Russia’s friends in Europe seem to be gaining momentum. Alternative for Germany (AfD) has had a good spell lately, coming first in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania state elections with about 40 percent of the vote. Even in the traditionally left-leaning Berlin, it almost doubled its results to 16 percent. With the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) suffering one setback after the other, Chancellor Friedrich Merz is fighting for survival. CDU voters are defecting to AfD: a party which calls, among other things, for curtailing military and financial aid to Ukraine and rapprochement with Russia—in the name of peace.

Germany is not alone. As Europe braces itself for a year of scores of crucial elections, anti-systemic parties are on the rise. In France, National Rally’s Marine Le Pen is in a strong position to win the 2027 presidential race. Vox is closing the gap with Partido Popular on Spain’s right, ahead of a cycle of local, regional, and national elections.

In Italy, Roberto Vannacci’s newly founded National Future will likely perform robustly in the forthcoming polls too. He is challenging Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whom he accuses of having betrayed the far-right agenda, and is pushing a similar line as AfD on Russia and Ukraine. In Vannacci’s telling, he is not “pro-Putin” but “pro-Italian” and “pro-European.”

It is tempting to blame the rise of illiberal parties and politicians on Russia. Populists and nativists share President Vladimir Putin’s “anti-woke” views, campaigning against the alleged civilizational erasure caused by unrestrained migration, and pushing for the curtailment of LGBTQ and green issues. They are also all too happy to abandon Ukraine.

However, their growing popularity is linked to their ability to exploit genuine economic grievances and cultural anxieties and connect to voters on social media. Russia’s machinations play, at best, a secondary role. What influence campaigns usually do is amplify social cleavages and feed resentment in order to disrupt established order from within. But the choice—as well as the responsibility it entails—lies squarely with the voters in a given democracy, be that France, Germany, the United States, Greece (where a Russia-friendly coalition of the far right and far left won power in 2015), or anywhere else.

It is also important to consider that insurgents’ policies and views evolve, especially when they get elected. That has been the case with Meloni in Italy, who became a staunch backer of Ukraine and Western unity after her Brothers of Italy won in 2022.

In the same vein, National Rally (RN) has moved to the center on many issues, including EU integration and Russia policy, under Marine Le Pen, and especially her successor as the party’s leader, Jordan Bardella. Both Le Pen and Bardella have accused Russia of using threats and destabilization to try to dictate French policy, although Bardella also pushed for France not to sign off on a 90 billion euro package to Ukraine.

Thus far, AfD has been the exception. It sticks to its extreme positions and, all things considered, that strategy is working for it. But in the longer term, the party would possibly have to tack to the center in order to attract disgruntled CDU voters, particularly outside its east German turf, and to dismantle the proverbial firewall (Brandmauer) agreed upon by other parties against entering into a coalition with AfD.

Ironically enough, AfD’s hardcore pro-Russian stance puts a lid on its numbers. If it adopted a more neutral line, the party would draw in even more disgruntled CDU voters who might share its conservative views but are no fans of Putin and Russia. So long as it fails to overtake the Christian Democrats in western Germany, AfD has no path to power at the federal level.

Yet even if no major European country dramatically changes its foreign policy, Russia could score points by default. The EU, otherwise adept at muddling through, could well be hamstrung by discord. French-German relations are already in bad shape because of poor personal chemistry at the top, as well as structural divergence. A president Le Pen pushing “France First” policies would make things even worse by inhibiting efforts to build a more coherent defense and security capacity at the European level.

Assistance to Ukraine would continue to flow but in lower volumes, with fiscal constraints used as an excuse. Enlargement would also be put on hold. To join the EU, Ukraine needs to have its treaty ratified by a four-fifths majority in the French legislature or a referendum. That’s already a high threshold under a pro-European leadership in Paris, let alone with the RN calling the shots.

Calls to lift at least some of the economic sanctions on Russia would multiply, with the high cost of energy providing the rationale. And European companies in other sectors such as retail might lobby their governments, fearing that their U.S. competitors might reenter the Russian market first with the blessing of the White House.

Of course, the above scenario might not materialize in full. The continuing war limits the potential for rapprochement. But the populist turn helps Russia in another negative way too. It compromises Europe’s defenses and allows Moscow to play hardball.

The likes of AfD have power over agenda-setting. They direct attention to issues such as migration, away from the threat posed by Russia. In turn, policymakers are struggling to mobilize societies that do not take sufficient interest in foreign policy (with the exception of Russia’s neighbors such as the Baltics, where Russia obviously looms large).

Thus, German voters appear to have disregarded the drones discovered at Leipzig airport. If the threat is not high in the public mind, Russia has more scope for hybrid operations aimed at disruption and subversion.

Germany is not the only example. Bulgaria, where the government is taking a Russia-friendly line that mirrors AfD’s positions, has proven a soft target too. In short, politics is undercutting deterrence policy.

The European far right might not be Putin’s friends. They might even fail to steer the EU policy in the direction Russia wants. Yet they will create enough chaos inside Europe to effectively neuter whatever geopolitical ambitions they might have. That is certainly not a bad outcome from the Kremlin’s perspective.