Q&A
Steve Feldstein, Dara Massicot
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In The Media
When It Comes to Digital Authoritarianism, China is a Challenge—But Not the Only Challenge
China’s proliferation of digital authoritarian tools presents serious challenges. Its technology is used by repressive regimes to quell mass protests, monitor political opponents, and keep autocratic leaders in power.
Published on Feb 12, 2020
Source: War on the Rocks
Last year, the Wall Street Journal and AP broke stories about how Chinese technicians from Huawei were working directly with government security forces in Uganda and Serbia to install advanced facial recognition cameras for surveillance purposes. Both countries have spotty human rights records. In Uganda, longtime ruler Yoweri Museveni faces upcoming elections in 2021 and is laying a repressive groundwork to intimidate would-be political opponents and suppress opposition voters. Similarly, Serbia under the ruling Serbian Progressive Party has increasingly moved in an illiberal direction. Both governments have strong incentives to use digital tools to counter their opponents and ensure their political survival. In both cases, the Chinese have proven to be willing partners.
What can we make of China’s involvement? Do its actions represent a larger effort to spread coercive technology in order to bolster non-democratic leaders? What is driving these trends?
About the Author
Steve Feldstein
Senior Fellow, Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program
Steve Feldstein is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program. His research focuses on technology, national security, the global context for democracy, and U.S. foreign policy.
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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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