Egypt finds itself at a critical environmental juncture, with climate change posing grave risks to its economy, sovereignty, and stability. A business-as-usual approach or maladaptation could have major adverse consequences.
Edited by Yezid Sayigh
While Egypt has made notable improvements in certain sectors, it remains one of the region’s worst polluters in others. The country hosted the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (known as COP27), offering it an opportunity to help advance the global environmental agenda, particularly in relation to recovery and regeneration. But the need for domestic action in Egypt is rapidly becoming more pressing.
In 2019, Egypt’s overall ecological footprint per capita was 5.3 times higher than its per capita biocapacity, meaning that its combined imports of biocapacity through trade, liquidation of national ecological assets, and carbon dioxide emissions were greater than its ecosystems could absorb. Over the last thirty years, its average temperature increased by some 1.6 degrees Celsius, and may soon reach temporary hikes as high as 3 degrees Celsius due to passing phenomena such as the start of the El Niño climate pattern.
As the World Bank’s November 2022 Country Climate and Development Report for Egypt noted, “High temperatures and more heat waves will raise the already high evaporation rate, accelerate crop transpiration, functionally increase soil aridity, and elevate water requirements for human consumption and agriculture.” Rising sea levels are accelerating coastal degradation and threaten to inundate the Nile Delta, potentially displacing millions of residents and taking large tracts of arable land out of cultivation in one of the world’s three major “hotspots for vulnerability,” according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
For Egypt to meet these and other environmental challenges in ways that are both economically feasible and socially desirable, it must work effectively with its civil society and foreign partners. This will require transparency and inclusion in the design, implementation, and post-delivery phases of its environmental mitigation and adaptation strategies, among other important elements.
This compendium discusses what is being done to tackle Egypt’s environmental challenges in a sample of sectors, the cascading impacts of climate change on the country, and the potential costs of maladaptation.
History may designate 2023 as one of the years when the Anthropocene markedly accelerated humanity’s course toward a massive global ecological unravelling with multidimensional repercussions. The melting of the ice caps entered uncharted territory, the north Atlantic Ocean suffered its first heat wave, Northern Hemisphere summer temperatures broke 120,000-year-old records, and unprecedented disasters hit many parts of the world. This is only the beginning of a larger human-induced story of runaway climate change, breadbasket failures, and the retreat from globalization.
As is the case for many countries, several global economic factors are well out of Egypt’s control. But the choices Egypt makes vis-à-vis its ecological capital will determine whether it can remain an economically viable nation in a climate-disrupted world.
Ancient Egypt was one of the early civilizations to have flourished thanks in large part to an abundance of natural resources and relative climate reliability. It owed its significant rise to power to the Nile, a river that gave birth to one of the early agrarian societies that generated complex and literate political as well as economic systems. But while the ancient Egyptians saw the Nile as a source of life, the backdrop of the Holocene geological age and the series of geological sequences that came before are what made the Nile exist at all. In other words, although humanity looks upon ancient Egypt as one of the beating starts of human history, it is in fact merely a beneficiary of complex geological and atmospheric processes that eventually led to ecological reliability, predictability, and abundance from which complex civilization could eventually arise. Today, w ith the Nile’s faltering and Egypt’s generalized ecological exhaustion baking in unpredictability and socioeconomic dampening, what is at stake is the very foundation of Egypt’s economy, stability, and credible sovereignty.
Scientists still debate the Anthropocene’s relevance, specificities, and when exactly it began. Some argue that it started when humans developed agrarian settlements. In creating these settlements, they began to actively convert landscapes, which started to disturb biochemical fluxes that symbiotically existed between atmospheric and ecological stability. Ironically, it would make ancient Egypt and its descendent civilizations first movers into the age of the Anthropocene. Others argue that the Anthropocene accelerated, if not started, around the time of the Industrial Revolution, when the excess release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (as a result of burning fossil fuels) started altering atmospheric stocks and composition and irremediably drove a global warming process. In this event, Egypt may be considered a significant actor due to the buildup of its political-economic rents on the back of natural gas and oil. Yet, its energy consumption and intensity are nothing compared to that of European and American societies, while Egyptians keep suffering exponential exposure to climate-related shocks.
The year 2023 has seen the hottest recorded months in the last 120,000 years. During June and July, parts of Egypt regularly recorded land temperatures above 40 degrees Celsius. On the opposite side of the Mediterranean basin from Egypt, in Italy, a severe heat wave caused tempestuous weather including a tornado. Also that year, scientists confirmed that the Arctic Ocean could see ice-free summers as soon as 2030, while the United Nations confirmed that the availability of fresh water could be about 40 percent lower than demand by 2030. Meanwhile, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has reached over 420 parts per million (ppm)—a significant hike from the original 350 ppm threshold that scientists considered safe when evaluating climate-related risks. This translates into an increase of 1.1 degrees Celsius to the world’s average temperature, compared to its preindustrial level.
Climate and earth system scientists have decisively warned that an increase of 1.5 degrees Celsius is not just a political target; it is a biophysical limit beyond which ecosystems will start tipping in cascades, beginning with a collapse of ice sheets around the poles. Already, in 2023, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) announced that the 1.5 degrees Celsius threshold has a 66 percent chance of being crossed in at least one year between 2023 and 2027 and that this condition will likely result from a new El Niño cycle, an oceanic oscillation phenomenon usually associated with extreme temperature hikes and natural disasters. This overshoot may be temporary, but only if humanity collectively starts drastically reducing the use of fossil fuels. In 2022, the world was still stubbornly 82 percent reliant on fossil fuels.
In Egypt, these global changes are manifesting more rapidly than elsewhere. Egypt is part of a region that is warming twice as fast as the global average. An average rise in global temperature toward 1.5 degrees Celsius translates to a rise of 3–4 degrees Celsius in Egypt and neighboring countries. It is unclear whether this would move Egypt toward full or partial inhabitability. But, undoubtedly, the summer months would become difficult to bear and Egypt’s natural resource base would suffer tremendously, thereby undermining social, economic, and political fabrics in ways that may not always be anticipated.
By 2025, Egypt’s water supply could fall below 500 cubic meters per capita, a level that hydrologists define as “absolute scarcity.” And this is before the possible 1.5 degrees Celsius breach at the global level; if that happens, it would lead to more water evaporation, declined precipitation patterns, and increased water-related climate disruptions, such as floods and prolonged droughts.
The Nile Delta, where major cities are located and where population density is the highest in Egypt, will particularly suffer. Higher water evaporation rates and lower rainfall will significantly impact subsidence and aridification given that the delta is the final tributary location of the Nile’s flow. In addition, if the world continues to follow what the IPCC describes as the high-emissions scenario, sea levels will increase. This will have direct impacts on Egypt’s coastline, not just because of erosion but also because of salinization.
In effect, Egypt is increasingly going to find itself ecologically challenged due to high temperatures, critically low water resources, subsidence, salinization, and natural disasters. The ecological impacts will include scarcity- and shock-related macroeconomic disruptions, not to mention social disruptions related to climate injustice and increased inequality and marginalization (made worse by a lack of social safety nets). Rising temperatures and impacts on labor productivity and industrial activity, as well as less agricultural land, will lead to unfavorable balances of trade. As Egypt’s agricultural base contracts further and the country depends more on food imports, it will become more exposed to inflationary pressures stemming from supply chain disruptions worldwide. These disruptions are expected to increase substantially in the next few years, not just because of El Niño’s impact on the real economy but also because of a lack of concrete advancements on climate mitigation and adaptation worldwide, in the North African region, and in Egypt.
If Egypt’s balance of trade edges toward more structural deficit, it will lead to cascading impacts. As explored in the compendium’s essay on coastal development , Egypt could increasingly become a tributary of foreign direct investments that often provide less taxation income and make the central government more accountable to foreign investors than to national constituencies. This is a recipe for wider inequality at income and territorial levels, more distrust in the national government, and potentially less transparent economic governance.
Eventually, the structural deficit could lead to severe maladaptation, thereby worsening inequality, marginalization, and violence, which, in turn, would likely corner the Egyptian government into more reactive maladaptation. In its 2022 report, the IPCC Working Group II warned that countries currently suffering from large inequality and marginalization issues are more likely to ill-adapt to climate disruptions and stay stuck in a vicious inequality-maladaptation cycle that will dampen all forms of economic growth.
Egypt could also gradually and structurally run out of macroeconomic and political-economic agency, which may create increased potential for unrest, repression, and poverty. In other words, climate change could impoverish Egypt’s capacity to govern itself and determine its future. Climate and ecological spaces are not backdrops to Egypt’s economy; they are the enablers of Egypt’s economy, as they are everywhere else.
In the face of fundamental climate and environmental changes and grave risks to Egypt’s stability and sovereignty, a question arises: how is Egypt driving change in return?
The answer seems to be “by doubling down on business-as-usual,” as pointed out in this compendium of essays , which offers snapshots of different environmental issues and how the Egyptian government and other stakeholders tackle them. Taken separately, each essay may come across as anecdotal, with the impacts limited in geography or in scope. Taken together, however, they show that Egyptian stakeholders adopt political, economic, and social reflexes that double down on the anthropogenic drivers that bake insecurity into governance, societal, and economic fabrics and that contribute to undermine the very base upon which Egypt stands.
In her essay, Yasmine Hussein argues that coastal real estate development practices in Egypt virtually ignore the real and fast-approaching perils related to coastal erosion, subsidence, and salinization Developers also contribute to parking marginalized communities further inland, where their economic base is reduced due to decreasing soil fertility and freshwater access and rising temperatures. Not only does this segregate access to the coastline, favoring private owners rather than the collective, it also may contribute to unhealthy economic dependencies driven by foreign investment at the expense of the public good.
Nadine Wahab exposes the pervasive pollution of plastics in Egypt and the fact that it is not a top concern on the government’s agenda. Plastic pollution has direct health and ecological repercussions, as well as indirect macroeconomic repercussions with regard to agricultural production and other nature-related activities. In particular, Wahab demonstrates the costs of a polluting economy, as well as the missed opportunities that result from Egypt’s lack of transformative approaches to plastics production and consumption.
Justin Dargin adopts a more forward-looking note regarding Egypt’s potential to become a major green hydrogen developer. Not only does Egypt hold comparative advantages in developing this new form of energy, it is also particularly well-positioned to serve African, European, and North African markets. Still, this essay exposes the fundamental obstacles that Egypt needs to overcome to realize a decarbonized economy—especially as it remains dependent on fossil fuels for over 85 percent of its energy—and a service-oriented economy for hard-to-abate sectors worldwide. And while it is understandable that Egypt seeks to tap into new energy markets to transform its own asset markets, expanding energy bases to move into the hydrogen base will be resource and space intensive. At the moment, decisions are being made to develop a green hydrogen sector without having done a snapshot assessment of what Egypt’s natural resources can assure in terms of industrial carrying capacity.
Finally, Nada Arafat explores the most fundamental problem Egypt faces: water. From scarcity to pollution to flooding events, Egypt is faced with critical issues that the government is currently failing to address. Interestingly, Arafat’s essay shows that in the face of profound ecological challenges, the government is quick to respond with technological mechanisms and economies of scale. The underlying rationale—to boost economic productivity as much as possible—remains. The problem is that Egypt is far from taking the necessary measures to rebuild its ecological capital; it is merely applying superficial rather than transformative adaptation solutions to its economy.
There is one exception, though. On the sidelines of the 2022 United Nations Climate Change Conference (known as COP27), the Egyptian government signed an agreement to begin a Sinai Peninsula regeneration project. The project is in its early days, which is why this compendium does not cover it. However, its mere existence demonstrates the seed of different thinking around positive disruption potential. In the coming years, the Egyptian government will work with foreign counterparts and investors to ignite an ecosystem-wide regeneration process in the Sinai Peninsula. This eco-engineering project goes beyond carbon capture. It is about rebooting ecological integrity and ecological services in a key area of the world that connects different bioregions, and it can therefore act as a climate adaptation catalyst. If successful, the regeneration could help rebuild the region’s hydrological cycle, contribute to replenishing water in soils, and over time recreate precipitation patterns that would amount to regional resource stabilization in spite of larger climate disruptions.
This may seem like a tall order. The situation is so dire in Egypt and the efforts around climate mitigation are currently so limited that only disruptive solution pathways will eventually yield benefits in terms of economic productivity and macroeconomic and sociopolitical agency. Technology advancements will only carry Egypt so far, especially since Egypt is more of a tech-adopter than a tech-innovator in the current digital and industrial revolution. On the other hand, Egypt may well find its own disruptive formula if it reconnects with its roots and develops complex regenerative solution pathways to ensure sovereignty, stability, and resilience in the future.
This compendium provides a short, albeit powerful, snapshot of the critical environmental juncture in which Egypt finds itself. Put into a larger historical, geological, and geographical context, it demonstrates how poor Egypt’s governance agency has become and how risky business-as-usual economic decisions may turn out to be for Egypt.
By 2050, more than 10 million people on Egypt’s northwestern coast could be displaced due to the effects of climate change, according to the United Nations Development Program. The Egyptian government recognizes the dangers posed to the northwestern coast, but it is still proceeding with plans to settle 5 million people in the region by 2052—as part of its broad effort to absorb a nationwide population increase of 34 million. To achieve this, it has launched a string of development projects and has undertaken a sweeping revision of its urban, topographical, and administrative plans for the coast.
Meanwhile, the country’s entire coastline, which stretches from El-Salloum on the Libyan border to Alexandria west of the Nile Delta, faces major challenges due to urban expansion, poorly planned construction, and inefficient natural resource management—all of which are being compounded by the increasingly disruptive impacts of climate change. These impacts include rising temperatures, wild fluctuations in the amount and timing of rainfall, increasing frequency and intensity of storms, unseasonalsandstorms, and other environmental phenomena. Rising sea levels and increasingly intense winter storms have already made flooding more frequent in various parts of the coast, thereby eroding the land, exposing sharp outcrops of limestone and sandstone, and deepening what were once shallow areas of coastline. Salinization of freshwater aquifers and soil in nearby low-lying land is accelerating, in part because of the destruction of sand dunes that used to protect inland areas and help maintain an equilibrium between salty and fresh water. Together, these phenomena have contributed to declining coastal tourism, changes in fishing practices, a decrease in the amount and productivity of cultivable land, a growing gap between water demand and supply, higher costs for drinking water and food, adverse impacts on human health, and deteriorating infrastructure.
This situation poses pressing questions not only about the sustainability of the Egyptian government’s development plans but also about the coastal population’s safety and security, especially given the real and present threats of coastal erosion and rising sea levels. Of course, Egypt’s environmental insecurity predicament stems to a significant degree from other countries’ behaviors, but the government’s approach toward development of the northwestern coast is creating a vicious cycle by increasing the country’s vulnerability to fiscal shocks, additional debt burdens, and loss of development capacity. The government should—and can—do much more to achieve domestic climate justice by both ameliorating the disproportionate consequences of climate change faced by disadvantaged communities and distributing these burdens more equitably. This would meet not only the UN General Assembly resolution of July 2022 recognizing a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a human right, but also the obligations set out in Egypt’s constitution articles 45 and 46.
Ill-conceived development, bad management, and counterproductive mitigation measures along the northwestern coast has led to a grim cycle of environmental damage. The construction of residential and tourist accommodations, breakwaters, barriers, marinas, and artificial lagoons is leading to a general trend in which one stretch of coastline is destroyed, causing investors and wealthy residents to build along unspoiled stretches further west. This rebuilding then worsens the impacts in the areas these investors and residents have left behind.
A resort town, Marina El-Alamein, offers a graphic example. When three enclosed lakes nearby filled with sediment, became salty, and turned into marshland, they were integrated into a single lagoon and linked to the sea to allow their water to be renewed. But this generated strong reverse currents that began to erode beaches to the east while building up sedimentation at beaches to the west. Moreover, the wave barriers erected at the lagoon entrances limited the effects of waves and sea currents, threatening to close the entrances and revert the lagoon to salty marshland. Because uncontrolled urbanization has dissipated and shifted nearby sand dunes, villages to the east have resorted to defensive measures to prevent their own coastline from receding; they have established various solid structures and rock barriers to compensate for the severe lack of sedimentary formations or sources of replacement. Many coastal resort villages and towns have also resorted to building breakwaters, despite the negative effects and coastal erosion that these structures cause in neighboring areas.
The coast stretching nearly 155.3 miles (250 kilometers) west of Alexandria offers another example of the vicious cycle of development and environmental degradation. The first half of this stretch, which has experienced a proliferation of privately owned tourist resorts since the 1980s and is known locally as the “Kind Coast” (Es-Sahel El-Tayyeb), includes approximately ninety older resort villages, most of which suffer from coastal degradation. The second, wealthier stretch, known as the “Evil Coast” (Es-Sahel El-Sharreer), encompasses almost forty-two newer villages that have not yet experienced major degradation. The vast majority of these villages lie directly on the seafront, blocking most access to public beaches and reflecting a planning policy that favors private, seasonal resorts. A yacht harbor built by an Emirati company at Marassi village shows how this pattern of development has denuded beaches further east of their sand, destroying 32.8 feet (10 meters) of coastline a year. Elsewhere, sedimentary accretion (soil deposited by wadis) along the Sidi Abdel Rahman coastline has gone from a net surplus of 0.78 feet (0.24 meters) per year between 2005 and 2015 to a net deficit of 4.2 feet (1.3 meters) a year between 2015 and 2022.
Despite growing evidence of environmental damage, especially since 2017, official authorities have only responded reactively, with short-term and localized measures rather than region-wide comprehensive solutions. And these measures have sometimes reproduced the same damaging sequences. For example, the man-made lagoon in Marina El-Alamein is a copy of the one in the town Sidi Kerir, even though it had already exhibited problems. The lagoon design continues to be applied in new projects, most prominently in the New Alamein city, despite a flurry of studies on the shortcomings of man-made lakes and lagoons. Another problem is confusion over roles and responsibilities among government agencies. For example, the Ministry of Environment is responsible for approving environmental impact assessments of projects in coordination with its Environmental Affairs Agency, but when it acknowledged high levels of erosion and turbidity along the northwestern coast, it placed responsibility for issuing construction licenses with the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation—as it did when faced with the Sidi Abdel Rahman Bay sedimentary accretion problem in 2022. The Ministry of Environment is also responsible for carrying out periodic environmental inspections (which have not been done in this case) and, when necessary, for issuing stop-work orders and ensuring that construction companies do not resume work before problems have been resolved.
State responses to climate impacts along the northwestern coast are what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) calls maladaptive: they create “lock-ins of vulnerability, exposure and risks that are difficult and expensive to change and exacerbate existing inequalities.” State-led changes in land use and the construction of protective beachfront infrastructure by private businesses such as tourist resorts focus on the short term and are highly localized. Consequently, they have negative knock-on environmental effects further down the coast. Mass construction, which is a relatively new phenomenon, is particularly at fault. The state leads the construction of new cities intended to generate revenue from upmarket customers, and private investors follow in its footsteps. Laws and regulations designed to ensure environmental protection and sustainable development are not scarce, but in practice, both the state and the private sector routinely bypass them. Indeed, government agencies greenwash their projects to attract investors and sell housing units in the newly built cities.
The government announced a state-led effort in 2014 to develop northwestern Egypt, as laid out in its Egypt Vision 2030 and the comprehensive National Urban Development Framework (see figure 1). These plans were established to guide the country’s sustainable social, economic, environmental, and urban development. Specifically, they aim to double the national rate of built-up zones from 7 to 14 percent of Egypt’s total land area to accommodate a rapidly growing population. Indeed, the population of Matrouh Governorate, which contains much of the northwestern coast, is expected to rise from 530,270 in 2022 to 5 million people by 2052. Sixteen new cities are to be built to absorb this population growth, as part of 182 development projects that have already been implemented or are under construction in the housing, transportation, communications, energy, and infrastructure sectors in the governorate.
To provide effective provincial administration, three new governorates are set to be created, which will include El-Alamein. Its capital, New Alamein city, will be home to one of the biggest state-funded projects on the northwestern coast. Its residents will enjoy large green spaces, clean energy, wide sandy beaches, man-made lakes, and Dubai-style towers. Unlike nearby tourist resorts, which function seasonally, New Alamein is intended to be a year-round tourist hub. Plans for the city will not only change the form and use of its 8.69-mile (14-kilometer) beachfront but will also generate severe environmental damage to the coast further east.
Egypt has a fairly substantial set of environmental laws and regulations, but this framework has a number of loopholes, implementation is weak, and a lack of transparency hinders constructive debate. There is little effort to ensure policy continuity and harmonization, limited institutional capacity, and equally poor follow-up to ensure the transformation of guiding principles and strategic goals into practical implementation on the ground. Moreover, urban development strategies for the northwestern coast are not based on updated environmental impact studies that, for example, assess climate change effects in the region or the effects of previous projects. Several development planners have noted the lack of resilience in integrated coastal zone management and regional strategic planning for the northwestern coast.
The most recent detailed study on the region’s development from an environmental perspective was issued as far back as 2010. An exploratory study of integrated coastal zone management was done in 2016–2017, but it was prepared by a foreign consulting firm and only took the form of interactive maps on an English-language website; detailed analytical studies for each sector are difficult to obtain except in draft form.
These impediments are evident in the haphazard approach the Egyptian government has taken toward creating institutional capacity and an integrated environmental policy framework. Although the government established in 1994 a national committee for integrated management of the coastal zone, the committee remains inactive despite being officially reconfigured in 2007. Similarly, although Egypt added a protocol for integrated coastal zone management to its revised Environment Protection Law No. 9 of 2009 and to the associated regulations No. 1095 issued in 2011, the country is not part of the international Protocol on Integrated Coastal Zone Management reached in January 2008. In 2018, Egypt’s Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation launched a UN-funded project for “enhancing climate change adaptation in the North Coast and Nile Delta,” which has been portrayed since the start of 2023 as part of an “integrated system for managing coastal zones.” However, this supposed system appears to exist more as a broad concept than a concrete strategy: the ministry website offers no details, while press statements do little more than repeat general goals and principles.
Loopholes present another obstacle to the effective implementation of environmental governance frameworks that look good on paper but fall short in practice. For example, the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development and the Ministry of Environment jointly launched the “Environmental Sustainability Standards Handbook: Strategic Framework for Green Recovery” in 2021, with the objective of integrating environmental considerations into all economic and social sectors in pursuit of sustainable development. And according to the Egyptian Environment Law No. 4 of 1994, new projects are required to prepare an environmental impact assessment before starting any construction, as doing so is one of the licensing requirements. The framework is commendable, but it is based on a classification of high-risk areas by the Environmental Affairs Agency, which has proved inadequate for assessing projects along the northwestern coast. (The coast is already classed as Category C, high risk.) Furthermore, while the private sector is obliged to submit environmental impact assessments before obtaining licenses for the construction or modification of facilities, it is not clear that its public sector counterparts actually does so as well. For example, when faced with lawsuits over two construction projects—Appeal No. 60 of the juridical year 73 and Appeal No. 13213 of the juridical year 72 of the Alexandria Administrative Judiciary in Alexandria in 2018—the Ministry of Environment was unable to provide assessments, according to the lawyer.1
As the above overview suggests, state agencies may pledge to follow environmental standards, but their actual efforts cannot be substantiated in practice, as the relevant data and environmental impact studies are not available for independent scrutiny and public debate. This lack of access to statistical information and official documents violates Article 68 of the constitution, which guarantees such access as a right for all citizens. All development projects can be viewed through Egypt’s projects map website, but publicly available information is limited to project overviews and basic details on their geographic location, classification, cost, and delivery deadline. In fact, it is easier to find environmental and social impact studies on the websites of foreign donors carrying out development projects.
The grand design to populate the northwestern coastal region inevitably means a vast increase in urbanization, including dense transport and infrastructure networks, and, consequently, increased air pollution, water pollution, and other environmental impacts. Protecting a coastline already suffering visible damage wrought by man-made and climate disruptions poses a major challenge to both local communities and state authorities. Doing so on a scale sufficient to offset the expansion envisaged in Egypt Vision 2030 and the National Urban Development Framework is difficult to imagine. Coastal development is an intricate subject that requires in-depth dialogue, transparent information, and involvement of local communities. The debate is not about eliminating coastal development completely, but such development must be implemented in ways that uphold the Egyptian government’s declared goal of sustainability. To protect Egypt’s natural heritage for future generations, environmental justice and community participation need to be prioritized. Yet these very terms are absent from the section of Egypt Vision 2030 relating to the environment and the National Strategy for Climate Change in Egypt 2050. This can be achieved through several strategies such as integrated coastal zone management that brings together those involved in the development, management, and use of the coast for a common goal: sustainable use of coastal resources. Ecosystem-based adaptation that involves the conservation, sustainable management, and restoration of ecosystems can help people adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Green infrastructure that uses natural processes can create healthier urban environments and adaptive construction measures.
What is needed is a shift in approach from unchecked growth to real sustainable development that appreciates and safeguards the distinctive characteristics of the northwestern coast, opens a dialogue with local communities, and respects the constitution and regulations concerning the environment and the right to information, while also capitalizing on its socioeconomic opportunities. Without this shift in approach, the race to settle millions of people along a narrow coastal strip at a cost far beyond Egypt’s means will trap the country in a worsening cycle of nature- and human-induced environmental destruction.
1 Author interview with the lawyer, Alexandria, May 2023.
In 2010, Egypt was the top contributor to marine plastic waste pollution in the Middle East and North Africa region. More recently, it has been estimated to contribute 43 percent of the total plastic waste that flows into the Mediterranean Sea each year. Exacerbating the country’s plastic pollution problem are rapid population growth and urbanization, which increase consumption and waste of plastic products, and inadequate waste management infrastructure, which hinders access to recycling facilities and proper disposal systems.
Egypt appears to recognize that single-use plastic pollution has far-reaching consequences for both the environment and public health, but its response to the problem is impeded by an overly complicated and difficult environmental policy milieu. Reducing plastic pollution should be relatively easy, because doing so is both universally accepted as beneficial to the public and has dedicated funding streams from international donors and corporations. While plastic pollution reduction policies have focused on end-of-life solutions, such as recycling, there have also been efforts to decrease market access to single-use plastic products. Examples of the latter are plastic bans in the tourist destinations of the Red Sea and South Sinai governorates.
At least some government actors see plastic pollution as an opportunity for easy environmental wins. This is evidenced by their attempts to regulate market access to plastics at the local level and develop a circular economy at the national level—where waste, such as plastics and clothing, is fed back into the beginning of the production cycle. These efforts have given civil society actors an opening to build capacity and a history for productive and effective engagement with multiple government stakeholders. In addition, negotiations over a potential global plastic treaty started by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2022 have provided another opportunity for Egyptian civil society organizations (CSOs) and government officials to engage in a more tangible way.
By developing holistic polices that address the entire plastic life cycle and creating an enabling regulatory framework, the Egyptian government has an opportunity to capitalize on the country’s natural resources, position in global supply chains, and active civil society to lead on developing sustainable plastic alternatives.
The consequences of plastic pollution in Egypt are far-reaching. Plastic has an extremely long and complicated life cycle, so its unchecked entry into the environment has multiple effects on biodiversity, public health, and the economy.
Plastic waste often finds its way into water bodies, including the Red Sea, Nile River, and Mediterranean Sea, posing a severe threat to marine ecosystems. Marine animals, such as turtles, birds, and dolphins, risk dying from ingesting plastic debris or being entangled in it. A 2022 World Bank report noted that “in the Red Sea, one in every six fish has ingested small pieces of plastic, implying that microplastic pollution has reached commercial and non-commercial fish species.”
The full impact of plastic pollution on human health is not yet fully understood. A 2019 report by the Center for International Environmental Law noted that “microplastics entering the human body can lead to an array of health impacts, including inflammation (linked to cancer, heart disease, inflammatory bowel disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and more), genotoxicity (damage to the genetic information within a cell causing mutations, which may lead to cancer), oxidative stress (leading to chronic diseases such as cancer, diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, cardiovascular diseases, chronic inflammation, stroke), apoptosis (cell death associated with a wide variety of diseases including cancer), and necrosis (cell death associated with cancer, autoimmune conditions, and neurodegeneration). These effects over time could also lead to tissue damage, fibrosis, and cancer.”
Plastic pollution also has economic implications. Agriculture accounts for 12 percent of Egypt’s gross domestic product (GDP), and microplastics from Egypt and all down the Nile basin can drastically affect yields and soil quality. Tourism accounts for another 12 percent of GDP. The effect of plastic pollution on Egypt’s status as a historical and ecotourism destination may be immeasurable, but there are definite economic impacts of such pollution on tourism elsewhere. For example, a 2019 study of coastal tourist destinations in the United States showed a clear correlation between plastic debris and the number of visitors, revenue from tourism, and local job generation. Across Egypt, plastic not only creates an environmental hazard in Red Sea diving and beach destinations but is also an eyesore at cultural and heritage sites.
Yet the Egyptian government and public perceive plastic pollution elimination programs as a luxury that poor communities and developing countries cannot afford to prioritize. Since plastic is substantially cheaper to produce than alternatives, production continues to expand. According to the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry’s (MTI) Industrial Modernisation Center, the number of factories operating in the plastic sector and registered in the Chamber of Chemical Industries was about 4,921 in 2019, while industry experts put the number at 7,500 in 2021. In 2021, the Chemicals and Fertilizers Export Council estimated investment in the plastic industry at about $7.2 billion, with an annual production value of about $16.6 billion. Data about informal plastic producers in Egypt are hard to come by, but the lack of government oversight prevents accountability for pollution during the manufacturing process and enables substandard and toxic products to enter the marketplace.
Globally, efforts to reduce plastic pollution usually start at the end of the plastic life cycle, with recycling waste. Waste management is how most people interact with the problem. Recycling has considerable support from plastic producers and producers of fast-moving consumer goods—in part because putting the onus of mitigation on individuals and governments helps reduce the pressure on themselves to stop producing nonessential plastic.
Egypt is no different. Cleaning and recycling campaigns by Egyptian CSOs are easy to organize because they have broad public support, including financial support by private sector and international donors. Further, by jointly organizing successful cleanups, Egypt’s Ministry of Environment (MOE) benefits from high exposure at zero cost. For their part, the CSOs raise their public profiles and credibility, providing them with an entry point for more substantive engagement with both the general public and government officials. However, underfunding, deficient solid waste management infrastructure, lack of clarity regarding regulatory and enforcement authority, and uneven application have repeatedly impeded the long-term progress of cleanup campaigns and the MOE’s ability to address the issue effectively.
Three of the most recognizable grassroots environmental organizations in Egypt—Greenish, VeryNile, and Banlastic, all formed in 2017 and 2018—initially used cleanups as part of a public-facing effort intended to trigger more substantive plastic pollution reduction initiatives and strategies. Growing public awareness around plastic pollution led to more CSOs and sustainable social enterprises (for-profit companies that prioritize social and environmental objectives in their business models) organizing cleanups across Egypt, but the government continued to underfund waste management. In 2018–2019, Egypt allocated a mere 4 billion Egyptian pounds for solid waste management (aggregated for different levels of government) compared to, say, a general budget of some 1,424 billion Egyptian pounds (a ratio of 1 to 356). By way of contrast, the U.S. city of New York spent $1.73 billion on solid waste management that year out of a total budget of $89.2 billion (a ratio of 1 to 52). This highlights the underfunding of waste management in Egypt, which in turn means a weak solid waste management infrastructure.
The lack of a strong solid waste management infrastructure and the need to repeatedly clean the same locations led Egyptian CSOs to push for a reduction in nonessential plastic. In 2017, the MOE partnered with UNEP to launch a national initiative to reduce single-use plastic bags. Committing to these goals prompted the ministry to engage actively with civil society actors from across Egypt to develop a single-use plastic reduction strategy. Drafting of a national strategy to reduce plastic use began in March 2021, following the enactment of Waste Management Law No. 202 of 2020.
During this time, Egyptian CSOs and social enterprises came together to lobby local governments to eliminate single-use plastic products like bags, plates, and cutlery. Their actions led the Red Sea and South Sinai governorates to ban some single-use plastics in 2019. As these bans came into effect, the same organizations that had lobbied the governorates strove to ensure effective implementation. In spite of these efforts, Egypt’s plastic problem continues to grow.
Initiatives by governorates and the MOE have nonetheless been handicapped by the lack of clarity around regulatory and enforcement authorities, thus impeding the effectiveness of any plastic elimination strategies. Bans have been unevenly applied even within single cities. And the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted the mobilization of CSOs and allied businesses around the bans, causing a reversal in previous gains in reducing nonessential single-use plastic.
Part of the problem is that Egypt has complicated and intertwined regulatory authorities that oversee plastics from production to waste management. Regulating plastic is spread across multiple ministries, including the MOE, MTI, and ministries of local development, tourism, finance, health, and supply and internal trade. Lack of transparency and complicated shared authorities makes accountability for plastic pollution very difficult to achieve.
As a result, steps taken so far do not begin to address the size and complexity of the issue. The MOE has noted the difficulty of implementing a single-use plastic bag ban nationally, including concerns over the economic impact on thousands of plastic producers. As a result, a total ban has not been implemented. The Waste Management Law, which addresses some aspects of the plastic pollution problem, is another example of a promising start gone awry. The law establishes an extended producer responsibility (EPR) scheme that makes producers responsible for the costs of collecting and recycling. It also regulates the sale, trade, storage, distribution, and disposal of single-use plastic bags. But the EPR scheme lacks a clear implementation strategy, and, in fact, it has not been implemented.
The biggest event to impact the environmental movement in Egypt since the pandemic was the twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27), held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in 2022. COP27 garnered lots of criticism, but the conference’s most significant negative impact on the local environment came from hosting over 30,000 delegates without clear guidelines from the convention on how to organize an environmentally friendly COP.
The millions of dollars spent prior to and during COP27 did not make Sharm El-Sheikh a more environmentally friendly city. In fact, environmentalists privately condemned the immense negative environmental impact of the construction required to prepare the city to host one of the largest COPs in history. The event also produced huge amounts of plastic in an isolated beach community with a weak waste management infrastructure. The lack of clarity and accountability was an invitation for greenwashing; for instance, Coca-Cola, the world’s number one plastic polluter, sponsored COP27.
COP27 also had the unintended effect of redirecting available funding in Egypt away from other priorities that would have served much-needed communities. Many politicians, organizations, and companies refocused their work to include the environment so they could benefit from COP27 funding and coverage. Local environmental CSOs privately noted that this effectively squeezed out organizations and social enterprises that had been working in the environmental sector for years, prompting many not to engage with COP27 at all. For other CSOs, plastic reduction programming took a back seat to COP27-oriented work.
Even government programs were redirected toward economic opportunities around COP27. In early 2022, the MOE initiated discussions on creating a plastic pollution pavilion with several CSOs, including members of the Eco-Dahab initiative, but the pavilion never materialized. Cleanups were organized in the protected nature reserves that surround Sharm El-Sheikh, but no long-term policy to reduce the use of single-use plastic was fully implemented. While some Egyptian organizations and international groups organized side events at COP27 focused on reducing single-use plastic waste, they were mostly organized ad hoc and paid lip service to the issue rather than offer substantive engagement.
However, a silver lining to COP27 was that the Egyptian CSOs and social enterprises that had collaborated and cooperated on plastic reduction projects in previous years were able to coalesce and navigate the political minefield created by COP27. Thirty-two organizations/initiatives came together to present to the COP27 president and Egyptian president joint recommendations on issues related to agriculture, marine biodiversity, and other topics. They also constructed the only booth made entirely from recycled and reclaimed material and hosted daily workshops and events by small local organizations that otherwise would not have been able to participate in COP27 due to the cost. Through collaboration and the integration of work aimed at shared goals, a collective action movement was created, and it is now working with regional and international partners on the global plastic pollution treaty.
In March 2022, the UN Environment Assembly adopted a resolution to create a comprehensive treaty on plastics pollution by 2024. The resolution established an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to draft a legally binding global agreement. UNEP Executive Director Inger Andersen called it “the most significant environmental multilateral deal” since countries adopted the Paris Agreement on climate in 2015. At the assembly, a group of member states formed the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution.
Rwanda and Norway led the high ambition group at the INC-1 and INC-2 sessions, advocating for developing an enforceable effective and robust mechanism. The negotiations have focused on two tracks: the substantive text that sets the goals of the treaty and the organizing body that will implement it. The high ambition group seeks to develop a strong treaty that will end plastic pollution by 2040 rather than just reduce it. This will entail a substantial reduction in plastics production, limiting their use to essential products only. It will also simultaneously require investment in developing sustainable plastic alternatives and creating a truly circular economy for plastic products.
In terms of implementation, the high ambition coalition proposes a top-down structure that could set legally binding targets for all treaty signatories. But the United States, Saudi Arabia, and some other countries support voluntary commitments similar to the Paris Agreement, where each state submits its own goals. This is despite the fact that the structure of the Paris Agreement has not been sufficient for achieving the overall objective, which is to prevent the global average temperature from rising 1.5 degrees Celsius above its preindustrial level.
Egypt’s submission to the INC-2 session reveals the need for a clearer Egyptian strategy to reduce plastic pollution. The submission focused on recycling and circularity rather than phasing out plastic production, a focus that is in line with the country's petroleum and plastic production industries. But it also recommended that the legally binding instrument on plastic pollution under negotiation at INC-2 be implemented following the “successful implementation of other Multilateral Environmental Agreements, in particular the Montreal protocol.” The Montreal Protocol of 1987—deemed “perhaps the single most successful international agreement to date”byKofi Annan, later secretary-general of the United Nations—sought to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production of ozone-depleting substances. Further demonstrating the submission’s conflicting aspects, it also recommended following the example of less effective frameworks than the Montreal Protocol, such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Paris Agreement.
Nonetheless, the INC process offers an opportunity for substantive civil society engagement. The group of Egyptian CSOs that came together around COP27 have continued to engage with key Egyptian and international stakeholders on the global plastic pollution treaty. Members of the informal Egyptian plastic reduction coalition participated alongside international CSOs in preparing for INC-2 in early 2023, presenting policy recommendations to the Egyptian delegation and attending the negotiations.
Egypt has an opportunity to spearhead the global trend away from plastic. It has the means to develop reuse infrastructure and become an exporter of plastic alternatives thanks to an abundance of natural resources, including glass, cotton, and waste from sugarcane and rice husks, and its strategic location on global supply routes. For example, Egypt was able to successfully collect and recycle over 2 million tons of rice husks in 2020 and can do the same with an estimated 3 million tons of sugarcane waste; Egyptian engineer Irene Samy Fahim Gabriel won an international award in 2020 for creating sugarcane-based tableware.
Egypt also has an incentive to transition away from plastic. Nonessential plastics will gradually become obsolete due to declining demand, tougher national regulation in developed countries, stricter certifications, and the push to decrease carbon footprints. Investments that support expansion in fossil fuel–based industries, especially in primary plastic polymers, will not reap long-term returns. The Egyptian government therefore needs to help the economy prepare for the global shift away from oil toward sustainable natural resources. But substantial incentives by the Egyptian government and the international community to develop plastic alternatives are needed if Egypt is to develop a sustainable packaging industry that can supply international markets. Supporting manufacturers and industries to adopt sustainable practices, such as eliminating plastic packaging, and also de-incentivizing plastic production would be important steps in this direction.
Unfortunately, Egypt’s existing regulatory framework is not conducive to innovation. The government needs to ensure effective implementation of the Waste Management Law, including a ban on single-use plastic bags and an EPR scheme that benefits recycling and investments in plastic alternatives. In addition, it needs to develop a legal and regulatory framework that supports research and development, production, and export of plastic alternatives. Enacting comprehensive policies and regulations to ban or restrict the use of nonessential plastics and promote sustainable practices would provide the legal framework and incentives for the development of a forward-thinking alternative industry.
In Egypt, the economic benefits will not be limited to a few industry players on the cutting edge of developing plastic alternatives for the local market. Because the country has an abundance of raw materials that can be used to produce sustainable plastic alternatives, it has the potential to make huge, widespread economic gains as the world begins to shift away from nonessential and single-use plastics. However, without strong support from the Egyptian government, sustainable social enterprises will not be able to compete with the plastics producers, let alone innovate to develop an industry that can compete in the global marketplace.
Furthermore, addressing Egypt’s plastic pollution problem requires a multifaceted approach involving various stakeholders. Robust engagement with CSOs on plastic reduction strategies will be beneficial, but it will not be enough. Strategies should include pathways to eliminate plastic production rather than focus exclusively on recycling and reducing plastic leakage. Environmental issues often start as upper-middle-class concerns, but the experience of informal waste pickers demonstrates that transitioning away from plastic necessitates an inclusive approach. A comprehensive global plastic pollution treaty that includes provisions for a just transition will ensure that no Egyptian is left behind.
As the global energy transition accelerates, green hydrogen has emerged as a promising—and sometimes controversial—solution to address climate change and diversify energy sources. Egypt has set its sights on becoming a key global player in the industry thanks to its strategic location, sizable domestic market, and plentiful solar energy. Significant motivators for establishing a thriving hydrogen industry include ensuring energy security and protecting against price fluctuations such as those triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war. Hydrogen also promises to generate employment opportunities, boost exports, attract foreign investment, and foster technological innovation at home.
In contrast to previous Egyptian governments, whose support for renewable energy production was insufficient, the administration of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has adopted an ambitious multifaceted strategy to meet the country’s climate pledges and enhance economic growth. The green hydrogen strategy he unveiled in 2022 during the twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) in Sharm El-Sheikh identified key sources of future hydrogen demand, encompassing fertilizer products, ammonia, methanol for marine fuels and energy exports, jet fuel, and road and rail transport. Extensive land near the Nile River has been designated for wind and solar power generation, with dedicated transmission lines to facilitate the transfer of renewable energy to a planned $5.5 billion hydrogen project in Ain Sokhna port. Impressed by this vision, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will lend Egypt $80 million for its nascent green hydrogen industry—the bank’s first such loan.
However, Egypt’s journey to become a prominent player in the renewable energy domain depends on its successful implementation of strategic policy interventions, which have the potential to unlock its vast capabilities. Targeted investments, administrative support mechanisms, rationalization of unplanned urbanization, and technological advancements are essential to ensure infrastructure compatibility, promote sustainable water management practices, and facilitate the scaling up of renewable energy capacity. Scaling up this capacity and fostering collaboration for research and development (R&D) will bolster Egypt’s position in the green hydrogen landscape. Yet Egypt must overcome its pressing political, economic, and ecological challenges to fully realize a comprehensive and successful transition toward a sustainable future.
For much of its modern history, Egypt has grappled with sovereign debt issues, high inflation rates, and severe environmental degradation, with short-term economic gains leading to the unsustainable exploitation of nonrenewable aquifers, wetlands, and coastlines. Further, the government has focused on unbridled industrialization, coupled with economic austerity measures, which may compromise future environmental rehabilitation efforts, exacerbate ecological stress, and ultimately increase poverty rates and fuel social unrest. In this context, establishing an entire green hydrogen industry will require a balanced and sober outlook. All those involved need to consider the enduring and disruptive socio-political-economic realities of a developing country like Egypt.
Taking a comprehensive and pragmatic approach must be a priority if Egypt is to make steady and sustainable progress toward a decarbonized energy sector and a vibrant green hydrogen export industry.
Egypt’s progress toward becoming a prominent player in green hydrogen sector is facilitated by its comparative advantages in the renewable energy sector. That is because green hydrogen is produced through renewable energy sources, such as solar and wind. Egypt has extensive energy infrastructure, substantial renewable energy potential, and vast storage facilities, and its ability to leverage large-scale solar and wind projects can play a vital role in achieving sustainable and carbon-neutral hydrogen production.
As Egypt meets the upstream requirements for hydrogen production, incorporating green hydrogen into its energy mix will likely produce considerable side benefits, including reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, moving away from carbon-intensive conventional hydrocarbon fuels, and attracting investments that drive multisectoral economic growth. Despite the potential benefits of green hydrogen production, however, there are critical environmental dimensions that Egypt needs to address to fully capitalize on its ecological potential. Land use and competition for renewable energy resources could pose challenges, along with increased strain on water demand rates in a country already facing severe water scarcity issues. Integrating a green hydrogen component into Egypt’s macroeconomic development strategy requires a thorough and well-planned approach to effectively balance the associated environmental externalities and ensure sustainable and responsible growth in the hydrogen sector.
Integrating hydrogen into Egypt’s energy framework also has the potential to stimulate substantial transformations across several sectors. For example, the adoption of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and the establishment of hydrogen refueling infrastructure could generate major positive changes in the transportation sector. Such a transition would notably improve mobility, reduce air (nitrogen oxide and particulate matter) and noise pollution, reduce carbon emissions, and mitigate the environmental consequences of increased oil extraction required for the transport sector. A move toward sustainable transportation could also stimulate investments in various sectors, most notably vehicle manufacturing. Green hydrogen production could directly supply fuel for the emerging hydrogen fuel cell vehicle industry in Egypt, encouraging the industry’s growth. This could additionally result in technological advancements in fuel cell technologies and the cultivation of a skilled workforce.
With appropriate policy support and further investment, a developed hydrogen industry could potentially foster both domestic and export markets for these vehicles. Egypt already has a nascent automotive manufacturing industry (composed of approximately fifteen automotive manufacturing plants). Since 2022, it has also signed significant investment agreements with several global auto manufacturers and has announced its intention to cooperate with the United Arab Emirates on local production. Yet, Egypt has a long legacy of struggling to meet its industrial targets. Successfully establishing a viable hydrogen car export sector hinges on navigating existing bottlenecks and creating the necessary enabling factors. Without addressing these challenges, Egypt’s dream of becoming a prominent player in the hydrogen-powered vehicle industry may remain unrealized.
The overall outcome of Egypt’s efforts in the hydrogen sector depends on the government’s decisions regarding the allocation of green hydrogen for domestic use or export. Overcoming sizeable financial, regulatory, and administrative barriers is vital for the sector’s success. If the government decides to prioritize the domestic market, substituting conventional hydrocarbons with green hydrogen could substantially reduce GHG emissions. This may improve Egypt’s industrial emissions profile and enhance its competitiveness in markets with strict emissions standards and global decarbonization objectives. However, the hydrogen sector’s capital-intensive nature, akin to other energy-related industries, presents challenges. To realize hydrogen’s employment opportunities, particularly in secondary and tertiary sectors such as equipment manufacturing and hydrogen infrastructure development, the government needs to remove financial hurdles and foster a conducive business environment.
Integrating hydrogen into the power generation sector could also enhance the use of renewable energy sources such as solar and wind by serving as an energy storage medium for their intermittent output. This would be further supported by the construction of various renewable energy plants alongside green hydrogen facilities, enabling excess energy to be stored as hydrogen for later use in overall power generation.
To make the transition from fossil fuels to hydrogen and renewables viable in Egypt though, its grid must be modernized. Improving the roundtrip efficiency of the conversion process from electricity (generated from renewable energy) to hydrogen and back to electricity, which currently stands at between 18 percent and 46 percent, could further enhance the benefits. Higher roundtrip efficiency would not only contribute to grid stability but also increase overall energy efficiency, enabling more effective deployment of renewable energy production.
This planned transition aligns with Egypt’s renewable energy targets, thereby having the potential to contribute significantly to its broader goal of decarbonizing the electricity supply, while fortifying the country against potential shocks in global energy prices. Reducing reliance on hydrocarbon production could also ensure a greener and more environmentally sustainable energy sector—reducing GHG emissions, enhancing Egypt’s environmental credentials, and meeting its Paris Agreement pledges. However, as discussed below, the environmental credentials of green hydrogen must be moderated by an understanding of the ecological complexities associated with its production.
While promising, the quest for a low-carbon hydrogen economy in Egypt involves many tasks. These include ensuring an adequate renewable energy supply; striking a balance between hydrogen production and the energy needs of other sectors (such as upholding the principle of “renewable energy additionality”); grappling with the complexities of green, blue, and turquoise hydrogen production; navigating the intricacies of hydrogen transportation and storage; addressing water scarcity and resource management; enhancing R&D capabilities; securing financial resources; and establishing robust regulatory frameworks and certification processes. Each task necessitates robust and innovative action to ensure the successful development of a thriving hydrogen economy in Egypt.
While Egypt has been primarily focused on advancing a green hydrogen industry, it also has pursued technical feasibility studies on blue and turquois hydrogen projects with external stakeholders (see figure 1).1 What is often overlooked is that blue and turquoise hydrogen production can often be more economically viable than green hydrogen and still meet climate goals. Blue hydrogen is created by using high heat and steam to break down natural gas into hydrogen; the carbon dioxide produced in the process is captured and stored underground, making it a more eco-friendly option. Turquoise hydrogen is made by pyrolyzing methane, which leaves solid carbon rather than carbon emissions. The production processes for both types of hydrogen require less energy per kilogram than green hydrogen production and are therefore more energy efficient overall. They also utilize existing natural gas and methane feedstocks, which do not require the massive investments in renewable energy that green hydrogen necessitates. Furthermore, a portion of the hydrogen produced by both methods can be used to power the production processes, potentially creating an extremely low-carbon or carbon-free production cycle.
However, the deployment of carbon capture and storage facilities or carbon capture, utilization, and storage facilities poses another challenge for blue hydrogen production. Egypt’s depleted hydrocarbon fields could potentially serve as storage sites, but concerns arise regarding the potential reaction of hydrogen with residual materials in the fields and the potential release of hydrogen sulfide, a toxic gas. Additionally, utilizing these depleted hydrocarbon fields for hydrogen storage would result in higher blue hydrogen production costs. Most hydrocarbon fields are designed for extracting oil and gas, not for storing hydrogen. As a result, adapting these fields for hydrogen storage may require significant modifications to the existing infrastructure or the development of new facilities, leading to additional capital costs. There are also expenses associated with monitoring and maintaining the fields to ensure the integrity of the storage sites and prevent leaks, as well as potential transportation costs if the fields are not located near the hydrogen production sites. All hydrogen production processes have challenges that must be weighed in a cost-benefit analysis.
Another significant challenge is hydrogen transportation, particularly when compared to the fungibility of oil and liquefied natural gas. Unlike conventional fuels, hydrogen cannot be easily transported or stored due to infrastructural limitations and its inherent properties, such as low volumetric energy density, high diffusivity, flammability, and low boiling point.
It will be essential for Egypt to establish separate infrastructure for hydrogen transmission so that it can support large-scale hydrogen production and safe and effective transmission. While leveraging and repurposing the existing natural gas network is possible, and viable in certain instances, there are important considerations. The country is already facing population density issues, and there is limited available space for infrastructure development. With competing land use requirements, finding suitable locations for separate hydrogen-oriented infrastructure could be difficult.
Separate hydrogen production facilities could also introduce ecological burdens. Construction and operation of the facilities may require land use changes that could disrupt natural habitats, affecting biodiversity and ecosystem services. Additionally, the expansion of infrastructure must be carefully managed to avoid exacerbating water demand issues or causing undue stress on water resources.
Moreover, unchecked annual temperature increases in the region, potentially surpassing 5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels by 2100, could strain the physical integrity of Egypt’s hydrogen infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities. Heat-induced expansion may lead to structural problems and increase the risk of leaks or other operational issues. Extreme heat could also impact the energy efficiency of hydrogen production methods, leading to greater energy consumption for cooling systems. Such increased energy demand could further burden the energy grid, especially during periods of peak electricity usage when demand for cooling and air conditioning rises.
Finally, the development and deployment of such infrastructure may come up against substantial financial constraints. Thus, careful consideration must be given to the location and capacity of dedicated pipeline networks to ensure the most efficient and cost-effective distribution of hydrogen. One potential solution is to convert hydrogen into green ammonia or green methanol, as they are much easier and less expensive to handle, store, and transport. However, this may not be suitable for the extensive use of hydrogen as a direct fuel in power generation. This is due to the energy conversion efficiency; converting hydrogen into green ammonia or green methanol and then using those substances for power generation involves additional conversion steps compared to using hydrogen directly. Each step may introduce energy losses, reducing overall efficiency.
As already mentioned, water scarcity poses a formidable challenge for Egypt, and its reliance on the Nile River for freshwater amplifies the concern. In 2022, the government announced that Egypt had officially entered a period of “water poverty,” with the country lacking enough water for its citizens. This decline in water availability has been accelerated by various factors, including the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which has reduced water flow to Egypt, as well as population growth, fast-paced urbanization, and temperature increases. Unsustainable water usage for extensive agricultural projects and the construction of hydroenergy plants upstream on the Nile have further strained water resources. As of 2022, Egypt was grappling with an annual water shortfall amounting to 54 billion cubic meters.
The situation is reaching critical levels. There have been increasingly worrying signs that water scarcity is contributing to social tensions in Egypt, which is already experiencing numerous sociopolitical stressors. Addressing water scarcity is therefore crucial not only for ecological balance but also for the well-being of Egypt’s population and social stability. Proactive measures, sustainable water management practices, and investments in water-efficient hydrogen production technologies are imperative to mitigate the cascading impact of water scarcity on various sectors.
Seawater electrolysis has been posed as a possible solution to freshwater scarcity, but this technology has not yet achieved economies of scale and may introduce more energy- and carbon-intensive processes. And construction of the necessary facilities could compete with the need to provide suitable and affordable housing to Egypt’s burgeoning population. These issues, in turn, could both hinder widespread adoption and escalate production costs, impacting the country’s aspiration to be a low-cost hydrogen producer. Balancing competing water demands, implementing conservation strategies, and exploring alternative water sources for green hydrogen production will be essential in navigating the water scarcity problem and its far-reaching implications for the nation as it pursues its macroeconomic growth plans.
Investment in R&D is also vital for fostering technological advancements and innovation within the hydrogen sector. Without sufficient R&D efforts, Egypt will be ill-prepared to address critical technical and operational challenges, ultimately hindering the scalability and sustainability of its hydrogen projects. A lack of a viable knowledge base and technical skill sets, along with the absence of requisite technology deployment, would limit Egypt’s ability to optimize electrolyzer performance, enhance hydrogen storage technologies, develop efficient distribution networks, and integrate hydrogen into existing energy systems.
Even though Egypt was (and still is somewhat) the educational powerhouse of the Arab world and has produced skilled technicians and engineers, it still must overcome some R&D hurdles. R&D efforts have historically relied on state-led initiatives rather than actively involving the business sector. The country’s R&D expenditure still lags behind that of other nations, such as those in the European Union. Although Egypt aims to increase R&D spending to 1 percent of GDP, strengthening R&D capabilities will also require systemic reforms to foster a culture of innovation and enhance knowledge sharing and collaboration between academia, industry, and government. Without these reforms, opportunities to acquire and develop cutting-edge technologies and expertise will be limited.
Financial considerations loom large in the advancement of the green hydrogen sector. Substantial funding is needed to continually support R&D efforts and effectively implement green hydrogen projects. Given the high capital costs associated with green hydrogen infrastructure, particularly electrolyzers, large investments are required to overcome the initial barriers and ensure the successful growth and scalability of green hydrogen initiatives. Such investments will be a tall order for Egypt, however, as it is burdened by financial constraints and competing investment priorities.
Alkaline water electrolyzers have capital costs ranging from $500 to $1,000 per kilowatt, while polymer electrolyte membrane electrolyzers range from $700 to $1,400 per kilowatt. Considering the goal of replacing existing gray hydrogen (produced from methane or coal) production with green hydrogen in Egypt, a total electrolyzer capacity of 21 gigawatts would be required. This translates into a massive investment requirement of $11 billion to $29 billion, excluding the costs of developing dedicated renewable energy capacity to power the electrolyzers. Even if only half of Egypt’s gray hydrogen production were to be replaced with green hydrogen, the financial burden would still be substantial.
Egypt could explore the potential of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to address the capital cost barrier. The country has a history of successful PPP projects, with over fifty active projects totaling $10 billion. But this funding model would only address a fraction of the substantial financing needed to develop green hydrogen capacity at scale. Egypt needs to continually engage multiple domestic and international partners. Strategic collaborations, innovative financing mechanisms, and long-term phased investments spanning a period of ten years or longer may be necessary.
Egypt must also address the absence of local regulations and certification bodies capable of verifying the origin and quality of green hydrogen. The lack of standardized certification processes raises valid concerns about the reliability and authenticity of green hydrogen products. Without robust certification mechanisms, ensuring the credibility and market acceptance of green hydrogen becomes a formidable task. Uncertainty around certification will hinder the industry’s growth and limit its export potential.
Therefore, establishing a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework will be paramount to creating an enabling environment that instills confidence in both domestic and international investors. Such regulations should provide clarity and guidance to industry players, as well as facilitate the implementation of stringent certification processes that guarantee the authenticity and sustainability of green hydrogen production.
Egypt must undertake comprehensive policy interventions to firmly establish itself in the global hydrogen landscape. While the government has outlined a national hydrogen strategy, further refinement is essential to clarify its vision, set specific targets, and create a coherent policy framework. This framework should effectively tackle the diverse array of administrative, technical, economic, and infrastructural challenges that could impede the growth of Egypt’s hydrogen industry. However, amid the optimism surrounding hydrogen potential, it is vital to acknowledge the country’s political and economic realities. Despite receiving significant aid and loans, Egypt still faces a potential sovereign debt default. Like numerous other industrializing nations, it has a history of announcing ambitious, large-scale projects that have failed to materialize due to economic mismanagement, corruption, and administrative weaknesses.
As Egypt grapples with major economic problems, it must also carefully scrutinize its pursuit of industrialization at any cost; the strategy may lead to immense environmental degradation. While green hydrogen holds great promise in reducing GHG emissions and curbing air pollution, its production raises important ecological concerns. Prioritizing sustainable water management will be paramount, as green hydrogen production could exacerbate water demand and place additional strain on already scarce water resources. Prudent management of renewable energy resources during the production process will be essential to avoid potential conflicts with other vital sectors.
Furthermore, Egypt must carefully consider the siting of hydrogen infrastructure; the country faces limited habitable domestic space, with the majority of its population concentrated on a small fraction of the country’s land area (about 4 percent) along the Nile River. Striking a balance between expanding hydrogen-related facilities and preserving livable space will be crucial to ensure long-term ecological sustainability. As Egypt navigates these complexities, it must adopt a well-considered approach to maximize the benefits of green hydrogen while mitigating adverse environmental impacts.
To tap into the vast possibilities of Egypt’s hydrogen industry and elevate its standing in the budding sector, the government must pursue strategic policy reforms. These reforms should help the country increase the influence of PPPs, boost funding in R&D, implement effective water resource management strategies, carefully select suitable locations for hydrogen infrastructure, establish a certification process for green hydrogen, roll out comprehensive training programs, and advocate considerable investment in hydrogen infrastructure. Each objective is pivotal in unlocking the abundant potential of Egypt’s hydrogen sector and helping it become a leader in this emerging field.
The promotion of PPPs will be especially instrumental in leveraging private entities’ expertise, resources, and market access. The partnerships should help propel hydrogen infrastructure development, projects, and value chains. Collaborative initiatives involving the government, private sector, and international partners can facilitate knowledge transfer, technology sharing, and market expansion. However, it will be important to structure PPPs in a way that safeguards Egypt’s economic interests, ensures fair distribution of benefits, and prevents excessive reliance on foreign entities. Although this approach does not align with the government’s intent to fund green hydrogen using primarily external sources, it is sensible to ensure the country’s economic sovereignty. Failure to establish effective partnerships and attract necessary investments could hinder the growth of the hydrogen industry and limit Egypt’s position in the global market.
R&D investments are also necessary for driving technological advancements and innovation in the hydrogen sector. Collaborative partnerships between industry, research institutions, and universities can facilitate knowledge exchange and expedite the development of tailored hydrogen solutions—and thereby enhance the competitiveness of the Egyptian hydrogen industry. Unless Egypt prioritizes strengthening R&D capabilities and provides adequate funding, it will struggle to keep pace with global advancements in the sector, impeding its ability to capitalize on emerging opportunities.
In the long term, Egypt must adopt a comprehensive and proactive approach to managing and addressing water scarcity. Egypt has already declared universal water access a top priority. Desalination technologies could help the country utilize seawater for hydrogen production and meet general water consumption demand, alleviating pressure on limited freshwater supplies. Concurrently, implementing advanced water treatment and recycling systems will maximize water efficiency and minimize waste.
The development of smart irrigation practices in agricultural projects is another key facet of water resource management. By optimizing water usage in agriculture, Egypt can ensure that water is not diverted from hydrogen production. Collaborating with experts and research institutions to monitor and assess water usage across various industries will enable data-driven decisionmaking and help guide targeted water conservation efforts. And raising public awareness through education campaigns will instill a culture of water conservation. Encouraging water-saving habits at both the individual and industrial levels will contribute to overall water resource sustainability, reducing strain on limited supplies.
Similar to water resource management, the identification of suitable sites for hydrogen-related facilities also requires a holistic approach. Urban planners, environmental experts, and local communities should collaborate on assessments and find potential locations that will help offset the land management challenges. Prioritizing areas where construction and production will have minimal impact on sensitive ecosystems, agricultural lands, and residential zones will help preserve Egypt’s scarce habitable land for essential purposes.
As Egypt seeks a leading role in the green hydrogen export market, the adoption of green hydrogen certification and the country’s compliance with internationally recognized standards will be of utmost importance. By ensuring transparency, traceability, and credibility throughout its green hydrogen production processes, Egypt will be able to cultivate trust among international buyers, inspire market confidence, and set its hydrogen apart in the global arena. Neglecting to meet certification and standards requirements may hamper Egypt’s competitiveness and restrict its access to premium markets; more broadly, it may also undermine the significance of sustainability and quality assurance in the hydrogen industry.
Relatedly, establishing training programs and educational initiatives in collaboration with vocational institutions, universities, and industry associations will be mandatory for cultivating a skilled workforce. Egypt should build on its extensive university system and create specialized courses and certifications focused on hydrogen technologies, safety protocols, and system maintenance.
In addition to human capital, financial investments in hydrogen infrastructure—including production facilities, storage systems, and distribution networks—will be vital to meet domestic demand and international export opportunities. To promote hydrogen use in the domestic market and meet the projected increase in domestic demand, the government should prioritize and fast track the establishment of hydrogen refueling stations. This will also support the potential widespread adoption of hydrogen-powered vehicles by consumers. Additionally, strategic planning and investment in storage technologies and capacity will ensure an efficient and reliable hydrogen supply, promoting the stability and growth of the industry.
Encouraging the use of local materials, labor, and manufacturing (known as local content regulations) in the hydrogen industry will be essential for boosting the domestic economy. Prioritizing Egypt’s comparative advantages will create expansive opportunities for local businesses and workers. This approach not only creates jobs but also adds value to the local economy, contributing to overall economic growth and community development. If the Egyptian government does not incentivize local companies, it could result in missed opportunities and a reliance on imported hydrogen-related technologies that could hinder the development of backward and forward linkages throughout the national economy, as well as the development of robust secondary and tertiary sectors.
Implementing the recommended policies and strategies outlined should help Egypt establish a thriving hydrogen industry that aligns with its macroeconomic goals, job creation targets, GHG emissions targets, and climate policy aspirations. By capitalizing on its strategic advantages and embracing an integrated and coherent approach involving all stakeholders, Egypt could unshackle its vast hydrogen potential, position itself as a global leader, and provide improved economic opportunities for its citizens. Alternatively, if Egypt does not pursue policy reforms and tackle the aforementioned challenges, it could be relegated to a minor position in the burgeoning global hydrogen market, which could limit its economic growth potential and exacerbate negative environmental externalities.
1 In the energy industry, various color codes or nicknames are employed to distinguish different types of hydrogen, including green, blue, brown, yellow, turquoise, and pink hydrogen. These designations are based on the specific production methods used. However, it is important to note that there is no standardized naming convention, and definitions may vary across countries and evolve over time.
Despite being home to the Nile River, Egypt has become one of the world’s most drought-stricken countries. This situation is partly man-made, owing to unsustainable agricultural practices and urbanization. The situation will be further exacerbated by the construction of hydroenergy plants such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Climate change is visibly exacerbating the crisis, as rising sea levels threaten not only to submerge low-lying areas of the Nile Delta—where much of the country’s agriculture and population resides—but also to increase seepage of salt water into fresh groundwater and raise the salt content of the soil, decreasing both its organic matter content and productive capacity. Inland, rising average temperatures are fast increasing evaporation rates of the Nile River and anthropogenic changes such as unsustainable agriculture are disrupting the hydrological cycle, thereby changing the global patterns and intensity of rainfall, reducing the amount of surface runoff, and affecting water availability as well as agricultural crops and yields. A joint study by the Egyptian government and the United Nations Development Programme estimates that the country will suffer anywhere from an 8 to 47 percent decrease in overall agricultural output by 2060.
The transformation has been decades in the making. Water consumption rates overtook supply in the late 1970s due to population growth and the expansion of water-intensive agriculture and manufacturing sectors. As a result, the Nile, which provides roughly half of the country’s total water needs, is no longer able to meet the demands of rapid urbanization, a population of 110 million, and growth in manufacturing and tourism. The country currently faces a net shortfall of 28.4 billion cubic meters per year (author’s calculation). Egypt’s annual per capita water supply has gone from 2,000 cubic meters in 1959 to 560 cubic meters in 2021—well below the 1,000 cubic meters that the United Nations regards as the threshold for “water scarcity” and close to “absolute scarcity,” which is set below 500 cubic meters per capita.
To deal with this challenge, the Egyptian government has opted for technological solutions to preserve and maximize the use of existing water resources and to develop new resources. According to the official state information service, Egypt’s efforts include, for example, building or improving infrastructure for water transport, irrigation, and wastewater treatment and reuse; smart farming and reducing food wastage; and exploiting groundwater (aquifers), desalination, and virtual water. However, official initiatives are often not based on realistic feasibility studies, nor are they subject to scrutiny or challenged by experts and civil society, who are generally denied access to project information. As a result, hastily conceived solutions have not just been unworkable but have actually exacerbated water scarcity. Construction of the New Administrative Capital highlights both the stark reality of water stress and the inefficient use of scarce funding in a country already suffering from acute economic and financial crises. Furthermore, the water megaprojects being built across the country are exhausting the scarce hard currency that the North African country possesses—but then are directed to serve only a small percentage of Egypt’s population, with almost no foreseeable gains for the majority of Egyptians.
In 2020, Egypt’s total water resources amounted to 81.06 billion cubic meters per year, of which the Nile provided 55.50 billion cubic meters per year. Total consumption, however, reached 114 billion cubic meters in 2021, creating a shortfall that was met by importing foods representing the equivalent of 28–34 billion cubic meters or more annually. Successive governments have sought to rectify the growing shortfall in water supply. In 2009, the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation drafted a strategy for sustainable agricultural development that aimed to improve the efficiency of water delivery and agricultural irrigation, which had conveyance rates under 70 percent and 50 percent, respectively. The plan, which covered the period to 2030, assumed that repairing leaks and switching from surface watering techniques to drip irrigation would save vast quantities of water. However, little headway was made until 2017, when the administration of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi resuscitated the effort and upgraded the strategy to the National Water Resources Plan 2037, with a $50 billion price tag. Three years later, Sisi also announced the immediate launch of a national project to improve agricultural infrastructure, setting a target date of two years for completion rather than the original estimate of ten years.
The government has sought to rationalize the use of water for irrigation through two main tracks. The first was to offer farmers low-interest loans from the state-owned Agricultural Bank of Egypt, with the aim of replacing outdated irrigation systems such as flood irrigation with more efficient systems such as drip and sprinkler irrigation. However, the initiative did not enjoy much uptake. For a start, small-scale farmers, whose plots are no larger than a single feddan (approximately 1 acre) yet make up 48 percent of agricultural land, were often reluctant to invest in advanced, modern systems. Moreover, they were facing falling profitability, rising expenses, and seasonal fluctuations in commodity prices, as well as periodic losses due to climate change and adulterated pesticides and fertilizers. Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Hani Sweilem has acknowledged that the modern irrigation systems promoted by the ministry have medium- and long-term drawbacks, especially in the northern Nile Delta, where increasing salinity is degrading farmland and forcing farmers to use flood irrigation to rinse out the soil. As a result, the spread of these modern irrigation methods has largely been confined to newly reclaimed desert lands, and increased uptake would require supervision and scrutiny to ensure the desired goal of rationalizing water consumption, since the absolute majority of studies that prove the benefits of drip irrigation are conducted in labs, rather than open fields, and at the hands of scientists, rather than farmers, thus having much more control over the specific conditions under which savings could be made and without exploring how open-field and large-scale application could differ. This is even more important in Egypt, where farming and irrigation are largely unmonitored.
The second track in the government’s plan sought to tackle the Nile Delta’s annual loss of some 7 billion cubic meters of water due to seepage from canals and leaky piping, along with a further 2.5 billion cubic meters due to evaporation. Although the plan has provided some dividends, the government approach has been inconsistent, and there have also been unwanted consequences.
In 2020, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation released a plan to refurbish and upgrade 7,000 kilometers (4,350 miles) of canals across the country, at a cost of 18 billion Egyptian pounds ($582 million). The government expanded the goals a year later to cover 20,000 kilometers (12,427 miles) of canals, at an increased cost of 68 billion Egyptian pounds (over $2 billion). Sisi later cited an even higher estimated cost of over 80 billion Egyptian pounds and then raised it again to 90 billion Egyptian pounds in April 2022. And yet, shortly before the first phase of the project was completed, Sweilem, whose predecessor launched the project, publicly criticized the canal-lining project, citing the lack of an environmental impact assessment and the removal of trees along the banks of refurbished canals that had previously contributed to fighting climate change and reducing evaporation.
The project has continued since then, albeit at a slower pace, in what Sweilem has called “a scientific manner.” Lining canals without studying each case individually was tantamount to wasting public money, he argued. A further 899 kilometers (559 miles) of canals were lined by April 2023, bringing the total to 6,905 kilometers (4,291 miles). Access to water has indeed improved in several provinces; the concrete-sealed canals have enabled a rapid flow and ensured supply to farmers farthest along the canals.
The project has, however, had adverse side effects. In much of the northern Delta region, the seepage of fresh water from irrigation canals into the surrounding soil had previously helped to push back against salinity, which was increasing due to the use of artificial fertilizers and pesticides as well as the growing encroachment of salt water due to incremental rises in the level of the Mediterranean Sea. In addition to reversing this beneficial effect, canal-lining using concrete, coupled with high temperatures, has increased evaporation rates significantly, further contributing to rising salinity of both soil and groundwater.
Alongside the aforementioned efforts, successive Egyptian governments have also sought to reduce the country’s reliance on Nile River waters by developing new resources. As of 2020, agriculture accounted for the lion’s share of Egypt’s water consumption at 61.63 cubic meters, and so government efforts have naturally focused on this sector. These initiatives have encompassed wastewater recycling, smart farming, groundwater extraction, virtual water trade, desalination, and food waste management.
The government seeks to boost use of sewage and wastewater for agricultural and manufacturing purposes. Current plans to treat and reuse wastewater aim to recover an estimated 3 billion cubic meters a year of agricultural drainage water, of which about 2 billion cubic meters can be used for farming or manufacturing. Egypt now boasts some 480 secondary and tertiary sewage processing stations, which are capable of handling about 16.2 million cubic meters per day. This includes the Bahr El-Baqar wastewater treatment plant in Port Said Governorate, the biggest of its kind in the world, and a further 211 plants are under construction. However, recovering sewage on this scale requires a vast network of pipes and other infrastructure and comes at a great expense. Furthermore, use of recycled wastewater poses potential risks for public health and the environment and could exacerbate soil salinity.
These various requirements and concerns have prompted farmers in some parts of the Nile Delta to resort to a method of terracing that can reduce water consumption by around 15 percent. But terracing needs to be accompanied by other complex regenerative farming methods in order to rebuild water retention (and refill aquifers). These methods may include recovering ancient seeds that have adapted to Egyptian soils, which are then used to help regenerate the soils. Egyptian scientists have had some success developing seed varieties that are better adapted to drought and salinity. But this process is slow and requires long-term investment, which is far from guaranteed given the meager sums allocated to the Agricultural Research Center in recent state budgets. Still, it is better than importing modified seed variants, as this option would increase input-reliant agriculture in a cash-strapped country already saddled with debt.
Given its low average rainfall, Egypt’s alternative water resources are limited, but groundwater is seen as one way to increase water supply. The country sits atop six aquifers, including approximately 38 percent of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System, which it shares with neighboring Sudan, Libya, and Chad. Use of groundwater to reclaim land for agriculture began in the 1980s, particularly on the edges of the Nile Delta. The Desert Research Center monitors groundwater extraction, ensuring that the digging of wells conforms to requirements regarding location, local water table levels, soil types, land area, types of allowable crops, and irrigation methods. Consumption is also supposed to be metered.
In practice, however, monitoring rarely takes place. Whether due to corruption or lack of scrutiny, there are now thousands of wells that the government does not know about. Worse, dozens of private new land reclamation companies dig unregistered wells for farming without state approval or monitoring, and they grow export crops such as alfalfa, which is water-intensive. Not only are such practices illegal, but they also amount to exporting nonrenewable water resources from a country that is already hurtling toward absolute water scarcity. Several Gulf states have banned the cultivation of this forage crop in order to preserve their water resources but then invest in cultivating it in Egypt and other countries for consumption in the Gulf. Whether spurred on by Egyptian or foreign investors, growing consumption and uncontrolled extraction of desert groundwater has significantly lowered the water table in various areas, including the Siwa and Bahariya Oases in the Western Desert, and has also exacerbated soil salinity.
Egypt has made use of virtual water, or the indirect water used throughout the value chain to produce other goods, by exporting agricultural products. Furthermore, Egypt imports up to 40 billion cubic meters of virtual water through purchases of food staples to meet the needs of its citizens. In theory, smart management would allow the country to amplify its available natural water resources and arable land by striking a tight balance between exporting high-value, water-efficient crops (fruits and vegetables) and importing low-value, water-intensive crops such as cereals, without compromising on its food security. However, this balance can be extremely difficult to achieve.
Grains are of the utmost importance to both the Egyptian people and the government. This is why many newly farmed lands are cultivated with cereals with the goal of achieving self-sufficiency and reducing the country’s heavy reliance on importing them. However, this trade-off means that Egypt’s production of high-value fruits and vegetables remains stagnant, and the country potentially misses opportunities for generating hard currency from exports. If the government continued to pursue this strategy, the end result would be a stable income from exports against lower imports, which would be a dilemma as Egypt’s export sectors are weak and the country relies heavily on agricultural products to obtain the foreign currency it needs to pay for imports such as food, raw materials, and manufacturing equipment.
On the other hand, if Egypt were to boost its production of export-oriented crops instead, it would need to meet foreign standards, including using certain seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides. Egypt would need to import these items, just to export agricultural products to generate more foreign currency income to adjust Egypt’s ailing economy. This would, effectively, limit the country’s ability to adjust its trade balance, while also missing the chance of achieving self-sufficiency of grains and remaining reliant on grain imports. Then, Egypt would be more vulnerable to global market fluctuations and price volatility. Case in point, the global price shock following the Ukraine war revealed the fragility of Egypt’s food security, as the government was forced to allocate and borrow billions more pounds for wheat imports—including a recent deal with the United Arab Emirates, where Egypt secured a loan to import wheat on the condition that it buys from an Emirati company. Under this agreement, Egypt contracted with the Emirati company Al Dahra to buy locally grown wheat along with other imported quantities.
It is possible, nonetheless, to reach such a balance between imports and local production and ensure the resilience of Egypt’s water resources without threatening its food security. This was demonstrated already in 2016 and thereafter, when Egypt began setting aside areas for growing rice and prohibiting its cultivation in other areas. This meant the water-intensive crop would only be grown in areas that have both access to high quantities of water and high soil salinity. By using flood irrigation to cultivate rice in these areas, water is used to decrease soil salinity. Despite the necessity of the decision to reduce rice fields, the decision did not take into account justice among small farmers, most of whom were deprived of growing the profitable rice, compared to other summer crops, in exchange for allowing large companies to grow water-intensive crops without any significant control over their consumption rates.
The National Water Resources Plan 2020–2050 envisages quadrupling desalination capacity within five years to reach 2.8 million cubic meters per day. Despite the initial costs, desalinating seawater offers both a means of providing remote areas with drinking water rather than transporting fresh water from elsewhere and a means of reducing reliance on the Nile for agriculture. Currently, there are eighty-one desalination plants in Egypt, while eleven more are under construction. With nearly 2,400 kilometers (1,491 miles) of coastline on the Red and Mediterranean Seas, there is considerable potential, and public-private partnerships could help defray costs. However, the government needs to boost efforts focused on improving desalination technologies and developing clean sources of energy—such as solar and wind—to power the process. Use of desalinated water in agriculture will only become viable if the economic value of water becomes high enough to outweigh the costs of the desalination process. Studies are moreover needed on the environmental footprint of waste from the desalination process and its impact on marine ecosystems. The efficiency of Egypt’s brine disposal systems must be carefully assessed, especially given the country’s unique Red Sea coral reefs and distinctive marine ecosystems, which have already been impacted by toxic by-products from Saudi desalination plants. Moreover, desalination plants require major energy input, but Egypt suffers daily blackouts all across the country—a problem that is likely to repeat in the future, even if abated during the winter months.
Despite efforts to limit agricultural water wastage, the Egyptian government has not so far paid serious attention to the indirect waste of water through food wastage. Some 16 percent of food was wasted annually between 2015 and 2019, according to estimates by the official Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS). Tackling food wastage is particularly difficult because it occurs throughout the production chain from field to shelf. Contributing factors include inefficient farm machinery and harvesting methods, along with the fragmentation of agricultural holdings into small areas, which makes it difficult to create cooperative systems for harvesting, shipping, storage, and sale. Government construction of modern silos has considerably improved grain storage, but because the silos’ total capacity remains below 3 million tons, there is a significant amount of potential waste. The result is the waste of about 5 million tons of cereals a year, according to CAPMAS estimates, while another study calculated that some 4.4 million tons were lost in 2017–2018, or just under 21 percent of the total supply (including domestic production and imports). The same study estimated this waste to be equivalent to nearly 5 billion cubic meters of water, or 4.4 percent of Egypt’s annual water consumption in 2021.
Clearly, solutions to the water crisis come at a cost and often involve trade-offs. The government has occasionally adopted a regenerative approach, for example, by concluding the Lake Bardawil and Sinai Regeneration Initiative that is billed as a “large-scale nature-based project . . . [adopting] a holistic and inclusive approach.” But more often, it has aggravated the situation in avoidable ways, such as by launching massive construction and land reclamation projects that are water-intensive and require spending billions of dollars on water extraction and transport infrastructure. A foremost example is the rerouting of scarce water resources from existing Cairo neighborhoods and other satellite cities to the New Administrative Capital, which is being built to the east of Cairo at an immediate one-off cost of 1 billion Egyptian pounds ($32 million) in addition to the cost of electricity and fuel for transport. Three pipelines were also extended—totaling 149 kilometers (93 miles) in length—to allow for drawing water directly from the Nile, adding a further 10 billion Egyptian pounds ($323 million); the nearest desalination plant on the Gulf of Suez is 99 kilometers (62 miles) away, making this alternative water source expensive as well. The new capital is the largest of twenty-two new cities built so far, and another twenty or so are planned.
The government is also investing in land reclamation schemes amounting to 5 million feddans (5.2 million acres). Although justified in terms of food security, the reclaimed land has higher water utilization rates, as the soil is significantly less fertile, and it is largely being used for water-intensive export crops—which risks the export of more virtual water.
The government’s efficiency-oriented, technosolutionist approach to tackling Egypt’s severe water crisis is fundamentally flawed. In part, this is because the government’s strategies do not seek to change the form of agriculture in order to redesign water retention landscapes, which would require reallocating scarce financial resources. State investment, moreover, prioritizes urbanization schemes and associated infrastructure aimed at upmarket customers who represent a tiny fraction of the country’s population. To be successful, the government must better align its approach with the actual social and economic makeup of Egypt, and it must consider the fact that some 30 percent of Egyptians were considered poor in 2020, even before several currency devaluations and unprecedented inflation readings. Meanwhile, the government must simultaneously ensure that its initiatives target at least 5 million farmers and millions more laborers on these farms. Failure to do so will mean a further ecological hollowing out, including of precious water resources.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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