James M. Acton, Ankit Panda
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Virtual Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Stability
The concept of ‘virtual nuclear abolition’ appeals to the same realist self-help arguments that are normally invoked to explain why nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable.
Source: Chapter
The concept of ‘virtual nuclear abolition’ appeals to the same realist self-help arguments that are normally invoked to explain why nuclear disarmament is neither feasible nor desirable. This chapter explores the conditions under which virtual deterrence would be stable and under which states would have minimal incentives to rearm out of the fear that an adversary might do so.
About the Author
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American PowerPaper
- The Latest Iran Deal Ignores the Lessons of the PastCommentary
James M. Acton
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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