Pierre Goldschmidt
{
"authors": [
"Pierre Goldschmidt"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [
"U.S. Nuclear Policy"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"Western Europe"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy"
]
}Source: Getty
Securing Irreversible IAEA Safeguards to Close The Next NPT Loophole
One of the main outstanding loopholes of the international nonproliferation regime that deserves prompt attention is the absence of a requirement for irreversible IAEA safeguards to remain in force should a state leave the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Source: Arms Control Today
Over time, states have endeavored to improve the effectiveness of the international nonproliferation regime. These efforts have included the adoption by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the Model Additional Protocol to comprehensive safeguards agreements, the tightening by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) of export criteria on sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle technology, and the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 1887.
One of the main outstanding loopholes that deserves prompt attention is the absence of a requirement for irreversible IAEA safeguards to remain in force should a state leave the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Today, if Iran or any other NPT non-nuclearweapon state withdraws from the treaty, its comprehensive IAEA safeguards automatically lapse under the terms of that agreement.Under Article X.1 of the treaty, an NPT party has the right to withdraw, with three months’ notice, “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of [the NPT], have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.” The model comprehensive safeguards agreement, which NPT nonnuclear- weapon states are required to adopt, contains no reference to safeguards implications after a state’s withdrawal from the NPT.
About the Author
Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program
Goldschmidt was a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.
- A Realistic Approach Toward a Middle East Free of WMDArticle
- Serious Deficiencies Exposed by Latest IAEA Safeguards Implementation ReportArticle
Pierre Goldschmidt
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Europe
- Separable, not Separate: Governing Europe’s Collective DefenseArticle
European NATO countries are wrestling with the possibility of U.S. disengagement from the alliance. With the continent’s security increasingly uncertain, governments must restore the credibility of their collective defense.
Hans-Dieter Lucas, Adam Thomson, Pierre Vimont
- The Uncomfortable Truth About EU EnlargementCommentary
Before the next wave of EU enlargement takes place, the union needs to grapple with thorny questions of how power is distributed among its members.
Emil Sondaj Hansen, Ditte Brasso Sørensen
- The Denmark-Greenland-U.S. Agreement Needs to Stand the Test of TimeCommentary
The new U.S.–Denmark–Greenland agreement will help Washington exert political, economic, and financial dominance under the guise of security. Yet, it acknowledged Copenhagen’s and Nuuk’s sovereignty on the island.
Marc Pierini
- Taking the Pulse: Does the EU Have a Germany Problem?Commentary
Are Germany’s economic, industrial, and political struggles becoming a liability for the EU’s ability to rise to the geopolitical moment?
Rym Momtaz, ed.
- The Speech Ursula von der Leyen Can’t DeliverCommentary
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen is about to give her annual address on the state of the EU. Here’s what she won’t—but should—say.
Rym Momtaz