Monika Sus
Professor at the Polish Academy of Sciences
Yes, Poland’s EU Council presidency can remain credible without deploying troops to Ukraine, as the credibility of its security-focused agenda lies in addressing broader security dimensions like using its presidency to push EU countries to find solutions for financing common defense or accelerating and coordinating European defense production.
As for Poland’s reluctance to deploy troops, three factors stand out. First, from Warsaw’s perspective, providing weapons to Ukraine and preparing credible security guarantees are higher priorities than discussing troop deployment. Second, domestic political considerations are key. With the ongoing presidential campaign, the government’s response to French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal reflects political realities, as opposition parties such as Law and Justice and the Confederation would accuse the government of risking Poland’s safety. Third, public opinion opposes sending troops: A June 2024 poll showed that more than 70 percent of Poles were against sending soldiers to Ukraine.
Ultimately, the Polish EU Council presidency can enhance its credibility by focusing on effective, coordinated EU security actions rather than symbolic gestures. At the same time, I would venture to say that Poland’s participation in such a mission should not be ruled out in the future if it were formed as a coalition of several countries and part of a broader peace plan for Ukraine.
Wojciech Konończuk
Director of the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW)
Yes, it can be credible. We as the EU are still a long way from the point where it is possible to deploy stabilizing troops to Ukraine. This will definitely not happen in the next six months, because a freezing of the frontline does not seem to be a possible scenario in this time frame.
What we should probably expect is an attempt at negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv, driven by the U.S. Donald Trump administration, but with a continuation of fighting. The terms of the two sides are irreconcilable. Moscow expects Ukraine to surrender de facto and seeks to design a new European security architecture. Kyiv is prepared to recognize the fact that it will not be able to recapture its territories currently occupied by Russia in the foreseeable future, but not much more. This is not a recipe for ending the war.
There is therefore no room for maneuver for the deployment of Western troops in Ukraine in the coming months. This does not mean that the Polish presidency and the EU can relax. Trump’s concrete peace plan is not known, but he will certainly expect Europe to make a much greater contribution to support Ukraine. The EU will soon face tough decisions.
Anastasiya Shapochkina
President of Eastern Circles
Poland is taking over the presidency of the Council of the EU at a time when the union is threatened by Russian belligerence and an escalating war in Ukraine and undermined by the foreboding rhetoric of the incoming Trump administration. Both conditions call for strong European leadership.
Warsaw’s leadership capabilities will be measured immediately by whether it provides a way to keep Russia from advancing in Ukraine while strengthening Europe’s own defense capabilities. Although Poland’s quarter-million-strong army is the third-largest in NATO, in the minds of European elites, committing more resources to halt Russia undermines the continent’s ability to bolster its own defenses. The idea of sending soldiers to help Ukraine also seems radioactive in domestic politics.
Like Berlin before it, Warsaw has placed its security bets on Washington and does not look ready to take up on Russia on its own, even when placed in Europe’s driver’s seat. The next six months will test the limits of Europe’s eight-decades-long faith in America. It is ironic that Poland, who has ambitioned for the last generation to become a leader of Europe, is holding the presidency in the darkest hour. Thus, the deployment of troops to Ukraine to defend Europe has become the leadership test of our times.
Pierre Buhler
Former ambassador of France to Poland and author of the forthcoming book Pologne, histoire d’une ambition : Comprendre le moment polonais
“Poland takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union at a time of uncertainty and concern.” This first sentence of the Polish presidency’s program wraps up the current state of play. On this side of the Atlantic, the Kremlin’s intentions about the much-hyped scenario of a ceasefire with Ukraine remain shrouded in mystery. On the other side of the ocean, almost every other day President-Elect Donald Trump comes up almost with new injunctions, some of which have serious consequences for Europe. The latest we heard is the request from NATO allies to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense and the claim that the United States must gain control of Greenland for its “economic security,” without excluding coercion to reach that end.
Whether this is loose rhetoric or not, it adds to uncertainty. So, when Donald Tusk stated on December 12 that he wanted to “cut off speculation about the potential presence of this or that country in Ukraine after reaching a ceasefire” and declared that “for now, we do not plan such actions,” his plain political caution reinforced Poland’s credibility rather than undermining it. With a defense expenditure of over 4 percent, Poland has all the necessary credentials to play a major role in European security.
Liana Fix
Fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations
During its EU presidency, Poland will have to maintain EU unity and coordination with the UK to best manage the incoming U.S. administration—which, even before being inaugurated, is testing and trolling Europeans. To that end, the Polish presidency will have to craft European proposals on NATO, European security, and Ukraine. These should include a European pledge for sending 3 percent of GDP on defense, a commitment to take over all the financial support for Ukraine if the United States keeps military support flowing, and a willingness to play a role in security guarantees for Ukraine.
However, the success or credibility of the Polish presidency should not be judged alone by its willingness to deploy troops to Ukraine, a proposal that has so far not matured enough. Poland should have the ambition to advance and coordinate the debate, to find common ground, and to think through how—if at all—European troops in Ukraine could come about. In the end, however, despite all commitment to Ukraine, Poland—as all other countries—cares about its own security first, and it has the right to do so. An escalation with Russia without U.S. backing would be as undesirable for Poland as for everyone else.
Daniel Fiott
Head of the Defence and Statecraft Programme at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance
Yes, it can. Poland’s presidency of the Council of the EU will in any case be short-lived, although six months in today’s international climate can feel like an eternity. We should not forget that the idea to pull together a “peacekeeping force” for Ukraine is framed as a response to any potential ceasefire agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Thus, openly agreeing to such a force can be seen as an admission that all parties might be ready for peace negotiations.
Inevitably, however, we must question the terms and durability of any such agreement or “deal.” Europeans may not automatically agree with a Russo-American brokered deal, so why send troops to Ukraine? In any case, Poland will need to use its six-month presidency to push for more EU-level investments in defense and to continue to put Europe’s defense industry on a war footing—goals which are still out of sight for now. In this regard, it is better for Ukraine to be in a position of strength for whatever may come down the road in early 2025. Poland needs to help move the dial on Europe’s defense readiness and its support to Ukraine.
Marie Dumoulin
Director of the Wider Europe program at the European Council on Foreign Relations
In terms of timing, Poland’s presidency will be marked by the country’s presidential election in May. This will of course create a domestic constraint for Polish decisionmakers and may explain their reluctance to discuss boots on the ground.
But Poland may have to face a discussion on Ukraine’s security anyway, as the first months of the new U.S. administration may bring additional challenges for Europeans, depending on how it will deal with the war in Ukraine. Europeans should be prepared to come up with concrete ideas on how to secure Ukraine over the long term, without being able to rely on the United States the way they used to.
Some member states have come up with ideas for troop deployments in Ukraine, but there is no consensus yet on these ideas. A serious conversation about future security guarantees for Ukraine, but also about the broader Europeans security interests at stake in and around Ukraine, should therefore take place during the Polish presidency of the EU. These are not necessarily topics that have to be discussed within the EU, as the answers to these questions will not necessarily be EU answers. Poland may thus choose to take them on board of its presidency… or it may have to.
Jakub Janda
Director of the European Values Center for Security Policy
Ukraine has only three options to survive the brutal assault of the Russia-China-North Korea-Iran-Belarus axis in the long run: The first is NATO membership, which is not possible due to U.S. and Western European refusal. The second option is other European troops coming to Ukraine to help either assist it in self-defense or protect a future contact line. This most practical option has so far been refused by most EU countries, including Poland. The third option is arming Ukraine to the teeth. This would have been great two years ago; now, it is quite late and unlikely to happen.
The big picture is: Europe is not really sanctioning China to force it to end its support for Russia’s war. Poland should be leading this push but it is not, since the Polish policy is not to upset Chinese Communists. The European continent has largely been a passive spectator as decisions on European security get made. It looks like Europe will once again just sit and watch Russia-U.S. negotiations over the future of European security. Poland should at least initiate EU efforts to confiscate those $300 billion of frozen Russian assets and have Ukraine buy American weapons to ensure President-Elect Trump will not give up on Ukraine.
Elie Tenenbaum
Director of the Security Studies Center at Institut français des relations internationales
Poland’s military rise may be the most notable strategic evolution in post-2014 European defense after the aggravation of the Russian threat. It now tops France as Europe’s largest armed forces in manpower and will soon possess four times as many tanks as the British Army, five times as many artillery guns as the German Bundeswehr, and as many fighter aircraft as Sweden. Backed by solid and sustained economic growth—estimated at an annual 3 percent rate for the next three years—Polish defense policy has increased defense spending to 4.2 percent, with a planned 5 percent in 2025.
With this military rise comes a genuine political vision for European security, especially on the Eastern flank. With great power comes great responsibility. For the first time since the seventeenth century, Poland is no longer a military dwarf but a leading European force. At a time of critical decisionmaking in the ongoing war in Ukraine, it can make a difference by joining forces with other powers like France and the UK. It is only with a sizeable Polish contribution that a European coalition could deploy—with U.S. diplomatic and logistical support—a military force credible enough to guarantee Ukraine’s security, to deter further Russian aggression on the continent.
Tomasz Zając
Senior analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
The possibility of deploying troops to Ukraine does not seem to me like a good test for the credibility of the Polish presidency in the area of security. The need for such an action—regardless of whether it is the right call—is not in the mainstream discourse of the EU right now and there is not a real expectation from the EU member states or European societies in this regard.
Credibility in matters of security is built by showing readiness to take decisive actions and Poland has proven it is ready to do so. The crucial proof of this is its defense spending—the budget for 2024 assumed 4.2 percent of GDP allocated for such expenses and the subsequent one an even higher number of 4.7 percent of GDP (although the implementation of these plans will be essential).
For years, Polish political elites warned about Russian threats, and when the full scale invasion started Poland significantly helped Ukraine by providing its own military equipment and supporting Kyiv in many other ways. I think that these factors make the Polish presidency much more credible than a declaration regarding the deployment of troops.
