As NATO’s much-anticipated summit in Wales continues, Carnegie Europe has asked a selection of experts three questions on the major developments to emerge from the meeting.
1. Does NATO’s readiness action plan (RAP), which will install a semipermanent troop presence on the alliance’s Eastern flank, significantly increase the organization’s deterrent capability, or is this a more symbolic measure with limited impact?
François Heisbourg: The proposed reaction force won’t have the trip-wire automaticity of even a small permanent force. The plan’s deterrent value will therefore be only a minor improvement on existing provisions. NATO could add more deterrence to the scheme by deciding that it would be a first step toward a permanent force unless Russia withdraws from Ukraine.Karl-Heinz Kamp: NATO will always be confronted with the problem that different members have different threat perceptions due to their geography or historical experience. Poland, for instance, feels more affected by an aggressive Russia than, say, Portugal or Spain. Hence, Warsaw will arguably call for more visible reassurance measures than Lisbon or Madrid are ready to pay for. From this perspective, the RAP is a well-balanced step to signal commitment to the allies in the East and resolve toward Russia.
Ian Lesser: The readiness action plan does bring some valuable new operational capacity. The scheme could also be expanded over time. The political aspect matters greatly in terms of reassuring the most exposed allies—a trip wire of sorts. And it may prove just as useful for contingencies in the South, as well as in the North and East.
Eugeniusz Smolar: It is too early to evaluate the RAP’s future deterrent capability as the details—such as the role for the Europeans—will determine the outcome. However, the plan is politically important as it constitutes a basis for cohesion, a shared threat perception, and, eventually, action. The impact of the plan will depend on all allies, not just the Central Europeans, the Americans, and the Brits.
Ulrich Speck: The most important part of the RAP is the signal it sends to Moscow: that NATO is ready to defend its borders against a Russia that has become incalculable. If there is no doubt in the Kremlin that NATO is serious about the mutual security guarantee of Article 5, then Russia is highly unlikely to test this guarantee. In combination with U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Estonia, the RAP should be sufficient proof in the short and medium term that NATO is defending its members’ borders against all kinds of attack.
2. Will NATO allies’ defense investment pledge—a vow to spend at least 2 percent of their GDP on defense—reverse the downward trend in defense spending, or is this promise again mere rhetoric?
Heisbourg: Overall, the pledge is no game changer in a low-growth EU. Defense spending will remain doubly constrained in the eurozone (which includes thirteen NATO members) by low growth and the dictates of the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. France will find it hard to stick even to existing commitments due to its five-year spending plan. Prospects are best in Poland, where spending is close to 2 percent of GDP, and possibly in a rapidly growing UK, whose defense spending is already above 2 percent.
Kamp: The 2 percent figure is an inadequate means of measuring allies’ contributions. Greece, for instance, meets the 2 percent target, although many allies would prefer Athens to spend its euros in other areas. By contrast, if Germany were to match the 2 percent target, its defense budget would significantly exceed that of France or the UK. This would probably raise eyebrows not only in Paris or London. Hence, there is a need for “more bang for the buck” rather than more bucks for the bang. At the same time, all allies are aware of the fact that costly measures may be inevitable, depending on Russia’s future moves.
Lesser: The 2 percent standard may not make a big difference to investment unless the overall economic backdrop improves—or the threat worsens. Without this, many allies will still fall short of the target.
Smolar: The 2 percent pledge is a political statement. European politicians face domestic pressures—chronic unemployment, uncompetitive economies, cultural conflicts with growing immigrant populations, fear of extremist anti-EU parties—that make it easy and politically safe to avoid investing in defense. The second post-WWII generation also tends to treat hard security with some suspicion. Yet the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine have made today’s leaders realize that there are real threats and that governments will have to make some hard choices.
Speck: As long as important member states such as Germany don’t take the pledge seriously, there won’t be a change in long-term trends in defense spending. And with the United States back in the reassurance business, it is becoming even less likely than it was already that Europeans will take more responsibility for defending themselves.
3. Overall, has NATO reinvented itself at its Wales summit, or are these two announcements just a moderate step in the alliance’s development?
Heisbourg: This summit is a turning point in the sense of marking a return to the alliance’s core business, but NATO has not mounted a credible response to the upsetting of the post–Cold War order in the former Soviet space.
Kamp: This summit is neither historic nor pathbreaking. It is significant, though, as it indicates the ignition of a long-term reassessment of NATO’s roles and missions. Such a reevaluation might take longer than the usual two years between summits, simply because there are too many unknowns in the equation: the future course of Russia, the erosion of statehood in the Middle East, and the rising relevance of the Asia-Pacific region. NATO does not need to reinvent anything, but it does need to redefine the relationship between its three core tasks of defense, crisis management, and cooperative security through partnerships.
Lesser: “Reinvention” is not a meaningful term here. What matters is having NATO front and center again in the transatlantic debate—and policymaking. This now looks to be the case.
Smolar: The Islamic State and Russian President Vladimir Putin have made NATO genuinely relevant in Europe again. Potential Russia sympathizers at the NATO summit had no choice but to keep quiet. There was a growing expectation that the alliance had to deliver by providing answers to the new threats it now faces. As there was no appetite in Washington or European capitals for major out-of-area missions, it was easy for NATO to return to its core task—territorial defense. In the coming years, the alliance must translate that shift into an action plan that all member states must implement, whether they like it or not. NATO should tell potential dissenters that if they do not invest in common defense, they will no longer be protected by the alliance’s security guarantee.
Speck: What NATO has done is to confirm that the alliance is the backbone of European security. NATO appears to be moving back to its core business. That leaves two crucial questions: First, is this sustainable—in other words, will the United States underwrite European security over the long term? Second, has the alliance largely given up on trying to shape the world outside its borders to instead build a Western fortress? The contrast between reassurance for the Baltics and largely empty hands for Ukraine may indicate such a development.
François Heisbourg is a special adviser for the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris.
Karl-Heinz Kamp is the academic director of the Federal Academy for Security Policy in Berlin.
Ian Lesser is the executive director of the Transatlantic Center, the Brussels office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Eugeniusz Smolar is a foreign policy analyst in Warsaw.
Ulrich Speck is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe.
