Commentary
Pashinyan’s pro-European party has been re-elected with a decisive victory. But the pro-Russian opposition could still slow Armenia’s progress toward peace with Azerbaijan and rapprochement with Europe.
Mikayel Zolyan
{
"authors": [
"Michele Dunne",
"Andrew Miller"
],
"type": "commentary",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "MEP",
"programs": [
"Middle East"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North Africa",
"Egypt"
],
"topics": [
"Political Reform",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Commentary
Nine Reasons Why Declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a Terrorist Organization Would Be a Mistake
U.S. President Donald Trump wishes to designate the Muslim Brotherhood, a collection of loosely affiliated Islamist groups, as a terrorist organization. Here is why that would be deeply unwise.
Published on May 3, 2019
There are legal, diplomatic, pragmatic, and civil rights reasons why such a designation would undermine efforts to keep Americans safe from terrorism.
- The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) does not fit the legal definition of a foreign terrorist organization. There is no credible evidence that, as an organization, it is using violence to pursue political aims, and it has not deliberately targeted Americans.
- The few offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood that have become violent—Hamas, Hassm, Liwa al-Thawra—have already been designated as terrorist organizations. Designating the Muslim Brotherhood more broadly would not give the United States added tools to go after these groups.
- Sweepingly targeting the Muslim Brotherhood would create a cascade of diplomatic problems because political parties with Brotherhood roots serve in parliaments and even governments in many countries. But even a narrower designation of a single Muslim Brotherhood chapter, such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, would still do just as much damage to U.S. interests for all the reasons that follow.
- U.S. law does not permit designation based only on ideology rather than violent actions. To do so would politicize the process.
- By joining countries (for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E.) that designate groups as terrorist for political reasons, the United States would tarnish the international legitimacy of its other designations and erode the credibility of its counterterrorism efforts.
- Anti-U.S. sentiment among Muslims worldwide would rise. Most Muslims around the world would see the designation as the latest of a series of anti-Muslim steps by the Trump administration, such as the travel ban and the changed U.S. policy on Jerusalem. The U.S. president already stands accused of stoking Islamophobia internationally.
- The self-proclaimed Islamic State and al-Qaeda would celebrate such a designation as vindication of their argument that non-violent political activity is futile. They would use the designation in their efforts to recruit desperate and isolated Islamist youth, who once believed in peaceful politics.
- Designation could bring devastating consequences for Muslims in the United States, who currently make up less than 2 percent of the population. Anyone suspected of ties to the organization could risk having their assets frozen, or could be deported if they are not citizens. Islamophobic groups—with contacts inside the Trump administration—would press the FBI to investigate every U.S. mosque or Muslim charity for possible ties to Muslim Brotherhood-supported hospitals, clinics, and religious organizations throughout the world.
- Designating the Muslim Brotherhood would inevitably divert U.S. counterterrorism resources away from the real terrorists that are actually seeking to kill Americans, such as branches of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.
In the end, designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization would be a counterproductive political stunt that would make all Americans less safe.
About the Authors
Michele Dunne
Former Nonresident Scholar, Middle East Program
Michele Dunne was a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East.
Andrew Miller
Former Nonresident Scholar, Middle East Program
Andrew Miller was a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
- What Does Pashinyan’s Parliamentary Victory Mean for Armenia’s Future?
- Will Russia–Armenia Relations Improve Following Pashinyan’s Re-Election?Commentary
For all the menacing rhetoric, the Armenian prime minister remains a leader with whom Putin is prepared to interact: not as an ally, but as a partner, albeit a problematic one.
Alexander Atasuntsev
- Who Does Azerbaijan Want to See Win Armenia’s Elections?Commentary
By fueling the arguments of both supporters and opponents of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, Azerbaijan wants to ensure he is re-elected with a weaker mandate.
Bashir Kitachaev
- Is Belarus Really Set to Return to the Ukraine War?Commentary
By reminding the world that Lukashenko is a threat to NATO and Ukraine, Kyiv is trying to return the focus to why the Belarusian regime needs to be contained rather than rewarded.
Artyom Shraibman
- Could Migrants From India and Africa Solve Russia’s Labor Shortage?Commentary
The demands of the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, demographic problems, and public hostility toward Central Asians mean Russia does not have enough workers.
Salavat Abylkalikov
