Thorsten BennerCo-founder and director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi)
For a far-right takeover in Europe, Germany is the biggest prize. The Alternative for Germany (AfD) is now the strongest party in three German states that will hold elections this fall.
Chancellor Scholz has belittled the AfD as a “bad-mood party.” Others have either tried to win voters back by exposing the AfD as deeply racist and anti-democratic or alternatively taking over some of its positions. Right now, none of this seems to work. Fighting the rise of the far right in Germany promises to be a long struggle. There is no silver bullet. For sure, Germany needs to abandon self-imposed constraints of debt brake that fuel an incompetent politics of budget cuts driving voters further toward the fringes. The opposition conservative Christian Democrats need to maintain their policy of zero cooperation with the AfD. Democrats need to stand by those targeted by the AfD’s racist deportation plans.
Germany’s self-identification as a “militant democracy” means to try and “AfD-proof” key institutions and to seriously consider whether banning the AfD is a necessary step. German democrats have to learn fast to fight against enemies from within and without—something that does not come naturally to generations of (West) Germans that have only known stability and peace.
Caroline de GruyterEuropean affairs correspondent for NRC Handelsblad
In many countries, the far right has a potential reservoir of around one third of the vote. Whether this is used up or not largely depends on center-right parties: They determine whether the far right becomes socially and politically acceptable or not. When they stay in the political center, where most voters are, the far right often fails to break through.
In Hungary, Viktor Orbán steadily moved his originally centrist party away from the political center. The Party for Freedom (PVV) became the largest party in the Netherlands after center- right parties opened the door to cooperation—a door that had been shut for years. In Spain, the opposite happened: When the center-right People’s Party (PP) refused to cooperate with far-right Vox, the latter began tanking in the polls—a vote for Vox was a lost vote.
In the 1930s, German conservatives made alliances with the Nazis and were overrun by them. After the war, center-right parties formed a solid buffer against extremist parties, refusing to cooperate. Today, many conservatives seem to have forgotten this lesson, sacrificing their principles on the altar of the polls and trying to overtake far-right radicals on their pet subjects like security or migration. The European People’s Party goes in this direction, too.
By doing this, center-right parties make extreme ideas mainstream and marginalize themselves. One look at the sorry state of the French Républicains, the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) or the Dutch People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) illustrates the point.
Martin EhlChief analyst at Hospodářské Noviny
Yes, the far right in Europe could be contained. There is only one condition: Politicians from conservative, center, and left-wing parties need to stop being afraid of their voters. To be more precise, there is a growing need to use populism for parties in liberal democracies and a growing need for true leadership.
Using populism for the sake of democracy and using modern means of communication simultaneously are two tools that could help deal with the far right. Politicians are sometimes afraid to meet and face people to discuss their real problems. They rely too much on intermediaries such as PR agencies and spin doctors.
This “field work” should be accompanied by all accessible communication tools, including social networks, and then with policy changes which should be sold to the voters in an understandable way. One cannot defend the help for Ukraine, for example, with phrases from political science books but with real-life examples. Far-right politicians are much better in this field work—they meet and discuss with people often, which gives the voter the impression that those politicians understand them better.
Rumena FilipovaFounder and chairperson of the Institute for Global Analytics, Bulgaria
The far right’s now-permanent presence on the political scene of various EU countries can only be contained if the core reasons for its rise—related not only to concerns about immigration but a deeper sense of dissatisfaction with corruption and economic woes—are effectively addressed. Three main remedies can be singled out.
First, there needs to be a revitalization of democratic, results-oriented, responsible leadership, which is focused on substantive political and economic performance, thus countering disenchantment with political systems that do not deliver.
Second, youth has to be empowered more consistently as a harbinger of progressive change. The experience of countries in Europe and beyond, as different as Bulgaria, Thailand, and Ecuador, shows that intense societal disapproval of the status quo can push to the fore young, Western-educated politicians as a force for democratic renewal.
Third, the EU should reclaim publics’ hearts and minds from the parochial-authoritarian grip of the far right, reinforced by Russia and China, by emphasizing inclusivity, openness and joint action. European Parliament elections should acquire more distinctive pan-European characteristics, whereby results are not simply the sum total of national preferences but reflect a cross-European exchange of ideas.
Blanca GarcésSenior research fellow at the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
Far-right parties in Europe have become mainstream, being among the largest parties in many member states and with their ideas often adopted as common sense. How can this be reversed?
First, we know that austerity-driven recessions have increased distrust in the political environment and support for extreme—particularly right—parties. We need a state that reassumes its redistributive function and ensures social justice and equal access to common goods.
Second, we also know that when mainstream parties assume far-right postulates, they automatically validate them and by so doing give them wings in electoral processes. The victory of Geert Wilders in the Dutch national elections is the best example. The response should be not only to contest their assumptions but particularly to offer an alternative political project and a credible future.
Third, fear is the worst enemy. Since 2015, Europe has been haunted by the possibility of a new migration crisis. In recent years, fear of the extreme right is used to justify many policy responses. But fear is never a good advisor. Because of all these fears, Europe runs the risk of giving up its most fundamental principles, which would represent yet another victory for the far right.
Alena KudzkoVice president for Policy and Programming at GLOBSEC
The resurgence of the far right has been underpinned by identity and issue-based drivers—rising migration flows, the cost-of-living crisis, apprehension against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, and a backlash against green policies. The good news is these concerns can be ameliorated.
The spikes in energy prices—and inflation more generally—are already dissipating, though more still needs to be done to enable households and businesses to regain their footing. The EU is also pivoting more toward integrating market mechanisms into the ecological transition to promote job growth and toward fairly compensating those who are hardest hit by the European Green Deal.
Meanwhile, more stringent measures aimed at stemming irregular arrivals are co-opting the far-right agenda. Combined with the EU’s new impetus behind policies seeking to streamline and open legal migration channels, this approach could address European labor market needs, while deterring voters from turning to fringe parties.
As the far right is also exploiting the stalemate in Ukraine—calling for an artificial and flawed peace—Europe should and can do far more to support Kyiv so that it can swiftly and resolutely defeat Russia and build the foundations for a sustainable future.
Support for the far right receded during the pandemic and the movement was largely marginalized. That can happen again. Far-right forces will retain political salience for a long time. Yet, Poland, Spain, and Estonia have recently demonstrated that a far-right turn is not preordained, underscoring that strategies to curb right-wing extremism can play out differently across national contexts.
Stefan LehneSenior fellow at Carnegie Europe
There is no silver bullet for dealing with the rise of the far right, but there are various policy options. Which of them will work will depend on the specific circumstances.
Co-opting such parties—as much of the EU is now trying with Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia)—may help them move toward the mainstream. But similar appeasement efforts toward Viktor Orbán have just made him more radical and disruptive. Maintaining a cordon sanitaire around far-right movements has been effective in some cases, but can become unsustainable if it drives even more voters in their direction.
Recent developments in Poland have proven that a vibrant civil society can keep the hope of political change alive, even in the face of strong authoritarian tendencies. And Pedro Sanchez in Spain has shown that smart political tactics can in some circumstances blunt far right ambitions.
Intelligent policies to address concerns regarding migration, inequality, and the cost of living are probably the most promising approach to reduce the appeal of far-right parties, particularly if they are communicated effectively. And EU instruments such as the rule-of-law conditionality can at least raise the cost of dismantling an independent judiciary.
Democrats should not despair over the fact that the far right is part of today’s European political reality. They should rise to the challenge.
Denis MacShaneFormer UK Minister of Europe
Today’s far right, often with roots in pre-1940 fascism, is no stronger than was the Stalinist slavishly pro-Soviet far left in France and Italy between 1945 and 1975. There has been a modish academic line for more than a decade that the far right would take over Europe. Yet voters in Poland, Spain, France in 2022, and this year in Britain are rejecting the ugly-right whipping up anti-immigrant hate.
The ugly right (a better description than far or radical right) will do well in the European Parliament elections this June on a low turnout protest vote. It was the European Parliament that gave Nigel Farage a platform, but he always failed to be elected a national UK lawmaker. The failure of twentieth-century center-right and center-left parties to find answers to mass immigration and to working class poverty as they bow before the cult of Davos ultra-liberal Enrichessez-vous economics has opened doors to the ugly right with its racism and nostalgia for white, Catholic, rich man’s Europe.
Ugly right politicians eat each other alive, as Matteo Salvini and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni show. Far-right economic theory is an oxymoron. Meloni’s homophobic politics and her attack on vegans are nasty but not really the return of Mussolini.
As Spain, Poland, soon Britain, and other countries show that while the far right wins headlines, it does not yet win enough votes to take over Europe.
Oana Popescu-ZamfirDirector of the GlobalFocus Center, Romania
We are in the middle of a political cycle that favours populism and radicalism due to both domestic reasons and international context. Anxiety about inequality, inflation, living conditions, social change, and immigration is coupled with fear of spreading conflicts, fuelled by anti-EU discourse and subversive activities by geopolitical challengers of the West. This wave of discontent leading to support for far-right forces is still building up and will not be reversed just yet. The recent experience of Poland shows that political radicalization may have to run its course before the excesses and failure of radical movements to deliver on their revolutionary ideological promises become visible.
Until then, there are only two ways to limit the ascent of the far right. One is an electoral trick: Mainstream parties hijacking the nationalist discourse while stopping short of anti-EU narratives and intolerant overtones. In Romania, Social-Democrat Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu has managed to dampen enthusiasm for the far right by focusing on social justice, economic protectionism, and moderate criticism of EU policies.
The more sustainable solution is for political parties to reengage with the grassroots, from which they are alienated and who feel underrepresented—but at best, that can only begin to happen before the EU elections.
Wojciech PrzybylskiPresident of the Res Publica Foundation
The far right cannot be contained, but it can be defeated. Polish democracy is one example.
In Poland, Donald Tusk led a campaign against a stronger far-right party that rigged the electoral game. He started two years earlier and engaged with local communities in town-hall meetings outside big cities. He also took the full advantage of viral social media communication, including the controversial TikTok platform.
It was hard work and agile communication. But Tusk also exposed the far-right’s hypocrisy on migration. The Law and Justice (PiS) government, despite its racism and Islamophobia, had many migrant workers from confusing destinations. This chaotic hypocrisy is not only a feature of the Polish far right. Compare U.S. President Joe Biden’s success on immigration with Donald Trump’s failure to reduce the numbers. Yet, policies need good communication and Tusk was fast and proactive, fit for the digital age.
In uncertain times, the public wants efficiency and consistency. A democratic leader must deliver and keep integrity and virtues, which raises the bar. European leaders should not think they can win by defending the status quo. It takes time, effort, and a victory mindset, not just defending democracy or containment. And yes, it can be done.
Sanna SaloPostdoctoral fellow at the Finnish Institute for International Affairs (FIIA)
It is time to flip the question around and to ask not only if the far right can, but whether it should be contained, how, and by whom. This does not mean sympathizing with the far-right parties but rather acknowledging the facts: In many European democracies, around 20-25 percent of the electorate votes far right. The centrist parties need to ask themselves why and what they can do better to earn back voters’ trust.
So far, European mainstream parties have responded by first ignoring the far-right parties, then trying to tweak the public agenda away from difficult issues—immigration—and, finally, caving in and adopting some of the far-right’s positions to win back voters. These strategies have not worked.
The far right can only be contained if the centrist parties succeed in reclaiming the debate, offering a positive vision of the future with solutions to issues that concern voters. That includes immigration, but also the economy. Yet, this requires that the political elite knows what voters worry about. The mainstream parties would do well to ground themselves and strengthen their party organizations from the bottom up to reconnect with their grassroots.
Shimon SteinFormer Israeli ambassador to Germany
The short answer is “no” in the short term, a qualified “yes” in the medium term, and an “if” to both in the long term.
For the “if” to have the chance to contain the problem, a number of conditions will have to be met—and even then, success will not be assured. We have to understand that the ascendency of the far right, which has been a marginal political phenomenon, has not happened over night.
Many things came together to feed the frustrations—real or imagined—by growing groups of “protest voters” who joined right-wing populist parties. Frustration with what? A whole array of issues and not primarily of an economic nature. These include the attitude of the “elite” (tied to that the feeling of unequally distributed wealth as a by-product of the globalization); mistrust in democratic institutions; a growing number of immigrants and asylum seekers; and a feeling that governments have lost control. This in turn feeds the threat of “replacement.” There’s also the fear of what the climate crisis will bring and its disruptive impact on the “way of life” and the welfare state. These are just a few of the factors that lead protest voters to turn their back on democracy.
There is no shortcut in our efforts to contain the far right’s threat to liberal democracy. It will take a lot to restore the confidence of the protest voters in democracy and the ability to deliver and allay their fears when facing a complex and uncertain future.
Zsuzsanna VéghVisiting fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
Over the past decade, far-right parties have unprecedentedly benefited from the challenges the European Union faced. The refugee crisis delivered an issue close to these parties’ nativist agenda they could easily thematize. The rising insecurities and economic difficulties following the Covid-19 pandemic and then Russia’s war on Ukraine provide plenty of fuel for their populist and anti-establishment rhetoric, which in turn appeals to disenchanted electorates.
Yet, circumstances are not the only factor facilitating the rise of the far right; the mistaken reactions of moderate, mainstream parties are also to blame. The mainstream’s accommodation and even adoption of the far right’s policy positions in the hopes of curbing its rise backfires. Instead of marginalizing these actors, mainstream parties actively contribute to their legitimization while also abandoning their own, more reasoned policy positions, and putting fundamental values of liberal democracy, such as pluralism, tolerance, and inclusion, on the backburner.
This co-optation leads to lasting changes: It normalizes the far right, radicalizes the political debate, and results in illiberal policies that undermine democratic values. To contain the far right, the mainstream has a historic responsibility to reinstate a cordon sanitaire and address voters’ socioeconomic grievances through inclusive policies.
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