Nuclear Developments in the GCC: Risks and Trends

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In The Media

Nuclear Developments in the GCC: Risks and Trends

In the Gulf Yearbook 2007-2008, George Perkovich discusses what is publicly known about GCC intentions and capabilities to acquire nuclear technology and explores how the development a GCC nuclear program would balance Iran's growing power.

By George Perkovich

Published on May 1, 2008

Source: Gulf Research Center

The GCC states wish to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Any GCC project inevitably must contract with an established international vendor(s). Potential international suppliers will favor states in which risks of legal liability, economic turmoil, proliferation and political instability are lowest. They would insist on the GCC states' adopting the Additional Protocol. GCC efforts to build local uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities could threaten cooperation.

Developing a GCC nuclear program is one way to "do something" to balance Iran's growing power. The phrase "nuclear program" is usefully ambiguous. In material terms, it is extremely difficult to imagine the GCC collectively seeking to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities to deter Iran. The effects of a GCC "nuclear program" will be ambiguous and muddled, at least for the 10-15 years it would take to develop basic capabilities. Competition for Arab leadership could give nuclear programs in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, and perhaps Algeria, momentum independent of developments in Iran.

If faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, GCC states also would be tempted to rely even more intensively on US protection, which is a double-edged sword. Wanting to multiply their options, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recently have embraced closer defense ties with resurgent Russia. Ultimately, the GCC will mix tactics of balancing and potentially confronting Iran with diplomatic entreaties to encourage Iranian goodwill.

This article was originally published by the Gulf Research Center.

About the Author

George Perkovich

Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow

George Perkovich is the Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons and a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program. He works primarily on nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues, and is leading a study on nuclear signaling in the 21^st century.

Recent Work

Paper
How to Assess Nuclear ‘Threats’ in the Twenty-First Century
- George Perkovich
Commentary
“A House of Dynamite” Shows Why No Leader Should Have a Nuclear Trigger
- George Perkovich

Nuclear Policy Middle East Iran

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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