The five-year review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will begin in New York on May 2, and the agreement and the norm it embodies are being challenged as never before. President Bush and his top officials have an opportunity to demonstrate through their personal involvement that they are in fact doing, as the President has said, "all they can" to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. As of today, this is not the case. Continued failure to invest their time, effort and capital in the regime and the diplomatic nonproliferation process can only make it easier for states such as Iran and North Korea to go nuclear.

Now, the treaty regime faces multiple challenges referred to by US officials as a "crisis of compliance." North Korea and Iran’s violations of their treaty obligations, Libya’s now terminated nuclear weapons program, and the illicit transfer of nuclear technology and equipment from NPT states as part of the A.Q. Khan network all add to this crisis. Yet other member countries see a different crisis of compliance – a failure by the nuclear weapon states to comply with their disarmament obligation under the treaty. The overwhelming sense among many non-nuclear weapon states is that the U.S. and other nuclear states are not serious about their commitments to disarm. This sense is enhanced by the publicly stated interest in developing new nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles by the United States and others, and only recently abandoned attempts by the US to disavow clear disarmament goals it committed to at the 2000 NPT Review. The US rejects this assessment, and has after months of internal disputes finally started making its best arguments as to how it is complying with its disarmament obligations.

This contrast in perceptions threatens to keep member countries from agreeing on needed reforms and clarifications to the treaty’s implementation. A renewed concern that peaceful nuclear technology – even those under safeguards – can provide the basis for the rapid development of nuclear weapons has led some states to reconsider the wisdom of transferring uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. President Bush has said that no new countries should develop such facilities, while the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed El Baradei has called for a five-year moratorium on construction of all such sites. There is a growing sense that the issue is too complex to resolve at the New York meeting, but developing a mandate for further review and action there seems possible if other disputes do not intervene.

In addition, there is serious concern that the withdrawal provisions of the treaty – which requires only a notice of three months without any automatic review or response by the international community -- is too permissive. North Korea’s violations of the NPT and subsequent withdrawal have gone unchallenged by the UN Security Council and may lay out a road map for proliferants to abuse the protection of the treaty and then withdraw with a weapons capability in hand. It is therefore essential to adopt terms that would deny states in violation of, and withdrawing from the Treaty the right to make use of facilities acquired under the NPT’s protection. Such a move would help ensure that no state could legally withdraw from the agreement with impunity.

There are other potential areas of agreement that could be overwhelmed by the disarmament debate. Most states agree that the inspection authority of the IAEA should be enhanced, and that the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, which improves inspection rights should become the international standard. Most states also support additional transparency over nuclear commerce, want nuclear materials to be more secure, and even think continued engagement on the issues of the nuclear fuel cycle are warranted, even if no solution is immediately obvious.

The U.S., as the world’s superpower and historical leader in nonproliferation, has the ability to dramatically improve the prospects for next month’s NPT Review Conference. From the 1946 Baruch Plan to the negotiation and entry into force of the NPT, the United States has always led international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons..

Even if some of Washington’s policies are opposed by other states, the U.S. can still help strengthen the NPT by sending the signal that it views the treaty as important, and that Washington remains committed to collective approaches to the nonproliferation challenge. To this end, the President should appoint Secretary Rice to lead the delegation to the NPT as a clear sign that the NPT remains central to America’s security. Moreover, Secretary Rice should ensure that whoever manages the day to day operations for the month-long meeting is empowered to make real compromises on language and will have access to her office should disputes arise. Strengthening the NPT cannot be done by the US alone, but it certainly cannot be done without Washington’s active and constructive support. The U.S. must show that it can and will effectively use the diplomatic tools at its disposal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.