Japan’s long-term security policy is driven by concerns about China, and there is little appetite for (or interest in) pursuing a confrontation with Moscow.
James D.J. Brown
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The United States needs Europe to act as a genuine partner that can step up and out onto the world stage, on its own when necessary. For that to happen, Washington should change its traditional approach to the transatlantic alliance.
Source: War on the Rocks
The United States needs a stronger Europe. With China’s rise, Russia’s resurgence, and America’s soft-power image tarnished by its bungled domestic handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States should revive the transatlantic alliance. But a return to the more predictable days before President Donald Trump took office, when Washington led and European capitals were supposed to follow, is not sufficient anymore. Regardless of whether Trump is re-elected or Joe Biden becomes the next president, the United States will need Europe to act as a genuine partner that can step up and out onto the world stage, on its own when necessary. For that to happen, Washington should change its traditional approach to the transatlantic alliance.
Former Director, Europe Program, Fellow
Erik Brattberg was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations.
Max Bergmann
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Japan’s long-term security policy is driven by concerns about China, and there is little appetite for (or interest in) pursuing a confrontation with Moscow.
James D.J. Brown
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