Commentary
The truth is that Japan’s government is seeking a degree of reengagement but at a vastly reduced level than under Abe. Most significantly, Japan has shown no willingness to ease sanctions.
James D.J. Brown
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Tokyo-Tehran Ties and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
While Japan is not a party to the Iran nuclear deal, it played an important role in its conclusion and could prove influential in its implementation.
By Cory McKenzie and William Ossoff
Published on May 4, 2016
Source: Diplomat
While Japan is not a party to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), popularly known as “the Iran nuclear deal,” it played an important role in the conclusion of this international agreement and could be influential in its implementation. The global sanctions regime that helped drive Iran to the negotiating table depended upon the participation of major economic players like Japan. In concert with its U.S. ally and the rest of the international community, Japan endured economic costs in pursuit of shared nuclear nonproliferation principles and broader national interests. The JCPOA is an underappreciated example of cooperation between the United States and Japan on this front.
However, as the one-year anniversary of the JCPOA approaches in July, U.S. and Japanese interests are showing signs of divergence. Japan is expanding investment in Iran’s energy sector while the United States remains at odds with Iran over non-nuclear issues. How will Japan’s deepening economic partnership with Iran impact international nonproliferation efforts and the U.S.-Japan Alliance?...
About the Authors
Cory McKenzie
Former Junior Fellow, Asia Program
William Ossoff
Former Junior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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