• Research
  • Politika
  • About
Carnegie Russia Eurasia center logoCarnegie lettermark logo
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Dalia Ghanem"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center",
  "programAffiliation": "MEP",
  "programs": [
    "Middle East"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Maghreb",
    "Algeria",
    "Libya",
    "North Africa",
    "Mali"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform",
    "Security"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

Conditions in the Sahel Benefit Al Qaeda

Islamist militant and jihadist groups thrive on disenfranchised youths who lack opportunity and services in their native countries.

Link Copied
By Dalia Ghanem
Published on Jan 29, 2017

Source: The Cipher Brief

The Cipher Brief: Where does al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb maintain its primary base in northwestern Africa (Sahel region)?

Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck: It is hard to map jihadist groups in the Sahel region because organizations such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are often comprised of several factions, which are themselves divided into semi-autonomous brigades, battalions and sub-battalions. Furthermore, extremist groups operating in the region, such as AQIM, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar e-dine, adapt depending on countries’ counterterrorism strategies.

In 2012, the three aforementioned groups established a base in northern Mali and proceeded to conquer territory in the country until they nearly reached Mali’s capital Bamako. To stop these gains, the French military intervened in 2013 and pushed these groups north towards Libya and east towards Niger. Porous borders enabled the jihadist groups to move from one country to another and expand their scope of action. MUJAO, for instance, extended its sphere of action into Niger, where it perpetrated several acts of violence, such as an attack on Nigerien military base in 2013 and the more recent attack in Bani Bangou last November.    

TCB: Why did the AQIM select this area for its base? What advantages or disadvantages does it provide?

DGY: At first the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), the predecessor of AQIM, was pushed by southward by the Algerian military. AQIM’s movement southward also became a matter of conjuncture as it sought to unify all jihadist groups operating in the Sahel region, including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. In 2009, AQIM leader Abdel Malek Droudkel decided to open its Sahelian front with several kataib (battalions): Mokhtar Bel Mokhtar served as the emir of the western part, Abdelhamid Abou Zeid of the eastern part, and Yahia Djaoudi of the north.

The Sahel is a vast region that covers between 4 and 5 million square kilometers. The topography of the Sahel region and a history of de facto autonomy in some countries such as Mali, Mauritania and Niger, makes government control hard to exercise. Sovereign functions of the state, such as providing assistance, security and protection, development, and public services, are insufficient and lead to a marginalization of populations that in many cases lack education and employment opportunities. This leads to tensions with the central government and contributes greatly to the radicalization of many youths. Islamist militant and jihadist groups thrive on that. 

This article was originally published on The Cipher Brief website.

Read Full Text

About the Author

Dalia Ghanem

Former Senior Resident Scholar, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

Dalia Ghanem was a senior resident scholar at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where her research focuses on Algeria’s political, economic, social, and security developments. Her research also examines political violence, radicalization, civil-military relationships, transborder dynamics, and gender.

    Recent Work

  • Article
    Against the Odds: Women Entrepreneurs in Algeria

      Dalia Ghanem

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Scholars’ Best Books of 2021
      • +5

      Frances Z. Brown, Judy Dempsey, Dalia Ghanem, …

Dalia Ghanem
Former Senior Resident Scholar, Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Dalia Ghanem
Political ReformSecurityMaghrebAlgeriaLibyaNorth AfricaMali

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Azerbaijan Looks to Tap Ukraine’s Military Expertise With Raft of New Deals

    Baku’s backing for Ukraine is less about confronting Russia than about quietly broadening the mix of partners it relies on.

      Zaur Shiriyev

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    The Rada Reawakens: Ukraine’s Messy Politics Returns

    The return of parliamentary politics reflects a broader shift from earlier expectations of a settlement and elections toward the reality of a prolonged war.

      Balázs Jarábik

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    What Does Nuclear Proliferation in East Asia Mean for Russia?

    Troubled by the growing salience of nuclear debates in East Asia, Moscow has responded in its usual way: with condemnation and threats. But by exacerbating insecurity, Russia is forcing South Korea and Japan to consider radical security options.

      James D.J. Brown

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Who Is Responsible for the Demise of the Russian Internet?

    The Russian state has opted for complete ideological control of the internet and is prepared to bear the associated costs.

      Maria Kolomychenko

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Is Opposition to Online Restrictions an Inflection Point for the Russian Regime?

    After four years of war, there is no one who can stand up to the security establishment, and President Vladimir Putin is increasingly passive. 

      Tatiana Stanovaya

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Carnegie Russia Eurasia logo, white
  • Research
  • Politika
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.