Aleksandra Kozioł
European security analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Europe is clearly facing a crisis of leadership in the face of the most pressing international challenges. The fact that it has yet to develop an approach to possible peace talks on Ukraine means that its role with regard to the United States and Russia may be weakened and its ability to influence the security architecture in Europe diminished.
In this context, strong European leadership is essential. The current Polish presidency of the EU Council offers an opportunity to develop a strategic approach in the early stages of the EU’s new institutional cycle. Poland’s defense spending, amounting to almost 5 percent of GDP, and its strong belief in the need to strengthen European capabilities only confirm this.
At the same time, the threat posed by Russia and China, whose actions have become increasingly aggressive and coordinated, as evidenced by the recent sabotage of cables in the Baltic Sea, highlights the need to preserve the unity of the democratic world. Disputes between the United States and the EU, not only on trade but also the implementation of the peace agreement on the ground in Ukraine, will only benefit our adversaries.
Giovanni Grevi
Senior fellow at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Brussels School of Governance (VUB)
Political crises in France, Germany, and other EU countries pose a twofold challenge to Europe’s global strategy. First, they hinder consensus-building at EU level, whether because governments focus on domestic turmoil or because nationalist forces oppose strengthening EU foreign policy. Second, the rise of populist nationalism in Europe undermines the EU’s core asset: its credibility as a rules-based actor that builds unity out of diversity and delivers public goods. The values that have driven European integration are a source of comparative advantage in a geopolitical world, provided that they are backed up by adequate resources, from defense to key technologies.
Political polarization within and between EU member states shrinks Europe’s strategic bandwidth at a critical time for both the war in Ukraine and Europe’s positioning between U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration and China. However, somewhat paradoxically, the “Trump effect” might prove to be the decisive factor breaking Europe’s political deadlock. President Trump’s opening moves and statements suggest that Europeans may soon face more disruption at the nexus between security, trade, and digital policies, with little room for transatlantic engagement. If so, the resulting shock might shift political priorities at national and EU level, and compel Europeans—or a large coalition of them—to join forces to uphold their fundamental interests.
Nora Müller
Executive director for International Affairs at the Körber-Stiftung
The fact that domestic political developments in EU member states have an impact on the EU as a whole—and vice versa—is nothing new and part of the game in a multi-level system.
However, what is unprecedented is the dangerous coincidence of enormous geopolitical challenges—a “new era of harsh geostrategic competition,” as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen put it, on the one hand, and domestic political turbulence in some of the major member states on the other. The latter is often accelerated by increasing social polarization and a strengthening of the political fringes.
So, is an EU weakened by domestic political upheavals and defenselessly exposed to the storms of this world the inevitable scenario? Not if the forces of the political center stand their ground, resist the temptation to play the “my country first” card, and manage to convince their voters that only a united Europe equipped with military strength and economic power can survive in an increasingly Hobbesian world.
Paul Maurice
Secretary general of the Study Committee on Franco-German Relations at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri)
The possible change in the chancellorship from the Social Democratic Party’s Olaf Scholz to the Christian Democratic Union’s Friedrich Merz following the February 23 election in Germany could scale back the country’s defense commitments and military aid to Ukraine. Germany is also currently too preoccupied with its own internal problems to fully assume its traditional role as mediator between the United States and the EU. Meanwhile, France’s budgetary problems limit its ability to play a leading role in diplomatic negotiations or defense initiatives.
Add to this a few member states are being led by populist or far-right parties: Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, perhaps soon Austria... These situations create a leadership vacuum in key countries, complicating collective decisionmaking at EU level. European institutions such as the European Council, the commission, and the Polish presidency of the EU Council can play a stabilizing role, but they cannot fully compensate for the absence of national leadership.
The EU must also fix its economic competitiveness deficit, a crucial issue if it is to finance its ambitions in terms of defense and ecological transition. However, the internal divisions and divergent priorities of member states make it difficult to develop a coherent economic strategy in the face of China or the Trump’s United States, even if there is Franco-German convergence.
Anna Wieslander
Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council
The EU has always had a strategic problem when it comes to security and defense and the lack of strategic foresight seems to be a larger problem for the EU than the sum of domestic deadlocks.
But domestic politics are currently being used, at the very least, as a pretext not to take bold strategic action despite the urgency of the geopolitical environment. For example, it is telling that the leaders’ retreat in Brussels on Monday, February 3, did not result in a green light for major new initiatives, such as a €500 billion ($518 billion) joint defense loan or an agreement to use the €230 billion ($238 billion) of frozen Russian assets kept in Belgium and France to “buy European” weapons for Ukraine.
Germany has been reluctant to move forward, pretexting its upcoming national election, but the hesitation was actually there before the election was announced, and not only in Germany.
Updating the far too broad Strategic Compass, drafted before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, may need to wait until domestic politics are more settled. But the much needed “big bang” in European defense, as proposed by Defense and Space Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, does not need another EU strategic document and should be less hostage to domestic politics than it currently is.
Jaanika Merilo
Visiting lecturer at the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences
Since the start of the large-scale war in Ukraine, Hungary has consistently seized every opportunity to block support for Ukraine or obstruct sanctions against Russia whenever a unanimous vote among EU countries was required. Each instance was followed by a bargain, allowing Hungary to extract new advantages.
To avoid such scenarios, first and foremost, there should be no place for relentless blackmail among nations that are supposed to share the same values and have common threat estimates. Giving in to a blackmailer only reinforces the behavior, turning it into a habit—as we have already seen.
Now, there is more than Hungary blocking the aspirations of Ukraine to join the EU, and the challenge to reach a unanimous vote becomes even harder. With right-wing and populist politicians gaining momentum, I believe it is crucial to shift from unanimous voting to a qualified majority with a blocking minority. Without this change, the EU runs the risk of perpetual stalemate, unable to not only support Ukraine but also protect Europe through decisive action.
Daniel Gros
Director of the Institute for European Policymaking at Bocconi University
Political deadlock at home means that Europe’s leaders are unable to agree on a proactive strategy. But it often also means that when there is a need to react to an emergency, few object to taking action. These are the constraints and the opportunities facing the duo that now leads Europe: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa. It would be useless to put forward bold plans for the EU to take charge of the problems. But they also know that when push comes to shove, they can count on an overwhelming majority of the willing to do what is needed.
On the trade front, negotiations are conducted by the EU and gridlock in national capitals means that there is unlikely to be strong opposition to whatever the commission decides.
On Ukraine, the EU appears helpless and irrelevant, condemned to accept whatever Trump and Russian President Putin negotiate. In reality, the EU has significant influence, because it has provided 50 percent of the military and financial aid Ukraine has received so far. Without this aid, the battlelines would not have stabilized and Putin would be in an even stronger position. The EU might not make the headlines, but its actions shape the situation on the ground, which is what counts in the end.
Oana Lungescu
Distinguished fellow at the Royal United Services Institute
While the Trump administration is powering ahead on all fronts, the EU is just getting started, after a year full of European elections and self-inflicted political crises in France and Germany.
The coming months will bring more elections. In Germany, Poland, and Romania, Ukraine has become a polarizing issue, with German Chancellor Scholz blocking an extra €3 billion ($3.1 billion) in aid, Poland avoiding any discussion of peacekeeping troops in a possible U.S.-brokered deal, and Romania’s ultra-nationalist candidate Cǎlin Georgescu parroting Putin’s line that Ukraine is an “invented” country. This does not bode well for European unity on a solution for Ukraine, which will also shape the continent’s future.
The EU has been working with Washington to “de-risk” trade with China, and it may take an even tougher stance if conservative Friederich Merz becomes the next chancellor of Germany. However, Trump’s threatened tariff war against Germany and other European allies would backfire and risk driving some Europeans closer to China.
It is in Europe’s strategic interest to show Trump the danger of going it alone in a world where China aligns with Russia, Iran, and North Korea. But Europeans need to stand together, stay cool, and move much faster than they have until now.
Judy Dempsey
Nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
The EU doesn’t have a strategic problem. It has a strategic deficit. This has little to do with the political deadlocks in France, Germany, or other member states. One of the EU’s biggest weaknesses is that it reacts and does not strategize. Why? Because the twenty-seven member states, except in the field of migration, don’t share a common threat perception. This is despite Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine, the Trump administration’s disregard for multilateral institutions, and the growing confidence of China. All three threaten Europe.
A common EU threat perception could foster a strategic culture. Without either, Trump, Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping can—and already do—divide the union. Just wait to see how member states will respond when Trump, no fan of the EU, imposes tariffs. He is relying on concessions, acquiescence, transactional deals. China and Russia, too, have their ways of dividing the EU. All three are challenging the union’s ambitions to be a global player—and its values.
It could and should be different. But this is unlikely. Many EU governments, particularly Germany, are pursuing their own national interests at the expense of making the EU a strategic player. Until this changes, Europe is a pawn waiting to be taken off the board.
Ian Bond
Deputy director of the Centre for European Reform
Domestic political disagreements do not always lead to foreign policy paralysis: To defeat Nazi Germany, Winston Churchill and Clement Atlee bridged profound ideological differences, remaining in UK’s coalition government from 1940 to 1945.
That works if parties’ foreign policy aims are aligned. But former U.S. senator Arthur Vandenberg’s assertion that “politics stops at the water’s edge” would have been meaningless if Democrats and Republicans had disagreed about the need to stand up to Soviet expansionism after 1945.
In some EU countries, there is consensus among political parties across the political spectrum on responding to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine: The parliaments of both Finland and Sweden approved government decisions to join NATO by overwhelming cross-party majorities, for example. Policymaking is hamstrung, however, where there is no stable majority—as in France—and major parties disagree over key foreign policy challenges such as the Russian threat and how to respond to it.
But the biggest obstacle to effective EU foreign and security action is not domestic deadlock; it is disagreement among member states on the EU’s objectives, coupled with the union’s decisionmaking process. Even if twenty-six countries achieve cross-party agreement on how to respond to Trump or how to help Ukraine achieve victory, it only takes one Viktor Orbán to paralyze the EU.
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