Commentary
Dmitri Trenin
{
"authors": [
"Dmitri Trenin"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Caucasus",
"Russia"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform",
"Economy"
]
}
Source: Getty
In The Media
Medvedev Is Tasked With Modernisation
At some point Putin and Medvedev will have to decide between giving priority to the survival of the current system and accepting Russia's steady marginalization, or supporting modernization by opening up the system and putting its survival at risk.
Published on Jan 6, 2010
Source: Gulf News
Both methods were used to describe the Putin-Medvedev relationship to understand its nature and dynamic, and what it portends for Russia. But observers remain puzzled.
To dismiss Dmitry Medvedev as a mere Putin puppet, a constitutional bridge between Putin's second and third presidential terms, would be both unfair and wrong. Russia's third president has a broader role and a distinct function. Conversely, portraying Putin as "a man from the past," and Medvedev as "a hope for the future," exaggerates the differences between them and omits the more important factors that unite them. A better analytical model is needed.
For all the apparent freshness of Medvedev's recent pronouncements, including his now famous article ‘Go Russia!' which sounded a clarion call for modernisation and liberalism he is borrowing massively from Putin's vocabulary of 2000. This suggests that the issue of modernisation, which lay dormant throughout the fat years of high oil prices, is back on the Kremlin agenda.
In 2008, Medvedev was installed in the Kremlin as part of "Putin's plan," the substantive part of which was known as "Strategy 2020," a blueprint for continued economic growth and diversification. The intervening crisis only made the Kremlin modify and sharpen its plan. And Medvedev is a key agent in its execution.
Putin chose Medvedev carefully, and not only for his unquestionable loyalty, vitally important as that is. Putin, among other things, is a combative nationalist, and he wants Russia to succeed in a world of competing powers. He is certainly conservative, but he is also a self-described moderniser.
As such, he might be compared to Pyotr Stolypin, another conservative prime minister who famously asked for 20 years of peace and quiet mostly from liberals and revolutionaries to transform Russia. Stolypin never got the chance a revolutionary assassinated him in 1911 and neither did Russia, which stumbled into the First World War, leading directly to the collapse of the monarchy and the Bolshevik revolution.
Flavour of consent
Putin wants to finish the job, and much works in his favour. He is the tsar. He has both money, the government's budget and the oligarchs' fortunes, and the coercive power of the state firmly in his hand. He is the arbiter at the top and the trouble-shooter in social conflicts below. His most precious resource is his personal popularity, which adds a flavour of consent to his authoritarian regime.
But none of that is good enough. The 75 per cent of Russians who make up the Putin majority are essentially passive, and seek only the preservation of a paternalistic state. Putin can sit on their support, but cannot ride forward with it. The best and brightest are not there.
Enter Medvedev. His internet-surfing, compassionate, and generally liberal image helps recruit a key constituency those beyond the reach of Putin himself to the Putin plan. Whether the plan succeeds is another matter.
Conservative modernisation is a gamble. To modernise Russia, one must break the stranglehold of corruption, establish accountability, and free the media. At some point, Putin and Medvedev will have to decide. Either they give priority to the survival of the current system and accept Russia's steady marginalisation, or they start opening up the system, putting its survival at risk. Given the weight of geopolitical factors in Russian decision-making, it is difficult to foretell which path they will choose.
Putin is no King Lear. He understands leadership and control, and does not plan to retire. But Medvedev, today's front-office guy, is more of a junior partner than a simple salesperson. He may yet grow in stature and influence, and eventually inherit the store. One thing is clear, though: he does not like raw meat and the taste of blood.
Thus, Putin's governing pact with Medvedev, his trademark creation, is likely to remain in force. Both members need each other. So the real issue is not whether the noises that Putin and Medvedev make suggest real divergence, and a potential for rivalry, but whether there is daylight at the end of the tandem. Or, to put it differently, whether they choose modernisation or marginalisation.
About the Author
Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
- Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space
- What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West RevealedCommentary
Dmitri Trenin
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- Russian Oil Sector Battered but Not Broken by Ukrainian Air AttacksCommentary
If it proves impossible for the Russian authorities to avoid a gasoline deficit, the question then becomes how they will organize the distribution of a scarce resource.
Sergey Vakulenko
- Multiple Wars Are Ruining Central Asia’s Efforts to Diversify Its Trade RoutesCommentary
This year’s wars have made alternative routes to transit through Russia no less risky for Central Asian countries.
Galiya Ibragimova
- Loyal but Powerless: The Downgrading of Russia’s ElitePaper
The ruling elites in contemporary Russia are not a political class, but a community of managers who are not subject to competition or public accountability. The state is becoming an operating apparatus without any internal autonomy.
Alexandra Prokopenko
- What Does Pashinyan’s Parliamentary Victory Mean for Armenia’s Future?Commentary
Pashinyan’s pro-European party has been re-elected with a decisive victory. But the pro-Russian opposition could still slow Armenia’s progress toward peace with Azerbaijan and rapprochement with Europe.
Mikayel Zolyan
- From Sovereigns to Servants. How the War Against Ukraine Reshaped Russia’s EliteBook
How did Putin co-opt Russia’s political and economic elites, ensuring no more than fitful resistance to the regime’s war on Ukraine?
Alexandra Prokopenko
