Source: Carnegie

Nonproliferation issues are hot. The pace of developments in nuclear proliferation over the past 18 months is unprecedented, and it is hard for even dedicated experts to keep track and make sense of all the latest developments, to say nothing of the average citizen. Yet with all the developments, from Libya to Pakistan to North Korea, several questions have emerged to form the core debate over the future direction of U.S. nonproliferation policy.

The first question is whether proliferation is inevitable. Listening to press reports and public statements, one could reasonably conclude that every small, developing country has a nuclear weapons program. Yet few people realize that more countries have abandoned nuclear weapons programs over the past 15 years than have acquired nuclear weapons. Four countries have actually given up considerable nuclear arsenals voluntarily (South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) while only two (Pakistan and North Korea) are thought to have crossed the nuclear finish line. While no one should breathe easy quite yet, the track record in uncovering, confronting and reversing proliferation is actually quite strong.

At any given point over the past 50 years, the outlook for nonproliferation was quite grim. Experts and officials have predicted widespread nuclear acquisition for decades. Yet in these times the United States has historically led the international community in preventing this future from coming to pass. The 1950s saw the creation of the international safeguards process; the ’60s, the birth of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the ’70s and 80s, the growth and impact of nuclear arms reductions; the ’90s, United States engagement of a new Russia and the securing of its vulnerable nuclear assets. How the United States reacts to current challenges will go a long way in deciding what kind of world develops over the coming years.

The second question is whether our intelligence is good enough to handle proliferation. Iraq, the conduct of the war and the failure to find weapons of mass destruction will cloud the issue of proliferation and intelligence for the foreseeable future. Investigations and intelligence reviews will provide plenty of fodder for experts and politicians alike. But in the meantime, the work of intelligence collection and analysis must and does go on. Recent history is full of examples where U.S. intelligence was more than reliable. For years, the United States raised concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions that proved to be true. U.S. intelligence concluded in 2002 that North Korea had a secret uranium program, which Pakistan has now admitted to assisting.

Recent speeches by CIA Director George Tenet and President Bush have made the case that U.S. intelligence is what allowed us to crack Pakistan’s connections to Libya, Iran and North Korea and force A.Q. Kahn’s activities into the daylight. In reality, our intelligence has been even better on this issue than either the president or Tenet let on. The United States has known about Pakistan’s activities for years, even decades. What we have discovered is that in most cases, it was not intelligence that let America down, it was America’s leaders who failed to act on intelligence. In case after case, U.S. intelligence has uncovered proliferation, but other priorities have taken over. The clearest case is the 1980s, when the United States ignored Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities because it needed Pakistani help to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. History is repeating itself, now that we need Pakistan in the war on terror.

This then raises the last issue consuming nonproliferation experts and broader policymakers alike: What do we do about the challenges we face today? The good news is that we know how to prevent nuclear materials from falling into the wrong hands. Terrorists, unless and until they can produce their own nuclear materials, must look to steal (or buy stolen) weapons-grade uranium or plutonium that exists in national stockpiles. Over the past decade, the United States has invested billions of dollars helping Russia — which possesses the largest and most vulnerable stocks of these materials — keep its weapons and nuclear materials secure. These efforts are far from complete and are now beginning to expand to other states, but need more political and financial resources to keep ahead of the threats we face.

In addition, the United States has previously stopped or rolled back proliferation by working to remove the demand for nuclear weapons. Regional engagement, conflict prevention, military alliances and the like are as much a part of the non-proliferation history as nuclear seals and Geiger counters.

Lastly, the United States needs to do more than pay lip service to threats of proliferation. We must reconfigure our policies to prove we understand the nature of this threat and ensure that it trumps all other security considerations. This includes how we handle our own nuclear facilities and weapons, the support we provide to organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency, how we invest our defense and security budget, and how we prioritize our other countries.

The good news is that despite the challenges we face, proliferation is not inevitable and our knowledge of how and where proliferation takes place is better than most people think. The problem is that we may not always make nonproliferation the priority it deserves to be.
 

Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project.
 

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