therefore be counted on to provide the required result.

But the political bloc’s efforts are being undermined by a parallel campaign being waged by none other than President Vladimir Putin, who insists on talking about the war, the sacrifices required for that war, and his perception of the country’s economic woes, which is very different to that of the average Russian. The president is not only attracting unnecessary attention to the elections; he is sowing doubt that the government’s response to the country’s mounting problems is sufficient. 

The task of the Kremlin’s political bloc, led by first deputy chief of staff Sergei Kiriyenko, is quite clear: United Russia must retain its constitutional majority (at least 300 of the 450 seats in the State Duma), which enables it to pass any legislation regardless of the position of other parliamentary factions. Despite the socio-economic crisis in which the country finds itself, that goal is technically perfectly feasible.

Half of the deputies are elected under the single-mandate district system, in which voters choose a specific candidate. This time around, the presidential administration has reportedly cut the number of districts that will effectively be ceded to the “in-system” opposition—the other parties represented in the State Duma—to sixteen. Those other parties themselves have refrained from putting forward certain strong candidates who won in the 2021 elections. Taking into account the administrative resources at its disposal, United Russia is therefore likely to take more than 200 single-mandate seats (it won 198 back in 2021).

The rest of the seats United Russia needs can be won under the party list system—it would only need about 40 percent of the vote. The political bloc can achieve that by mobilizing voters who depend on the state for their livelihood. This time around, the pressure has been ramped up, including via electronic voting: People are scared that the authorities can see whom they have voted for via this system, so may vote for the ruling party just to be on the safe side. 

The other part of this task is to stop Russians with independent or opposition views from voting. The political bloc’s strategy in this respect has been to make the election campaign as dull and devoid of substance as possible.

This approach was tried and tested by the Kremlin under Kiriyenko’s predecessor, Vyacheslav Volodin, back in the early 2010s. But then the low turnout stopped suiting Putin, who wanted to see a broader expression of popular support. After the 2016 Duma elections, when fewer than half of eligible voters turned out, Volodin was replaced by Kiriyenko, who set about mobilizing the electorate en masse.

Following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, record results were seen at the presidential election: Officially, Putin got 87.3 percent of the vote with a turnout of 77.5 percent. These implausibly high figures met no resistance from the public, shocked by the start of the war but yet to run into economic problems. 

Now the situation is different. People are worried by the war, rising prices, the gasoline crisis, and another possible mobilization. The prevailing public mood is one of anxiety.

To minimize turnout among independent voters who might be tempted to express their concern at the ballot box, the campaigns of United Russia and the other in-system parties were supposed to be unobtrusive, without upsetting people by using pro-war slogans. 

Manifestos and slogans were made as vague as possible, and the parties’ fundraising efforts were lackluster, with accordingly low spending on campaigning. At the same time, the authorities tried to reassure the public: Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, for example, said that putting the economy onto a wartime footing would be unnecessary and harmful.

With such a low-key campaign, the political bloc would no doubt have easily achieved its target—if it hadn’t been for Putin himself.

At United Russia’s party congress in June, Putin talked a lot about the war and geopolitics, and noticeably less about social problems. Then he embarked on a tour of Siberia and the Far East that in many ways resembled an election campaign tour. In a departure from a typical campaign tour, however, the president made few promises, and focused more on geopolitics and his favorite topic: the war. While visiting Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, Putin donned a military uniform and threatened the West.

Meanwhile, the president had his own take on the country’s socio-economic problems. He referred to gasoline shortages that have led to fighting at the pumps as “certain inconveniences,” and additional business levies as “voluntary contributions.” Instead of proposing solutions to problems, he is dismissing them as unimportant, and openly stating that the needs of ordinary people are secondary to those of the state.

This approach stems from Putin’s confidence that all that is needed to boost United Russia’s ratings is for him to show himself to his loyal people. On August 22, during the second stage of the United Russia congress, the president effectively said that the Duma elections would be a referendum on support for the country’s course. Putin does not see this as a risky proposition because he is confident in what he believes is his adoring public. 

These two very different campaigns were never going to be compatible. The president’s public activity and his constant focus on the war are at direct odds with the aims of Kremlin officials, who found themselves caught between a war-weary public and a president who is determined to keep fighting and who demands public support for his chosen path.

United Russia would have benefited from Putin appearing as its patron, far removed from the elections and any campaigning. As an active frontman imposing his views on the public, he has done nothing but harm both the party and the ruling system as a whole.