Having failed to build a team that he can fully trust or establish strong state institutions, Mirziyoyev has become reliant on his family.
Galiya Ibragimova
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This memo offers a baseline assessment of the reform process as it stands a year and a half after the Euromaidan protests and the fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s government.
The Ukraine Reform Monitor provides independent, rigorous assessments of the extent and quality of reforms in Ukraine. The Carnegie Endowment has assembled an independent team of Ukraine-based scholars to analyze reforms in four key areas. To kick off a series of regular publications, this first memo offers a baseline assessment of the reform process as it stands a year and a half after the Euromaidan protests and the fall of Viktor Yanukovych’s government. The monitor is supported in part by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.




Correction: An earlier version of this memo stated that foreign currency deposits were shrinking. This has been changed to foreign currency reserves.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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