Saila Heinikoski
Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs
The Schengen area has not been borderless since autumn 2015. Indeed, the reintroduction of internal border controls has been the first reaction in crisis situations, be it immigration or the coronavirus pandemic. Closing borders sounds like a drastic measure attempting to create a feeling of security, but the political costs of doing so are small, as criticism often comes from abroad.
Even though internal border controls may be portrayed as a significant measure, they may not be that invasive. Checks are often conducted randomly, and most people are able to cross the border. Asylum-seekers should also be allowed to pass, even though they might eventually end up being returned to the member state they came from.
A problem with reintroducing border controls is the political impossibility of lifting them. As border checks are hoped to serve a deterrent effect, abolishing them may be feared to have a pull effect.
Similarly, as the checks serve a symbolic value in domestic politics, their effect on Schengen and European integration is also symbolic: It is a signal of putting domestic matters ahead of European ones. But as long as the majority of Schengen states are not reintroducing control, Schengen will be staying alive.
Jonas Bornemann
Assistant Professor of European Law at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Forty years on, Schengen stands at a crossroads. Once celebrated for enabling free movement and fostering European unity, it is now increasingly fragmented, especially in response to immigration-related anxieties. This reflex reveals a deeper tension: Is Schengen a project of unity, bringing citizens closer together, or does it become emblematic of the frictions that run between EU member states?
From its inception, Schengen has served both as a facilitator of mobility and as a security regime. While European citizens enjoyed easier travel, member states deepened cooperation on policing and external border control. Yet, the balance is shifting. The security function has become dominant, culminating in a trend where states invoke Article 72 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to bypass EU obligations, treating Schengen less as law and more as a toolbox of emergency measures.
This raises a fundamental question: What kind of Schengen does Europe want? A regime that ensures mobility for all lawfully residing persons, honoring its integrationist promise? Or a differentiated space that privileges citizens and excludes others?
Schengen’s future hinges on this choice. It can evolve into a more inclusive framework, or unravel into a patchwork of national controls, undermining both legal certainty and European cohesion.
Marina Nikolova
Research Associate at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
The temporary reintroduction of border control is an exception that should only be applied as a last resort and for a limited duration, according to Article 25 of the Schengen Border Code. This exception serves solely to reaffirm the rule that the Schengen area exists.
The fundamental objectives of the EU—freedom, security, and justice —represent a significant privilege shared by the citizens of its member states. The criteria that countries must fulfill to join the EU and the Schengen zone uphold the highest standards of security.
The world is undergoing transformative changes due to the technological revolution, the climate crisis, and growing inequalities, with uncertainty creeping into even the most stable economies as a result of multiple crises. Now more than ever, Europe needs to put the values of democracy, peace, protection of human rights, and respect for the rule of law into action, filling them with meaning.
The EU's motto is "united in diversity," and this unification is a process that develops slowly. Closing borders is not an option in a world in turbulence; The only choice would be to work harder to safeguard democracy by tackling inequalities, upholding justice, and fostering greater solidarity.
Sebastian Schäffer
Director of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe (IDM)
Schengen is more than a policy framework; It’s a foundational symbol of European unity. But symbols only endure when they are upheld in practice. Forty years on, the Schengen model remains conceptually fit for purpose, yet politically fragile.
The creeping normalization of internal border controls reflects a shift from temporary exception to semipermanent policy. What used to be extraordinary—such as checks during major football tournaments or G7/8 meetings—has become routine. This “permanent provisionality” is unacceptable and erodes citizens’ trust in the promises of European integration.
Instead of allowing Schengen to become collateral damage in national debates on immigration or security, the EU must recommit to its principles—through solidarity at the external borders, coordinated immigration governance, and the political courage to defend free movement. This also means completing the European project by integrating the Western Balkans. As long as these countries remain in limbo, borders continue to shift inward—not physically, but functionally—creating zones of exclusion that undermine the credibility of EU enlargement and unity.
Schengen’s future will not be secured by fences or fear, but by restoring trust and upholding the freedoms it was built to guarantee. In times when others are trying to shift borders by force, this is needed more than ever.
Susi Dennison
Senior Director for Talent and Transformation, and the European Power program at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Temporary suspension of the Schengen convention on open borders is an increasingly common tool used by member states for dealing with spikes in immigration concerns domestically.
However, the flip side of this picture is that it was the complete suspension of freedom of movement during the early months of the coronavirus pandemic that spurred EU member states into common action.
In 2020, many of the larger central EU states closed their borders to prevent the spread of the virus and demonstrate their control of the pandemic. Despite strong pressure on national governments to act, they were willing to support the European Commission’s coordination of the EU Digital COVID certificate precisely to facilitate the reopening of intra-EU borders.
Ultimately two aspects of Schengen make it a blueprint for future EU developments. Firstly, permissive consensus: The spirit of Schengen—freedom of movement—is a once and future element of the EU. It remains one of the core reasons that EU membership is worth the price tag for voters across the union. And secondly, flexibility: It was the possibility of legal derogations that allowed Schengen to weather the immigration and coronavirus crises. In a turbulent world, elasticity rather than brittleness may prove essential to the EU’s survival.
Raphael Bossong
Deputy Head of EU/Europe at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
Schengen is not inherently unfit for purpose; It is being rendered so by a lack of political fidelity. Without a swift return to a cooperative approach, Schengen risks degenerating from a model of integration into a cautionary tale of renationalization.
The Schengen area is confronting a paradox: Its political, legal, and technical foundations have been strengthened but its core principle of free movement is being systematically eroded. So while a major update of the Schengen regulation was adopted in 2024, Bulgaria and Romania became full members in January, and new smart borders should come online imminently, the reintroduction of internal border controls—once an emergency measure—has become a quasi-permanent reality in core member states such as Germany and France since 2015. These national actions stand in clear contradiction to EU law, a fact repeatedly affirmed by European and national courts.
The root of this crisis is not a flaw in Schengen’s design but a collapse of political trust, fueled by unresolved disputes over asylum policy and secondary migration. Member states are increasingly prioritizing unilateral security interests. It is worrying that Article 72 TFEU is increasingly seen as a proportionate and adequate way to override common European rules, undermining the mutual trust that underpins the entire system.
Matteo Villa
Senior Research Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
The Schengen Agreement has weathered decades of turmoil, but it has always survived: battered, but still standing.
Since 2015, countries like Germany, France, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden have routinely suspended the rules of the agreement, turning the once-exceptional reinstatement of border checks into a normalized practice. But closing down Europe’s internal borders poses real dilemmas—and not only of a legal and ethical sort, but also rather practical ones. For one, reinstating border controls disrupts intra-European trade, as cross-border road and rail transport slows down to a trickle.
The result is a fragile equilibrium: Schengen no longer functions seamlessly, but the more border checks are reimposed, the more they reveal immediate economic and political costs.
In a nutshell: Forty years in, Schengen is under strain. Still, the free movement of people continues to prove indispensable to the smooth functioning of the EU’s internal market. This offers hope. Policymakers may test the limits of Schengen, and have frequently done so over the past decade, but time and again they’re confronted by the same truth: Europe cannot function without it.
