For former imperial powers, Europeans seem strangely on the backfoot as nineteenth century spheres of influence come back as the organizing principle of global affairs.
The answer is obviously not to revert to imperialism—it culminated in two devastating world wars. But Europeans are not leaning enough into building their own sphere of influence as a central gambit of their geopolitical and strategic power, to face the rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship U.S. President Donald Trump desires.
With his return to the White House, this has become a matter of survival for Europe. The scales have now tipped in favor of the affirmation of three spheres of influence led by the United States, China, and Russia. Europe’s place in this system is at best an afterthought, and at worst up for grabs—and division—between the three.
Trump’s United States does not de facto include the EU and NATO member states in its sphere of influence. Instead of a “pivot to Asia,” what the Trump administration may be doing is a recentering on the northwestern hemisphere, with the core American area of influence composed of North and Central America, Greenland, and only a sliver of Western Europe.
Trump’s approach to the United States’ global role—weakening its alliances with wealthy friends in Europe and Canada, massively cutting its international aid, dismantling soft power vehicles such as Radio Free Europe—creates opportunities for Europeans to step up.
The imperative is to preserve Europeans’ sovereignty, security, and prosperity, and to empower them to mitigate the dismantling of the rules-based international order. A powerful, deliberately-conceived European sphere of influence could even mend the relationship with the United States in the longer term.
Enlargement has been the default “sphere of influence” policy for the EU, but it has suffered well-documented challenges and setbacks. The union’s enlargement policy has also become too narrow for what is now needed. While it should remain part of the toolbox where effective, new ideas are needed.
The core of the European sphere of influence would consist of EU member states, plus mutually beneficial strategic partnerships with countries holding quasi-membership status: The UK, the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Turkey. Asserting this sphere should not be solely driven by the EU institutions in Brussels. That would prevent it from firing on full cylinders with the UK, Norway, and Turkey—which would be important components for its success. Instead, it should be a common endeavor between the EU and individual member states with international leadership.
There is an immediate play to be made in the defense and informational environments.
Ukraine is an obvious place to start. It has been clear since mid-February that the Trump administration does not consider Ukraine as a strategic security concern in the same way that Europeans do. If the transatlantic alliance is to survive in some form, it is essential to acknowledge that strategic threat assessments will differ between the United States and Europe, and compel the Europeans to act without the Americans.
Europeans should be moving immediately to build a deep partnership with Ukraine that would be mutually beneficial, setting it apart from the exploitative approach of the United States.
Regardless of the outcome of ongoing Russian-American negotiations, the Ukrainian military will continue needing support to preserve the country’s sovereignty. This isn’t merely a cost for Europeans, it is an industrial and strategic opportunity. The Ukrainian army has become the most battle-hardened military on the continent and one of the most creatively equipped. It would be a contributor to European security in the long term, and its loss to Russia would be a security threat.
Ukraine remains a resource-rich country, in terms of agriculture but also raw and rare minerals. Its reconstruction needs could be a boon for European economies. Even without fully becoming a member of the EU, a special partnership anchored in irreversible investments would benefit both sides, including vis-à-vis the global south and its food needs.
Another immediate opening is in the soft power and informational space. European foreign ministers agreed to look into whether the EU could replace American funding for Radio Free Europe. They could either do that or choose to strengthen local media across the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova. Either way, the informational space is one that the standard bearers of liberal democracy cannot cede. This would require a significant beefing up of defenses of information systems within the EU to prevent manipulation by external actors, not only Russian but also private American actors, especially ahead of elections.
The Europeans could also build a special visa program for highly-qualified researchers, scientists, and innovators whose research grants and programs are being dismantled by the Trump administration. Strengthening Europe’s STEM standing will be critical for its strategic viability. And this could be the first building block of a longer-term overhaul of migration policy, to be developed in common with the UK, Canada, and Norway.
As a close second order of business, anchoring the Western Balkans firmly inside the European sphere must be given priority. Mass protests in Serbia indicate the population’s thirst for change. This doesn’t necessarily have to mean full EU membership. It could be a more business-driven, live-and-let-live approach that undercuts attempts by both Russia and some members of the Trump administration to crowd out Europeans.
In parallel, Europeans—including the UK—should work in concert to build larger partnerships with Gulf countries, moving away from a piggybank approach that has largely characterized their relations so far. This should be based on recognizing their potential in the fields of new technologies, connectivity, and infrastructure, as well as their strategic added value as hedging powers.
While Europeans do not have the means to replace the American share of international aid, identifying more mutually beneficial areas to partner with certain African countries is central to build a robust and enduring European sphere of influence.
None of this needs to be overly antagonistic toward the United States; It would merely reflect the Europeans maturing strategically, as their American allies have been asking them to.
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