Since his reelection, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has faced challenges domestically and internationally. But the upheaval to the Western order brought about by the second Donald Trump administration may soon create new opportunities for Ankara to strengthen its relations with European partners.
On the domestic scene, the president and his coalition have faced adverse developments. The municipal election on March 31, 2024 was an unforeseen political earthquake in which Erdoğan’s coalition lost in all major cities. Since then, the leadership has taken judicial action against opponents, with leaders of the Republican People’s Party facing enquiries and Kurdish mayors being replaced by administrators. Furthermore, Turkey’s main business association, TÜSIAD, is accused of meddling in politics and undermining Erdoğan’s government, and civil society personalities keep being condemned or under enquiry based on flimsy evidence.
A recent opinion poll suggests an opposition victory in a future presidential election. However, calls from the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, for the party to dissolve itself may lead to a peaceful end of the insurgency if implemented, which could boost to the president’s popularity.
In neighboring Syria, the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime at the hands of Hayat-Tahrir-al-Sham, an anti-Assad group Turkey has long befriended, is a strategic win for Ankara. Yet, uncertainties persist. Ankara’s priority is dismantling the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) led by the Kurdish militia, the People’s Defense Units, which it accuses of being tied to the PKK. But Ankara’s new allies in Damascus are still consolidating their power—for which they need the well trained and well equipped SDF—and would have a hard time accepting a new Turkish military incursion on its territory. Tensions could also escalate between Turkey and Israel over Syria.
Further afield, Turkey has been strengthening ties with distant partners, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Somalia, and other African countries. This raises Erdoğan’s profile in the Muslim South, but it does not elevate him into the top tier of global leadership.
Perhaps counterintuitively, it is on the European continent that Erdoğan’s standing could improve the most. Having failed to play the mediating role he had aspired to in Ukraine in 2022 and Gaza since 2023, he has an opportunity to leverage Turkey’s military capabilities and geographical location to contribute to Europe’s stability.
Talks between Washington and Moscow to engineer a ceasefire in Ukraine have thus far been bilateral, leaving Ukraine, Turkey, and European leaders out of the loop. Erdoğan recently offered again to host a meeting between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States in Turkey and “support” the negotiations.
Talks held by the U.S. President Trump with France’s president and Britain’s prime minister on February 24 and 27, respectively, did not provide any reassurance on the continuity of the U.S. security guarantees for Europe. A security summit was convened in London on March 2 to discuss support to Ukraine, the path toward a ceasefire, and the continent’s security. There, for the first time, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan participated in discussions around increased military deliveries to Ukraine, deployment of troops on Ukrainian soil and in neighboring NATO countries, and air and sea surveillance around Ukraine.
On March 6, the European Council’s conclusions paved the way for an EU defense spending boost through new funding instruments, while twenty-six EU members—all except Hungary—agreed on reinforcing financial and military support to Ukraine. Turkey could fall into the category of what the conclusions refer to as “like-minded non-EU partners.”
One of the main ways in which Turkey could contribute to European security is by helping to rapidly and substantially increase the deliveries of weapons to Ukrainian and/or European forces. Turkey’s defense industry has NATO-compatible industrial capabilities in key domains, including armored vehicles, long-range artillery, artillery shells, air and naval drones, and short- and medium-range missiles. President Erdoğan insists on participating in “EU defense procurements and reconstruction schemes.” Meanwhile, a clear political commitment to supporting the EU position is expected from Ankara if it partakes in the coalition of the willing.
Regarding future military deployment in and around Ukraine if a ceasefire is agreed upon, Ankara has significant potential but faces open questions: Is sending Turkish troops or air surveillance assets in or around Ukraine acceptable to all stakeholders? If Black Sea security is part of the agreement, can the Turkish navy help patrol the inner sea while maintaining its traditional role of controlling the Straits under the 1936 Montreux Convention?
Overall, Turkey’s participation in a newly-minted European policy in and around Ukraine faces three issues of a political nature. First, Russia may strongly object and pressure Turkey to abstain. Second, Ankara’s S-400 missile systems delivered by Russia in 2019 may prevent its participation unless they are disabled under Western supervision. Finally, trust would have to be rekindled between Ankara and Western European leaders: Because the rule of law is ultimately the core issue on the European continent, Turkey must restore a significant degree of rule of law in line with the European Court for Human Rights judgments. Defying the court and holding political trials have set Turkey apart from the overwhelming majority of its European partners in NATO.
Western Europe has been under threat from Moscow since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and it now faces disruption, political interference, and even enmity from Washington. European leaders are witnessing the end of the eighty-year-old peace and cooperation architecture born from the ashes of World War II. Statements from France’s President Emmanuel Macron or Germany’s federal chancellor-in-waiting Friedrich Merz clearly acknowledged this situation.
Disruptions emanating from the Trump-Putin world do not spare Turkey, complicating its balancing policy between Russia and the West. However, Europe’s focus on security may present a major opportunity for Ankara, if political stars align.
