Sinan Ülgen
Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
The large geopolitical shocks linked to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, coupled with a Trump-led America that is revisiting its commitment to Europe’s security, have compelled European policymakers to address this critical theme.
The first visible impact of this reckoning has been the political impetus for raising defense expenditures at the national level, as witnessed particularly in Germany, but also at the EU level, with the flexibilities introduced in defense spending.
The second impact has been acknowledging that the continent’s security cannot be ensured exclusively by the EU member states and EU-led security arrangements.
Going forward, the EU may need to build security partnerships with other non-EU European countries given the current role that the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Norway play in European security—in addition to their actual ability to contribute to European defense capabilities.
Turkey has the second-largest standing army in NATO after the United States and has combat-ready armed forces with experience in orchestrating multi-domain and cross-border operations.
As a result, the EU will now need to devise novel and more inclusive arrangements to leverage the ability of these non-EU nations to contribute to the continent’s defense.
Ester Sabatino
Research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
Should the security situation of EU countries deteriorate further, the EU may reconsider its position on including Turkey and the UK in defense industrial cooperation. Until then, defense cooperation measures will continue to be directed toward strengthening the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base.
This is reflected in the measures included in the White Paper for European Defense and in the proposal for a regulation on the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument. The money the EU is freeing through SAFE, however, is not exclusively directed to EU companies: SAFE allows for up to 35 percent of the final components’ cost to originate from outside of the EU.
To cooperate, both Ankara and London would need to sign an agreement with the EU. The role they might play would be that of a minor partner due to the 65/35 percent rule, but the SAFE instrument per se does not completely exclude cooperation with these countries.
This new money injection will likely impact cooperation outside of the EU framework but there has been a trend of increased defense industrial cooperation, particularly with Ankara. Turkey has positioned itself in an area in which European alternatives are scarce. On the UK side, the prospect of a security and defense partnership could substantially change the cooperation opportunities the country may have access to.
Jakub Janda
Director of the European Values Center for Security Policy
Finally, EU countries seem on the verge of starting to massively invest in Europe’s defense. Sadly, it comes eleven years later than it should have, after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014.
Europe faces two major problems. First, if massive funds are to be invested in the armament of Europe, transforming this large new demand into deliveries will take three to seven years. With aggressive Russian invaders already killing Europeans in Ukraine for three years, heavily backed by Chinese material, the next few years might be decisive for the physical defense of European NATO states.
Second, given decades of underinvestment, Europe simply lacks the industrial capabilities to produce the most-advanced weapon systems and does not have the industrial mass for even less advanced items.
Therefore, the best strategy for European survival has to be threefold: Purchase any available weapon systems off the shelf (like Poland does with South Korean arms), delay the American strategic withdrawal from Europe with any financial means possible, and massively build up the European defense industry—including with British and Turkish segments.
Europe must at least double its defense spending right away; we are literally playing for time after years of naivety, laziness, and ignorance.
Anna Wieslander
Director for Northern Europe at the Atlantic Council
The boost in money available for buying weapons and ammunition should be directed to “buy European.” This could be extended to the UK or Turkey if they sign defense agreements with the EU.
For several reasons, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to consolidate and strengthen the European Defense Technological and Industrial Base. The stakes are too high to dilute it in third countries.
First, the defense industry spurs technological developments and stimulates innovation, which is what the EU needs to do more of in order to withstand global competition.
Second, the difficulties in supplying Ukraine with weapons have underlined the need for the EU to create conditions for sustainable defense production capabilities. The union needs to ensure that there are constant orders to keep its production lines running and preserve its local suppliers and short supply chains. These conditions are crucial to maintain production rates up and minimize the need to buy off the shelf from third countries.
Third, for EU countries to get buy-in from their populations to support 3 to 5 percent of GDP going to defense spending, increasing job opportunities in the defense sector will be important.
Finally, if Europe wants to be able to make sovereign decisions about its security and defense, it needs to increase the independence of its weapon systems and security of supply.
Olivier Schmitt
Professor and Head of research of the Institute for Military operations at the Royal Danish Defense College
The landscape of the European security architecture is rapidly collapsing, with a U.S. administration not only disinterested in a European commitment, but increasingly hostile towards its European allies—especially those dubbed as “globalists”—while warming up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. This is in direct opposition to most of the EU member states’ interests.
Of course, European security is more than the EU’s security. And while EU member states must absolutely engage in internal strengthening through increased defense spending and societal mobilization, they simultaneously need to strategically think about mutually beneficial security partnerships.
Both the UK and Turkey are credible and important military powers on their own, and they both oppose Russian expansion—albeit for different reasons. As such, they should both be considered major security partners for the EU. Including them in the European preference would be a way to create mutual interests that can pave the way for greater convergence around security partnerships, regardless of the format.
Gesine Weber
Research Fellow at the Paris office of the German Marshall Fund of the United States
As European states ramp up defense spending and start building Europe’s defense industrial base, limiting the acquisition and procurement to equipment “made in the EU” seems a coherent option—especially if the EU contributes to financing these efforts.
Yet, building the “Europe de la défense” goes beyond the borders of the bloc and requires a whole-of-Europe effort to optimize interoperability, long-term planning, and leveraging economies of scale. Hence why, it would be shortsighted to limit the defense industrial dimension to the EU only.
Accordingly, Brussels would be well-advised to extend the European preference to other European states, especially the UK as a critical partner for European security.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of non-EU states into a European preference should be subject to conditions. This could include financial contributions via “plug-and-play” mechanisms for funding specific projects, joint borrowing by groups of EU and non-EU states, mandatory cooperation with the European Defense Agency, or association with the EU’s defense industrial toolbox—as it is already the case for Norway. All these steps would strengthen the European defense industrial base in the long term, with the EU at its core.
Marc Pierini
Senior fellow at Carnegie Europe
The United Kingdom and Turkey have important military production capacities and innovation talents. This makes them significant potential contributors to a European-led “coalition of the willing.”
The UK defense industry is closely tied to its U.S. partners and routinely includes American components in the weaponry it produces. In today’s transatlantic context, the key political issue is the unpredictability of U.S. policy decisions and, in some cases, a deliberate enmity against European countries—especially those belonging to the EU. It would therefore take precise arrangements to make sure that future EU defense spending in Britain genuinely reinforces Europe’s strategic autonomy.
Turkey’s case is equally political. Due to Ankara’s “balanced policy” between Russia and NATO and its military incursions in Syria, a set of high-end components such as navigation electronics for aircraft, or engines for ships, aircraft, and tanks, has been banned from exports to Turkey. Lifting these sanctions would necessitate strong commitments before including Turkey in the European preference scheme. In addition, in terms of reassurance operations in Eastern Europe, relying on Turkey could be a risk for Europe’s autonomy that would depend on Washington’s attitude vis-à-vis Ankara, given that most of the latter’s air force and defense is U.S.-made.
Federica Mangiameli
Senior program manager for security and defense at GLOBSEC
Integrating the UK and Turkey into EU plans to rearm is both strategic and necessary.
The UK’s advanced defense industry, particularly in air combat and naval capabilities, aligns with EU defense objectives. Despite Brexit, the UK remains deeply committed to European security through NATO, bilateral defense collaborations, and strong support for Ukraine. Excluding it risks weakening capability development and transatlantic cohesion. Structured agreements, such as case-by-case participation in the European Defence Fund, could balance EU priorities with UK contributions.
However, that needs to be balanced against potential tensions over procurement, standardisation, and military technologies. Cooperation shouldn’t undermine the EU’s goal of a unified and competitive European defense industry.
The situation with Turkey is more complex. Its robust defense industry, particularly in drone technology, has proven effective—including against Russian-built systems. Turkey’s strategic position makes it a crucial partner in countering regional threats and balancing Russian influence. Isolating it risks pushing it closer to adversaries, undermining EU security interests. But cooperation is an unlikely scenario given tensions with Cyprus and Greece.
Despite these aspects, the current security landscape does not allow the EU to be overly selective with its partners. It is necessary to act pragmatically and align with partners who share the same strategic interests.
Łukasz Maślanka
Senior fellow at the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW)
The priority of the EU in the short term—before the start of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) in 2028—should be to help member states in filling capability gaps and to continue military assistance to Ukraine—including after a potential ceasefire.
Therefore, joint procurement under the RearmEurope or the European Defense Industry Programme (EDIP) should primarily be guided by the criteria of quality and delivery time.
This, of course, implies openness to producers from outside the EU. In the case of the UK and Norway, this is further justified by their strategic proximity to the EU in defense and the high level of integration between British and Norwegian defense industries and the EU’s.
For other countries, such as Turkey, the United States, or Switzerland, the EU should firmly require the unrestricted disposal of purchased equipment to allow its transfer to partners.
Stricter criteria can be applied to long-term initiatives supporting the joint development of defense projects such as the European Defense Fund, the industrial part of EDIP, or further programs under future MFFs. In this case, EU funding should primarily be allocated to EU-based companies.
The non-EU defense sector could access funds if it guarantees that it is not subject to third-country export regulations, and if it makes a significant technological contribution to its EU partners.
