Justin Logan
Director of defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO Institute
The puzzle of the relationship between Europe and U.S. President Donald Trump at this point is how much the Europeans hate Trump’s gestalt therapy and how much they seem to need more of it. In response to the February 28 dustup in the Oval Office with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (and following the dressing-down by U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth in Brussels and the speech by U.S. Vice President JD Vance in Munich), European capitals went right back to their previous proposal for a European trip wire in Ukraine, tied to American power. The message seems not to be getting through.
Rhetoric in European capitals is belied by behavior in those same capitals. French President Emmanuel Macron has said that “Europe can die,” while Germany’s Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock described Russia’s war in Ukraine as an “existential” threat to Europe, but major European powers’ behavior does not match this rhetoric.
Europe’s helplessness is learned. The question is whether it can be unlearned. Sterner measures from Washington may be required. The United States’ March 3 cutoff of weapons to Ukraine delivered a shock to the EU and Germany: Brussels responded with €800 billion ($860 billion) in allowances for new defense spending, and Berlin might even pry open its own wallet to purchase more defense—at least in theory.
Trump has made clear: Americans will not fight for Ukraine, nor for allies in Ukraine. What European countries do with that information is up to them.
Tara Varma
Visiting fellow in the Center of the United States and Europe at Brookings
European leaders, lambasted by Trump publicly and privately, do not grasp how deep the rupture of the transatlantic alliance now is.
The key issue for Europeans is to assess whether the U.S. security guarantee—and the nuclear umbrella provided by NATO, for those countries that are members—holds. Trump has said time and again he believes European security should be left to the Europeans—except when it comes to Ukraine, where he aims to settle the war directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin, possibly with Zelensky’s acquiescence. He no longer wants Ukraine to benefit from U.S. air defenses or intelligence sharing, which have been so crucial to the country’s survival. The Trump administration announced on March 3 the suspension of all military aid to Ukraine, and the CIA director declared two days later the United States was pausing intelligence sharing, as a way to twist Zelensky’s arm into signing a minerals deal that Trump so desires.
Zelensky and other Europeans leaders have reaffirmed their commitment to peace, and a deal might ultimately be signed by Ukraine and the United States. Europeans know how dependent they are on U.S. weaponry. However, finally aware of the urgency of the situation, they have started to replace the U.S. capacities that Ukraine needs. And the Europeans aren’t resourceless, as the ReArm Europe defense package presented on March 4 by the European Commission demonstrates.
Jeremy Shapiro
Research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations
No, U.S. backing for a European force in Ukraine will not materialize.
The Trump administration has been brutally clear about this, over and over again. I’m not sure why the Europeans won’t hear that message.
Marek Magierowski
Director of the Strategy for Poland Program at the Freedom Institute in Warsaw
Europe alone cannot carry the burden of defending Ukraine, either now or in the foreseeable future. Grandiose chest thumping may be a harbinger of change in Europe’s strategic posture, but it is hard to imagine efficient European deterrence against Russia without America’s assistance.
It is even harder to imagine strong U.S. backing given the Trump administration’s growing animosity toward Zelensky and the Ukrainian cause, as seen in the March 3 halting of U.S. military aid to Ukraine.
Also, one should not underestimate domestic considerations and the expectations of Trump’s MAGA base in his political calculus. Offering security guarantees to a man who just a few days ago was depicted as a dictator and has become an object of ridicule and even hatred among the most radical Republicans would be extremely difficult to justify.
Nevertheless, European leaders should prioritize mending transatlantic ties, as tough as this task might appear. Otherwise, there will be no U.S. security guarantees either for Ukraine or for Europe in the framework of the North Atlantic alliance.
Sadly, we have reached a point at which the U.S. president seems more likely to attend the May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow than the NATO summit in The Hague a few weeks later.
James Carafano
Senior counselor to the president and E. W. Richardson fellow at The Heritage Foundation
There is no reason for the United States to supply security guarantees to Ukraine.
Ukraine is not a member of NATO or a vital interest for the United States.
That said, the United States has an interest in a free and independent Ukraine, and Washington can help Ukraine achieve that end. Trump’s plan for ending the fighting and finding a way forward is realistic and achievable.
Stephen Wertheim
Senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
For my money, the signal amid much noise was Trump’s utterance on February 26: “I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much. We’re going to have Europe do that.” That leaves room for the United States to make some material contributions—in the form of intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance and other capabilities—to a European military contingent that might be stationed in postwar Ukraine. But this is not exactly a security guarantee.
Just weeks ago, the transatlantic alliance was rocked by the U.S. announcement that NATO membership for Ukraine would be an unrealistic outcome of ceasefire negotiations. Now, European leaders are weighing a small, perhaps 30,000-troop force, which would come with no formal commitment by participating countries to come to Ukraine’s direct defense in case of a Russian attack. Such a force would supplement, not replace, Ukraine’s real security guarantee: its own military.
America’s allies would be better off putting a well-armed Ukrainian army at the center of their public proposals (and eventual negotiating demands) while privately discussing the specifics of a European force. A strong U.S. guarantee will not happen. The more Europeans publicly push Trump to offer one, the more they risk frustrating him into cutting off all U.S. aid to Ukraine and perhaps abandoning NATO allies to boot.
Max Bergmann
Director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center in Euro-Atlantic and Northern European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
The answer is no. And I am not sure how many times the Trump administration has to say this before the Europeans, including the Brits, take no for an answer.
The United States is not going to back a European peacekeeping, reassurance, or deterrence force in Ukraine against Russia. Instead of bemoaning that, Europe should face the reality that there will almost certainly be no peace agreement or ceasefire in Ukraine.
So this was all a hypothetical exercise to begin with. What is not a hypothetical exercise and, as such, should be Europe’s focus is how Europe can ramp up weapons deliveries to Ukraine as the United States walks away. Focus on that, rather than a mythical peacekeeping force.
Franz-Stefan Gady
Associate fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
No, the Trump administration has made clear through various statements that it intends to delegate responsibility for handling Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine to selected European countries.
Trump is primarily interested in achieving a quick ceasefire, regardless of the conditions for Ukraine, even at the risk of a resurgence of the war. He has shown little interest in the United States playing the role of a net security provider for Ukraine, a reality that Europeans will have to accept.
Europe increasingly faces the prospect of a Tilsit 2.0, reminiscent of the July 1807 meeting between Napoleon Bonaparte and Czar Alexander I of Russia at Tilsit, where they decided to divide Europe into spheres of influence, primarily at the expense of the Austrian Empire and Prussia. The Trump administration appears eager to reach a similar grand bargain with Russia, potentially compromising Europe, especially Ukraine.
Consequently, European leaders would do well to clarify to their constituents what Ukraine means for Europe’s security architecture, beyond the grandiose rhetoric that has often gone unaccompanied by concrete actions. Only with a clear understanding of Europe’s interests in Ukraine can observers determine what selected European countries would be willing to risk in enforcing security guarantees against Russia without U.S. backing.
