Disillusioned with the West over Gaza, Arab countries are not only trading more with Russia; they are also more willing to criticize Kyiv.
Ruslan Suleymanov
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}REQUIRED IMAGE
A military campaign against Yemen’s secessionist Southern Movement would only further inflame its supporters and increase support for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Instead a political solution is required that addresses the unresolved problems from the country’s poorly-executed unification in the early 1990s.
WASHINGTON, March 23—Yemen’s secessionist Southern Movement is undergoing a radical transformation that threatens the country’s stability. But a military campaign against the movement would only further inflame its supporters and increase support for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). A political solution is required that addresses the unresolved problems from the country’s poorly-executed unification in the early 1990s, concludes a new paper by Stephen Day.
Key Conclusions:
Policy Recommendations:
“The success of the political effort in the South will require steady, outside pressure and effective mediation, preferably by an Arab leader like Jordan’s late King Hussein, who tried to assist Yemenis in 1994,” writes Day. But “ultimately, the success of such an effort will depend on Yemeni leaders on all sides, and their willingness to tackle problems left unsolved since the 1990s.”
###
NOTES
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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