Commentary
Ulrich Kühn
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Source: Getty
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Nuclear Risk in the Euro-Atlantic
Risks of nuclear weapon use in the Euro-Atlantic region have grown, but policymakers have not yet correctly assessed which risks they should be most concerned about.
By Ulrich Kühn
Published on Apr 20, 2020
Source: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
The risk of nuclear weapon use—be it deliberately in an escalating crisis or war, in accordance with one’s own nuclear doctrine or due to inadvertent events—has grown in the Euro-Atlantic region, mainly as a function of the recurring competition between the Russian Federation and the United States. As this chapter argues, decision makers are correct to see a riskier environment. Yet in considering the risk of nuclear weapon use, analysts and policymakers alike are assessing threats by often focusing on highimpact/low-probability scenarios, driven by misreading of one another’s plans and intentions. As a result, they are assessing the risks wrongly, and respond to the wrong things. This chapter first addresses actors, interests, and political change at three levels of analysis. It then establishes a menu for manipulating and perceiving risk, focusing on asymmetric capabilities, (unofficial) doctrines, and poor risk analysis. It concludes with a set of recommendations on how to mitigate the most pressing risks of nuclear use in the Euro-Atlantic.
The original article was published as a chapter in "Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use," edited by Wilfred Wan and published by UNIDIR.
About the Author
Ulrich Kühn
Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
- Why Arms Control Is (Almost) Dead
- Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO PlaybookReport
Ulrich Kühn
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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