Tokyo would have to surmount a lot of obstacles—not least Western sanctions—if it wanted to return Russian oil imports to even modest pre-2022 volumes.
Vladislav Pashchenko
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After President Yoon’s January 2023 public, not-so-veiled proliferation threat, the April 2023 Washington Declaration was a two-way exchange of assurances: South Korea reaffirmed its commitment to abstain from developing nuclear weapons, while the US agreed to augment its security reassurances in return.
Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Nonresident Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program
Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Tokyo would have to surmount a lot of obstacles—not least Western sanctions—if it wanted to return Russian oil imports to even modest pre-2022 volumes.
Vladislav Pashchenko
Troubled by the growing salience of nuclear debates in East Asia, Moscow has responded in its usual way: with condemnation and threats. But by exacerbating insecurity, Russia is forcing South Korea and Japan to consider radical security options.
James D.J. Brown
For Putin, upgrading Russia’s nuclear forces was a secondary goal. The main aim was to gain an advantage over the West, including by strengthening the nuclear threat on all fronts. That made growth in missile arsenals and a new arms race inevitable.
Maxim Starchak
The Kremlin will only be prepared to negotiate strategic arms limitations if it is confident it can secure significant concessions from the United States. Otherwise, meaningful dialogue is unlikely, and the international system of strategic stability will continue to teeter on the brink of total collapse.
Maxim Starchak
The collapse of the Budapest summit is an inevitable result of the Russian system of artificially creating foreign policy crises in order to achieve a desired outcome.
Alexander Baunov