Dmitri Trenin
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U.S.-Russian Diplomatic Normalcy: One Small Step Nearer?
This week the U.S. government has presented to Moscow the candidacy of its future envoy for customary prior approval by the host country. Then, at some point, the Russian government not objecting and the U.S. Senate willing, a small but important element of U.S.-Russian diplomatic normalcy will be restored.
The absence of a U.S. ambassador in Moscow ever since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis has been striking. This never happened during the Cold War, when ambassadors were the prime conduits of dialogue between the superpowers. Not so these days. Sergey Lavrov and John Kerry have met many times during the past four months, and have spoken even more often. Occasionally, the two presidents also engage in telephone diplomacy. What the absence of a resident ambassador means today is that the government responsible for such a vacancy deprives itself of day-to-day contact with senior figures in the other country, and this limits its understanding of the host nation's policies.
Initially, the lack of replacement for Michael McFaul, who left Moscow on February 21, 2014, could have been seen as a sign of Washington's disapproval of Russia's actions in Crimea and with regard to Ukraine, an unspoken addition to the sanctions package. Yet, the longer the Spaso House, the U.S. ambassador's residence in Moscow's historical Arbat district, stays unoccupied, the more punishing the situation becomes for the United States: the Russian ambassador in Washington, Sergey Kislyak, has, of course, continued working in Washington. Now, the U.S. government has taken the usual step of presenting to Moscow the candidacy of its future envoy for customary prior approval by the host country.
Yet, this does not mean that Moscow will necessarily turn Tefft down. He would be coming to Moscow under starkly different circumstances than McFaul in January 2012. President Putin's popularity has never been stronger. Anti-government protests in Moscow have long died down. The Russian public attitude toward the United States has hardened. Also, John Tefft is a traditional career diplomat. He would do what diplomats are supposed to be doing under difficult circumstances: reaching out to key figures, listening to what they have to say, and seeking to explain his own government's intentions. He will be an interlocutor par excellence, not a negotiator.
On the Fourth of July, there will still be no U.S. ambassador to greet guests at Spaso. Then, at some point, the Russian government not objecting and the U.S. Senate willing, a small but important element of U.S.-Russian diplomatic normalcy will be restored.
About the Author
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.
- Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet SpaceCommentary
- What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West RevealedCommentary
Dmitri Trenin
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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