By choosing to vote against a United Nations resolution marking the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States seems intent on abandoning its leadership of the West after eighty years of hegemony. Europe is going through its gravest hour since the Second World War—and most Transatlanticist political leaders are starting to realize it.

At best, Europe will have to defend its territory alone and take responsibility for deterrence. At worst, it will have to fend off great powers actively seeking to subvert it as they assert their respective spheres of influence. This could involve political interference, economic coercion, and open aggression, tearing Europe apart. Europe’s choice lies in between these two scenarios. Rather than predict success or failure, it is worth outlining the building blocks that make the case for a stronger Europe possible and the pitfalls this vision could run into.  

While supporting Ukraine is the best short-term insurance for European security, a medium-term prospect of U.S. abandonment of Europe is the next line of focus. A Europeanized NATO—boosted by EU financial and defense market incentives—will ensure that European defense capabilities are coordinated, efficient, and interoperable. Such an approach will maximize their collective impact and guarantee that taxpayers’ money is well spent. It will also provide a way to deepen relations with NATO non-EU countries, such as the UK, Norway, Turkey, and Canada.

Increased defense spending can unleash huge economic benefits provided it is married to the twin digital and green transitions, in the form of research, innovation, job creation, productivity, and competitiveness. This was forcefully argued in the influential Draghi report, though it has yet to be implemented.

The economic logic to harness together the ambitious defense, digital, and green goals is to future-proof Europe. Politically, the rationale is to prevent the debate on defense spending from spiraling into a race to the bottom among competing budget headings, and ensure Europeans are invested in their future.

Strengthening the Single Market, as the Letta report maps out, could be achieved by including aspiring countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans, as promised in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. EU enlargement constitutes a unique opportunity to create scale on the European continent, that could be coupled with deepening the association with the UK, Switzerland, and the countries in the European Economic Area.  In this context, the European Political Community—which includes both EU and non-EU members—can provide the skeleton for a European sphere of influence.

Europe’s market, governed by democratic systems and predictable, accountable rules is also what makes the continent still attractive to the rest of the world. Along these lines, European countries and institutions can ally with partners to safeguard the international system. The inward-looking instinct associated with the need to focus on defense ought to be countered by an outward engagement with countries that share a commitment to the rules-based order. It is both beneficial and crucial to Europe.

Europeans have the ideas and means, but whether they can master the politics and leadership to assert their strength and autonomy is uncertain. The speed at which Europeans are responding to the current turmoil is impressive, but political obstacles still lie ahead.

First, the depth of the Transatlanticists’ awakening to the new U.S. position remains to be seen. Generations of Europeans, especially in the UK, Germany, and in Northern and Central Europe, have been brought up feeding on the Transatlantic relationship. Many of them in the security community were shocked by U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference.

The depth of the interdependence across the Atlantic and subsequent socialization could hamper the building of a greater European autonomy, especially when even tougher choices will come up, such as on nuclear deterrence or intelligence sharing. This is a cognitive as much as an economic point. Much will depend on how hostile to Europe and aligned with Russia the U.S. administration continues to be.

Secondly, some of the European national radical-right parties will seek to profit from this U.S. change of direction, despite their divisions between pro- and anti-Russians. As Viktor Orbán put it, after European leaders met in Paris without him to discuss the White House fall out between U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky: “We are on the high street of history, while our opponents are wandering muddy back streets on the edge of town.” Some of these parties are in coalition governments, while others already sit in European Council meetings and systematically undermine EU foreign policy, as Hungary does with Russia and Ukraine.

Thirdly, sclerotic democracy has made Europe harder to govern. It will be hard to make the case for Europe with cobbled-together wafer-thin majorities. Few governments across the continent enjoy wide parliamentary majorities and public support. Democratic fragility in member states has undermined the EU’s ability to move forward. EU institutions cannot fill that vacuum: While their governance still enjoys a shrinking political majority in the European Parliament, they can be hostage to party politics. Many of the EU’s decisions require implementation in the member states. Imposing measures without national ownership has proven an unsuccessful strategy in the past.

There are many, complex, and deep reasons for Europe’s ungovernability, but one is the progressive and overarching loss of trust in politics. As governments fret about how to finance a stronger Europe—be it through debt, taxation, or cuts—they need to engage with public opinions to shape a new European social and political bargain.

The case for Europe requires a radical shift in defense and security, along with the breaking of barriers toward greater economic integration on a continental scale.