George Perkovich
{
"authors": [
"George Perkovich"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Middle East",
"Iran"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy"
]
}Source: Getty
Nuclear Developments in the GCC: Risks and Trends
In the Gulf Yearbook 2007-2008, George Perkovich discusses what is publicly known about GCC intentions and capabilities to acquire nuclear technology and explores how the development a GCC nuclear program would balance Iran's growing power.
Source: Gulf Research Center

Developing a GCC nuclear program is one way to "do something" to balance Iran's growing power. The phrase "nuclear program" is usefully ambiguous. In material terms, it is extremely difficult to imagine the GCC collectively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities to deter Iran. The effects of a GCC "nuclear program" will be ambiguous and muddled, at least for the 10-15 years it would take to develop basic capabilities. Competition for Arab leadership could give nuclear programs in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, and perhaps Algeria, momentum independent of developments in Iran.
If faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, GCC states also would be tempted to rely even more intensively on US protection, which is a double-edged sword. Wanting to multiply their options, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recently have embraced closer defense ties with resurgent Russia. Ultimately, the GCC will mix tactics of balancing and potentially confronting Iran with diplomatic entreaties to encourage Iranian goodwill.
This article was originally published by the Gulf Research Center.
About the Author
Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow
George Perkovich is the Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons and a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program. He works primarily on nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues, and is leading a study on nuclear signaling in the 21st century.
- How to Assess Nuclear ‘Threats’ in the Twenty-First CenturyPaper
- “A House of Dynamite” Shows Why No Leader Should Have a Nuclear TriggerCommentary
George Perkovich
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- Simmering U.S.-Iran Conflict Is Moscow’s Ideal OutcomeCommentary
Ongoing uncertainty in the Middle East allows Moscow to both increase its influence in Tehran and continue to enjoy the financial windfall of higher oil prices.
Nikita Smagin
- Multiple Wars Are Ruining Central Asia’s Efforts to Diversify Its Trade RoutesCommentary
This year’s wars have made alternative routes to transit through Russia no less risky for Central Asian countries.
Galiya Ibragimova
- What Does Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia Mean for Russia?Commentary
Troubled by the growing salience of nuclear debates in East Asia, Moscow has responded in its usual way: with condemnation and threats. But by exacerbating insecurity, Russia is forcing South Korea and Japan to consider radical security options.
James D.J. Brown
- Russia Is Meddling for Meddling’s Sake in the Middle EastCommentary
The Russian leadership wants to avoid a dangerous precedent in which it is squeezed out of Iran by the United States and Israel—and left powerless to respond in any meaningful way.
Nikita Smagin
- The Afghanistan–Pakistan War Poses Awkward Questions for RussiaCommentary
Not only does the fighting jeopardize regional security, it undermines Russian attempts to promote alternatives to the Western-dominated world order.
Ruslan Suleymanov