Stefanie Babst
Strategic advisor and former NATO deputy assistant secretary general
Less than three months ago, on April 26, 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron performed one of his favorite roles: the leading European statesman with global insights and a grand vision. In a speech delivered at the prestigious Sorbonne University in Paris he warned: “Europe is mortal, it can die. It only depends on our choices.”
Yes, Monsieur le President! You are right. Europe is at a strategic crossroads, and it doesn’t look good. We have too many “I will make my country great again” populists and too many complacent policymakers with zero strategic instinct and no backbone in our ranks.
You have made things even worse. Your decision to call a snap election was both ill-timed and the result of bad political judgment. You haven’t only plunged France into political chaos which is likely to drag on for some time to come but also added more political challenges to the EU’s complex decisionmaking at a time when a strong and capable Europe is more needed than ever. Instead of confronting Vladimir Putin and his friends heads-on, leading a coalition of the willing to do military training in Ukraine, and spearheading new defense-industrial initiatives you have further weakened the European camp. Moins d’orgueil, c’est plus, Monsieur Macron!
Caroline de Gruyter
European affairs correspondent for NRC Handelsblad
No, it does not. Rather the opposite, for two reasons.
First, the widely predicted far-right landslide did not happen. Nationalism has done—and continues to do—immense damage in Europe and elsewhere. European integration grew out of the ashes left by nationalism, as an antidote to it. The fact that Rassemblement National (National Rally) no longer advocates a withdrawal of France from the EU or the eurozone is good news, but it cannot make us forget the political and psychological roots of the party’s ideology. Both Rassemblement National and La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) are instinctively anti-European, even if they are now ready to voice their position within the existing institutional framework.
Second, the French election is part of an encouraging sequence. In the European Parliament elections, too, the far-right landslide failed to materialize; in many countries in the north and east of the continent, for example, the far right was beaten and the political center was reinforced. This shows that citizens take their role seriously and understand that with a war raging nearby, now is not the time for extreme political experiments.
Yes, extremes are alive, and they are loud, as always. But the center holds, in France and in Europe. The price of it, and this may one day be seen as the legacy of Macron, is that the French political class will need to adjust to compromise and coalitions. Quelle horreur.
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer
Senior vice president for geostrategy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States
The recent French elections are set to reshuffle power dynamics and alliances in Europe. President Macron’s personal influence in the European Council may diminish, potentially putting its policy of support for Ukraine on the line. EU member states are already reaping the benefits of the current gap in French leadership.
Notably, Berlin is poised to bypass Paris on key strategic issues—as exemplified by the recent Leonardo-Rheinmetall tank deal. The latter presents a challenge to the stalled Franco-German Main Ground Combat System project and the efforts of Germany and its allies to block French plans for new joint borrowing to finance critical EU projects like defense.
The Labour Party’s rise to power in the UK will also lead to a rapprochement between London and Berlin, including on defense issues. Meanwhile, Hungary is leveraging its EU presidency to actively pursue engagement with Russia and China, positioning itself as a key mediator in the Ukraine conflict. Despite these developments, the French drive for a robust European defense and security pillar is likely to persist, particularly with the appointment of Kaja Kallas as the new high representative of the union for foreign affairs and security policy, and Ursula von der Leyen’s support for a geopolitically influential Europe.
Martin Ehl
Chief analyst at Hospodářské Noviny
Intuitively, the answer should be yes. The French vote weakens Europe. But let’s try to look from a different perspective, which I would call the “Valley of Tears,” inspired by an iconic Israeli TV series about the place where the decisive battle in the Yom Kippur War was fought.
It looks like European democracies are going through such a valley where democratic leaders struggle with populism, nationalism, extreme right, and even extreme left. There is also the prospect of having a not-so-Europe-friendly U.S. president with authoritarian tendencies. European leaders—if they are real ones—should better confront the situation now and act rather than wait this crisis out in Merkel style, only to encounter a new one in a couple of months.
The way Europe has worked in the last decades is simply obsolete. Elections in France could trigger a turnaround in this inefficient European way which is not delivering solutions for the voters. I stress the conditionality—it could or not. Indecisiveness and a lack of bravery among European political leaders to be bold and creative and to deliver on promises are the main problems Europe faces, not the will of French voters.
François Heisbourg
Senior advisor for Europe at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
The newly elected National Assembly meets on July 18. It will struggle to put together a governing majority among the least extreme factions, with the outgoing Gabriel Attal government playing a caretaking role until then and possibly into the Olympic Games opening on July 26.
After this hiatus, a stable government may be formed as the moderate left and the outgoing centrist majority cobble together the necessary 279-seat majority. In this case, a much-weakened Macron will still have claim on his de facto powers in foreign and security policy-making. But he’ll be hamstrung by the budgetary options of the new government. Since major spending will likely be part of any combination, aid to Ukraine and defense spending generally will be hard pressed to jockey for position.
In the quite likely situation where no such lasting government emerges and political chaos prevails, Macron’s powers may come under increasing pressure. He’ll be at pains to take any sort of foreign and security initiative with or even without budgetary implications.
With Germany’s coalition being also largely paralyzed until next year’s general election, decisionmaking in Europe will suffer a double whammy at the worst possible moment.
Agnieszka Legucka
Senior research fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs
Emmanuel Macron’s decision to dissolve the French National Assembly was a strategic but very risky gambit. He placed the burden of responsibility for the country’s future on French society. Republican voters showed their commitment to democratic values and France’s important role in Europe, a strong Europe.
However, the political landscape is becoming increasingly complex with the rise of the far right and anti-government sentiment. The lack of a decisive majority in the National Assembly increases the risk of institutional gridlock. This could affect Europe.
In the context of geopolitical tensions—such as the war in Ukraine and the upcoming U.S. election—Russia is likely to exploit France’s internal political struggles to further destabilize Europe. The dissolution of the assembly has not only domestic but also international implications. The recently reactivated Weimar Triangle could be silenced again, and Macron could be challenged from within to reduce the so-called offensive narrative toward Russia. This could lead to less support for Ukraine and affect the European security architecture. That creates a multifaceted challenge for Macron, who will have to navigate both internal dissent and external threats to maintain France’s stability and role in the broader European context.
Stefan Lehne
Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
Yes! Macron’s bold experiment of disrupting the French political scene with a centrist and pro-European message seems to have come to an end on July 7. It has left France polarized and divided, likely to be focused on itself for many months and lacking the cohesion and strength to play a constructive role on the European stage. And it has improved the radical right’s chances of winning the next national election. Conversely to what many believe, this would not pose an existential threat to the EU. Radical-right parties are already present in seven EU governments and experience has shown that many of them moderate their extreme Euroskepticism once in power. Marine Le Pen seems to be headed in the same direction.
The real threat is a different one. It seems highly unlikely that the next stage of the polycrisis—climate change, Russia’s aggression, turmoil in the Middle East, the possible return of Donald Trump, European economic decline etc.—can be handled by more muddling through. Rather, it will require stepping up EU common action in a number of areas and finding the necessary solidarity and the resources to do so. This will not happen if more and more member states are relapsing into a “nation-first” mindset. Emmanuel Macron is one of the rare European politicians to clearly understand what is necessary. Sadly, he lacked the political skills and persuasive powers to make it happen.
Denis MacShane
Former UK minister for Europe
Has there been an election in recent years which has strengthened Europe? Brexit was a plebiscite, not an election, but Britain’s isolation was welcomed by Putin and made Europe weaker. The UK now has a stable government in office for five years, but Labour is not reconnecting with Europe, beyond a minimal level. It is more friendly than in the era of Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, or Rishi Sunak, but London still runs scared of anti-European political passions in England.
The French election was two-faced. It was a humiliating defeat for Marine Le Pen, the first reversal at the hands of electors for more than a decade. But it also signaled the end of Macron politics based on a single dominant figure.
Thus, France now enters a modern version of the Fourth Republic government instability with no clear political line. Some arrangement will be found to pass laws and have ministers but no one will be happy and major decisions will be put off until after Macron’s successor is elected in 2027.
The French ultra-gauchiste political forces emerge strengthened thanks to Macron calling an early National Assembly election. Yes, France supports Le Pen on immigration but she offers no economic policy let alone partnership or foreign policy that is convincing. So, as in many other EU member states, elections just produce more questions and problems, not answers and ways forward for Europe.
Eva Michaels
Assistant professor at Leiden University
The worst-case scenario hasn’t materialized: we won’t see a far-right government in France this time. But claims that Macron “broke the wave of the far right” are adding to a false sense of security. The wave is high and may hit harder next time.
While not necessarily a strong judgement call by Macron, the snap election was another wake-up moment for Europe after the European Parliament elections. It showed that there is room for maneuver to build anti-far-right coalitions among democratic parties in Europe. Yet the huge challenge will be to come to lasting agreement on how to govern France. Of the three largest opposing blocs, the biggest—the hastily established New Popular Front—is deeply divided. The center-right/right-wing Républicains as a fourth bloc are far from united, too. Europe may learn a lesson or two on how to engage with discontent on the ends of the political spectrum and find compromise in a political system that hasn’t been designed for power-sharing.
We can expect much introspection from Paris, which will diminish its European leadership ambitions. This may weaken Europe if other leaders stand idly by. With fresh momentum in the UK and Kaja Kallas’s nomination as EU foreign policy chief, now is a good time to rethink leadership within Europe.
Pol Morillas
Director of the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
For a long time, we have been treating Euroskeptic populist forces as fringe movements with little more in common than their desire to break the EU, multilateral agendas, and “globalist” ideas. In 2017, pro-European centrist forces breathed a sigh of relief when Macron was elected, and again in 2020, when Joe Biden took the White House away from the populist-in-chief, Donald Trump. But that might look soon like a mere mirage, or an off-peak hour of a recurrent populist moment.
We now know that Trump 2.0 comes more prepared and willing to take over the reins of the U.S. administration, removing as many checks and balances as possible. Le Pen puts forward a similar message: “our victory has only been delayed,” as she stated after the electoral defeat of the National Rally in the French parliamentary election.
The Council of the EU will not be as coerced by populist forces as it could have been with a Jordan Bardella-led government. But it would be wrong to assume that the message of the “patriots” has disappeared. Unlike in the previous populist moment, these forces now have a vision for the EU, and it is convincing to many: in a world where powers and nations endure as the main actors, Europe shouldn’t be the exception. Their main objectives are now the repatriation of powers from Brussels to national capitals and putting on hold any new efforts for EU integration. This is certainly a feature of European politics that will permeate the EU agenda for the years to come. “Judy Asks” and Strategic Europe have been instrumental to shedding light into these debates, so long live these efforts and thank you for the work done!
Nora Müller
Executive director for international affairs at the Körber-Stiftung
In the second round of the election called by President Macron, France has avoided the worst-case scenario of a majority for the right-wing populist Rassemblement National (National Rally). This news was greeted with relief not only by liberal-minded French people, but also in the rest of Europe.
However, the distribution of parliamentary seats between three almost equally sized blocs with fundamentally different political orientations makes it extremely difficult to form a reasonably stable governing coalition—especially in a country that has no tradition of forming coalitions. Macron has suffered lasting political damage, even if he got off lightly with his daring election maneuver. France is entering a phase of domestic political instability. Under the current circumstances, Macron will hardly be able to push ahead with the ambitious European and foreign policy agenda with which he started out. A weakened France always means a weakened Europe—at a time when the EU cannot really afford to be weak in the face of growing threats.
Marc Pierini
Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
Predictably, the French legislative election ended in stalemate: three coalitions of roughly comparable importance—left, presidential, and right-wing—are currently unable to garner an absolute majority. While the country learns how to build workable German-style coalitions, France’s voice in the EU will be muffled.
Many French political commentators, as well as President Biden and Chancellor Scholz, expressed relief that the Rassemblement National (National Rally) did not come to power, given their pro-Russia and anti-EU political proclivities. However, despite its third position, the National Rally and its allies, including dissidents from Les Républicains (The Republicans), won 143 seats, a near-75 percent increase compared to the 2022 election, a spectacular achievement in itself.
More importantly, France’s own political drama should not hide a powerful political trend: the far right is making strides across Europe. In addition, on July 8, the National Rally president became the leader of a newly formed far-right political group in the European Parliament called Patriots for Europe, with members from Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
This far-right dynamic, now headed by Jordan Bardella and inspired by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, will soon give a hard time to the incumbent European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen (who still has to be approved by the European Parliament) and will work proactively to foster a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine on pro-Kremlin terms. And these are just two examples of what is to come.
Jacob Ross
Research fellow in the Franco-German relations program at the German Council on Foreign Relations
Emmanuel Macron’s decision to call a snap election on June 9 was met with anger across Europe. Commentators condemned his “political suicide” and slammed him for playing Russian roulette or opening Pandora’s box. Note that these were reactions to an election, not an attempted coup.
On Sunday, as the results from the second round were published, the relief was palpable. It didn’t last very long, however: reactions from politicians across the spectrum in France now illustrate how difficult it will be to form a government. The institutions of the Fifth Republic were conceived to avoid the constantly changing majorities of the preceding Fourth. Geared toward clear majorities, they do not favor coalitions and compromise.
France is now likely headed for months of instability: populists consolidated their grip on the left and despite a seemingly disappointing third place, the Rassemblement National (National Rally) might emerge as the winner of the election in the long run.
This comes just as Macron had initiated a French pivot to Europe, with resources shifting toward NATO and its Eastern flank. An insecure and inward-looking France could now not only stall this process but further weaken the EU’s capacity to reform, enlarge, and craft a strategic agenda.
Carsten Søndergaard
Former Danish ambassador to Russia, Ireland, NATO, Germany, and Turkey
It is still too early to assess the impact of the election in France. It was not a move to the right, but looking at how the votes were cast, the populist forces are strong.
President Macron’s position has been weakened. But will he act accordingly? And if he overplays his hand, will the majority in the National Assembly undercut presidential statements or initiatives? Will there be a risk that European issues and/or Ukraine will be subject to party political games?
The economy will be France’s Achilles’ heel. It is difficult to see a political majority agree on a policy pursuing a reduction in the debt. What consequences will that have?
Leadership in Europe is in short supply. France is now in a weaker position. Germany does not play the role in Europe many had hoped for. The challenges facing Europe are big: the geopolitical situation, the economy, and the populist forces. Leading from behind or just managing the inbox is simply not enough. It remains to be seen how the vacuum will be filled. A new European Commission will soon be in office. Can it make a difference?
Paul Taylor
Senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre
Not as much as it might have done.
To be sure, the inconclusive result weakened the authority of President Emmanuel Macron both domestically and internationally. But it could have been far worse if the Euroskeptical hard-right Rassemblement National (National Rally) had won. The party demanded an EU budget rebate, restrictions on free movement of foreigners in the Schengen zone, and the supremacy of French law over EU legislation. At least France is not joining the EU’s pro-Russian awkward squad.
Instead, the country which has been the main motor of European integration since Macron took office in 2017 will likely have a minority government of either the center-right or the left. Macron will have to take into account whether he can win parliamentary approval—and budget provision—for his EU initiatives. However, the presidency still has considerable powers in foreign and defense policy.
Bold French initiatives, such as the proposal to send instructors to train Ukrainian troops inside Ukraine, may no longer be possible. Paris seems unlikely to cut its budget deficit in line with the EU’s reformed fiscal rules, possibly triggering a clash with Brussels and Berlin.
France faces domestic instability until the 2027 presidential election, with potential strikes and street protests. This is bound to weaken its voice in European leadership.
Louise van Schaik
Head of the EU and Global Affairs Unit at Clingendael Institute
Because of his arguably irresponsible decision to call a snap election, Macron’s standing in Europe has weakened. This is despite voters and political parties joining forces and making smart use of the French electoral system to keep the radical right out as much as possible.
Combined with a German coalition government that is rather unstable and has taken a beating in the European Parliament elections, France is less likely now to steer strategic decisions on European integration. It is unclear, for instance, whether the EU can push forward a joined-up defense industry and new ways to finance its competitiveness without a well-functioning Franco-German axis and French visionary ideas for Europe.
Macron did bring the EU up to speed up on crucial issues like strategic autonomy and economic security. He dared to address sensitivities—for instance that the EU should not be taken for granted and that European boots on the ground might eventually be needed in Ukraine. Now, any position he will take can be undermined or at least discussed by new strongholds in France, which likely will take a more anti-globalist left leaning perspective. It can be expected that others will fill some of the void, possibly Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the European Commission president, but a strong French voice will be missed even when sometimes rather arrogant and unpredictable.
