While the imprimatur of U.S. President Donald Trump has been the sine qua non for an end to the Israeli war in Gaza, the EU holds key cards to ensure any plan is actually implemented.
That is, provided enough EU member states finally resolve to using their leverage in the most important theater abutting them apart from Ukraine. One where, unlike other atrocious conflicts in the world, a major member state—Germany—has been directly supporting the war effort through weapons exports and diplomatic cover.
For two years, internal divisions have paralyzed the EU in a conflict where it holds significant sway over both parties. Now is the time for the bloc to line up its ability to use its leverage, at critical junctures of what is sure to be a rocky implementation of Trump’s proposed peace plan.
On September, 10, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has gotten the institutional process going by making her proposal in her State of the Union speech. October brings decisive opportunities to operationalize the EU’s role.
The upcoming European Council summit on October 23-24 would be an ideal time to have an in-principle green light for the suspension of the trade component of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, not to use it immediately but to have as readily available leverage if and when needed.
It would also be the right setting to agree on a way to maximize the use of the EU Border Assistance Mission between Gaza and Egypt—EUBAM Rafah—and the EU Mission for the Support of Palestinian Police and Rule of Law—EUPOL COPPS—as part of the international stabilization force imagined by the French-Saudi initiative and the Trump Gaza peace plan.
Waiting until the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations hit a roadblock to agree on these instruments would be counterproductive. EU members need to agree on a plan now, to allow the European Commission to wield the threat of applying these potent tools. This would maximize Europeans’ ability to contribute to shaping the end of the deadliest and most politically destabilizing war in their southern neighborhood.
Von der Leyen’s plan is threefold: putting bilateral EU support to Israel on hold; sanctioning the extremist Israeli ministers and violent settlers and partially suspending the trade component of the Association Agreement; and setting up a Palestine Donor Group.
Her surprise proposal comes at a moment of big shifts in even the most reticent of EU member states.
Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced during the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that “Israel has crossed that line, with a large-scale war that involves the Palestinian civilian population beyond measure. […] A choice that Italy has repeatedly described as unacceptable, and one that will lead us to vote in favor of some of the sanctions against Israel proposed by the European Commission.”
Even in Germany, public opinion is shifting. A YouGov poll in September showed that 62 percent of Germans now think Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, including 60 percent of conservative Christian Democratic Union voters. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul described the situation in the Gaza Strip as “hell on earth,” during his speech at UNGA. And some Germany experts, like Muriel Asseburg of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), are now going as far as arguing that Berlin has to reexamine its unconditional support for Israel under its Staatsräson doctrine following the Holocaust.
In the most recent closed-door discussion in Brussels, those shifts started appearing. Austria and Italy’s oppositions to suspending the trade component of the Association Agreement have softened. But while a qualified majority is sufficient to get the suspension adopted, it will require Germany to be on board. Berlin has delayed its decision for now, arguing there was a need to allow the Trump plan to play out.
But it is precisely to ensure that the Trump plan has the highest chances of even partial success that it is time for the EU to send a resolute message.
It stands to reason to expect that its full implementation will be a long and winding road, strewn with several setbacks and pitfalls. If it is to have any real chance of getting past the initial exchange of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners, both the Israeli government and Hamas will require constant pressure to force them to honor the plan’s requirements. The EU’s instruments would be crucial in that regard, on both the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Arab states.
Trump is currently using some of his unique leverage as president of the United States to ensure the peace plan does get off the ground. But it is unclear how long he and his administration will have the bandwidth to dedicate to keeping both sides honest at every juncture.
The trade component of the EU’s Association Agreement with Israel is nearly as potent a tool as U.S. military aid. The bloc is Israel’s biggest trading partner and after two years of war, the Israeli economy would suffer from its suspension.
The EU’s capacity building missions for Palestinian border security and new security forces, as well as other required political reforms, are indispensable for a speedy implementation of Trump’s peace plan given they are already in place. The EU’s reconstruction funds are also nonnegligible because of the massive needs Israel’s war in Gaza has generated.
The EU finds itself in a sweet spot: In a critical conflict, it has significant leverage through civilian tools that are perfectly in line with its human rights and rule of law principles. But for the union to leverage these, it needs a central state—Germany—to change two foundational elements of its doctrine: to view its historic responsibilities in light of the Holocaust as extending to helping Israel dig itself out of the strategic catastrophe its far-right government has created in Gaza, and to get comfortable using power dynamics with extremely close allies. These would be crucial contributions to a successful German—and EU—zeitenwende.
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