Governments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania want to ensure that a U.S. military withdrawal would not leave them dangerously exposed to a Russian attack.
Sergejs Potapkins
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A better understanding of the views of non–nuclear-weapon states would provide the next U.S. administration with a serious opportunity to lead the rebuilding of a dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime, explains Deepti Choubey in a new report.
WASHINGTON, Oct 8—If the United States and other countries with nuclear weapons take action toward further disarmament, they hope that countries without them will support additional efforts to prevent the further spread and use of nuclear weapons.
But non–nuclear-weapon states take a different view. Citing the unfulfilled promises of nuclear-weapon states, they declare such a bargain to be unfair and a misreading of the political landscape.
A better understanding of the views of non–nuclear-weapon states would provide the next U.S. administration with a serious opportunity to lead the rebuilding of a dangerously damaged nonproliferation regime, explains Deepti Choubey in a new report.
Through discussions with sixteen foreign ministries of important non–nuclear-weapon states, Choubey provides a “reality check” on the environment in which U.S. officials seek to advance their nonproliferation agenda, offers a step-by-step approach to engage states without weapons, and explains what non–nuclear-weapon states want and how they can maximize their own agenda by responding to positive signals from the United States.
Key recommendations:
The next U.S. administration should:
Non–nuclear-weapon states should:
Choubey concludes:
“On both the nonproliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons, America’s leadership and authority have eroded so far that they have imperiled U.S. national security. There is a way forward, if American policy makers recognize that disarmament is not altruism. Instead, disarmament is vital to U.S. security. Many countries must take corrective action to improve the nonproliferation regime, but the United States has the best capacity to do so. With the alignment of a new U.S. administration, the sheer impact U.S. action can have on the international regime, and the impending 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the United States has a serious opportunity to reclaim its leadership.”
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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