Source: Carnegie

Originally published May 3, 2004 in the Orlando Sentinel .

Somewhere amid lingering concerns about anti-coalition violence, reconstruction costs, oil and weapons of mass destruction, the United States lost sight of the most important component of Iraqi reconstruction: the tense interplay between religion and politics.

In Iraq, Islamic political parties are essential for stability given their unmatched popular followings. The Bush administration acknowledges that the sovereign Iraqi government slated to take over power on June 30 will have a distinctly religious character. But that doesn't mean Iranian-style theocratic rule, nor does it necessarily prevent a vibrant, pluralistic political system.

Yet, if religious parties mirror their constituents, victorious parties will be suspicious of, or even hostile to, the United States. Thus, a truly representative government will test President Bush's faith in Arab democracy. Tolerating an anti-American, but potentially pro-democratic, regime is risky. Nevertheless, it may offer Washington's best long-term bet for fostering democracy in the Middle East.

Most religious parties fall into one of three very different categories: parties that accept the democratic process, those that are ambivalent toward democracy and groups that are openly hostile to representative government. Whichever model emerges as dominant will shape Iraq's new political order.

American policy-makers obviously prefer that an unabashedly pro-democratic religious party govern Iraq. Though most common in the Western Hemisphere, these parties exist worldwide. Prominent pro-democratic religious parties include Mexico's National Action Party, Germany's Christian Democratic Union and, as of late, Turkey's Justice and Development Party.

Though inspired by religious belief, pro-democratic religious parties primarily want to win elections. They rarely have formal affiliations with religious institutions, though religious leaders may influence party behavior. Sometimes they exhibit hostility toward aspects of representative government, but they accept elections as both legitimate and binding. It is highly unlikely that pro-democratic parties would refuse to give up power in accordance with election results. Unfortunately, Iraq's chaotic political environment hardly favors religious parties that champion liberal democracy.

Ambivalent religious parties, such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Dawa, exhibit a more tenuous commitment to representative government. Their strength stems from extensive organizational infrastructures backed by large mass followings. Like secular and pro-democratic religious parties, these groups influence policy through mass mobilization and participate in elections. But it is unclear whether these parties would relinquish power once in control. Ambivalent parties' populist religious messages present alluring alternatives to the harsh realities of everyday life in Iraq. Encouragingly, SCIRI and Dawa have generally worked with the coalition so far. Both these groups, however, possess paramilitary forces and have used political violence in the past. If either were to cast their lot against democracy, the ensuing conflict could rip Iraq's frail social fabric.

Luckily, pragmatism often triumphs over radicalism. Many formerly ambivalent parties have cast aside their doubts about Islam's compatibility with democracy to participate in free and fair elections. Turkey's ruling Development and Justice Party, for example, has moderated substantially since gaining power in the 2002 polls.

The most dangerous type, anti-democratic religious parties—such as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya (Egypt) and Sipah-e-Sahaba (Pakistan)—also want to control the state. American forces learned the threat posed by anti-democratic parties the hard way: from a bloody uprising led by militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army. These radical groups aren't interested in electoral politics. Instead, they seek power through violent acts or massive protests and thrive in chaotic environments. Often these groups amount to little more than religiously inspired terrorist groups that desire state power to forcibly impose a theocratic society.

Responding to anti-democratic parties requires a tripartite approach. Violence must not be rewarded and the coalition must provide physical security to allow democratic discussion. At the same time, U.S. forces must work hard to respect Iraqis' cultural norms. In other words, the coalition needs both more boots and more religious sensitivity on the ground—pronto.

Anti-democratic parties flourish when the government fails. The fate of Iraq's precarious democratic experiment hinges on whether the lives of ordinary Iraqis improve materially. The United States must commit the time, money and labor needed to make that happen.

Encouraging pro-democratic religious parties is no easy task. Even in the best circumstances, elected governments often displease Washington policy makers. But serious commitment to democratization in the Middle East demands no less.

Geoffrey J. Swenson is a Junior Fellow with the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.