Rem Korteweg

Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael

Since the Brexit agreements were concluded, a strategic approach to the UK has been lacking in European capitals. Governments were happy to outsource relations to a commission focused on implementation, not innovation. European leaders no longer saw UK-EU relations as a problem, nor as a solution to ongoing challenges. “Out of mind, outof heart” now runs the risk of resulting in an unambitious and suboptimal reset.

But closer UK-EU ties can help address urgent European concerns. British participation in European defense-industrial schemes can help create economies of scale at quicker pace. Coordination on investment screening, subsidies, and export controls will contribute to EU economic security. Regulatory alignment of electricity grids can help unlock the potential of North Sea wind. And every step to bring the UK closer to the single market increases the continent’s economic resilience. Finally, UK participation in an embryonic European capital markets initiative should not be ruled out.

Of course, this will require the Starmer government to take courageous steps. And yes, trust-building post-Brexit takes time: Who knows what a new UK government might do? But a strong political signal from European capitals—that today’s positive momentum to build stronger ties with the UK should not be wasted—is long overdue.

Susi Dennison

Senior Director, European Council on Foreign Relations

On both sides of the Channel, governments are looking at UK-EU cooperation as a relationship that can be helpful in withstanding the triple threat of Russian aggression, Chinese coercive competition, and U.S. unreliability. Increasingly, policymakers in the EU and the UK acknowledge the need to deepen cooperation with partners whose interests are being shaped by global turbulence in similar ways.

This does not mean that policymakers relish the idea of reopening the painful process of renegotiating the UK-EU relationship. Far from it.  As the eyewatering price tag offered by the EU to the UK for joining Security Action for Europe (SAFE), or the reticence from pro-European UK political parties for discussing the idea of rejoining the customs union or the single market shows, there is still a lot of baggage on both sides.

Starting a new chapter in EU-UK cooperation is not the right framing in this context. The question should be broader: How can Europeans protect themselves in the 2030s? And in almost all spheres of European sovereignty the UK and its EU neighbors’ destinies are deeply intertwined. Reinforcement of the EU-UK relationship to enable coordination as they navigate this environment can provide a central pillar to set European states up to succeed in this environment.

Sébastien Maillard

Special Advisor, Jacques Delors Institute; Associate fellow, Chatham House

It takes two to tango. But the UK is dancing the reset much by itself. Labour believed its change of tone would be music to Brussels’ ears after a hard Tory-led Brexit. That simply asking to lift visa requirements for British musicians touring or recognizing British qualifications were minor issues that Europeans would easily accommodate. Reset has underestimated that the EU had moved to something else, was unwilling to reopen questions settled under the painfully negotiated Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), and wished to firstly see the agreement implemented.

France prefers a rapprochement with the UK out of EU circles: at bilateral level, in coalitions of the willing, the E3, and the European Political Community. When it comes to EU, Paris sees the UK as a third country to be treated, as say, South Korea. Germany is not on the same page. It welcomes the reset, with some nostalgia of the good old days. Europeans miss sending their kids to study in British universities. But for a closer relationship, London must come up with a more compelling reason than British growth. If it would dare speak loud and clear about security and shared European sovereignty, then expect France to join it on the dance floor.

Georgina Wright

Senior Fellow and Special Adviser to the president, German Marshall Fund

Sort of. In theory, this is what the EU has always wanted: a closer trading relationship where the UK replicates EU rules in return for better market access, a new security and defense partnership, and an end to mutual recrimination. In practice, rapprochement has been harder to achieve.

Resetting relations with London is not a top priority for Brussels—competitiveness, Ukraine, the next EU budget (MFF), and the Middle East all are. Most EU-UK talks happen at the technical level precisely because the current relationship, while not great, hurts the UK far more than the EU. Second, fears of cherry-picking persist. If London gets everything it is asking for, it could become an enticing example for others. Third, there's anxiety about who governs next in London, and whether the EU could find itself locked into an ambitious partnership with a government that actively undermines it.

The second EU-UK Summit, planned for early summer, is the real test. The world has changed and talking about a geopolitical Europe without a strong EU-UK relationship makes no sense. The UK is not like any other third country and the window of opportunity for a closer partnership is closing. Fail here and only adversaries are the big winners.

Lukasz Maslanka

Senior Fellow, Center of Eastern Studies (OSW)

A decade after the Brexit referendum, the EU is cautiously open to closer ties with the United Kingdom, but enthusiasm remains limited and uneven.

The main driver of rapprochement is not political goodwill but shared security concerns, particularly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Trump's turning away from Europe. For many member states, including Poland, the UK is an essential military partner within NATO, which makes cooperation in defense both necessary and desirable.

However, the EU’s approach is conditional: Participation in initiatives such as SAFE depends on financial contributions and regulatory alignment. In economic terms, the appetite for deeper reintegration is even weaker, as the UK continues to reject core elements of the single market. From a Polish perspective, this creates a dual approach: Strong support for closer security ties with London, combined with backing for EU rules and institutional coherence.

To bypass lengthy and cumbersome negotiations with EU institutions, a coalition of EU member states might consider deepening security ties with the United Kingdom within an alternative framework supported by its own fund for developing military capabilities and fostering defense industrial cooperation.

Rebecca Christie

Senior Fellow, Bruegel

Britain may be confused about where next to take its relationship with the European Union. A March YouGov poll found UK voters were more enthusiastic about rejoining the EU than about reentering the single market or the customs union. They broadly backed restoring free movement of people and workers, unless it increased immigration from Europe. The EU is less conflicted: to Brussels, Brexit means Brexit. Once the UK untangled itself from Europe’s rights and obligations, the EU stopped accommodating British views so readily. 

It’s not that the EU is against the UK rejoining, not at all. It’s more that the EU has stepped away from the debate. Brussels has other pressing priorities. In relation to the UK, it prefers to focus on where policy interests align and what happens now. Keir Starmer’s government is the most pro-European the UK has had since its departure, and the EU certainly welcomes the good vibes. But British ambivalence makes active cooperation difficult on everything, from defense budgets to financial regulation. If London sees freedom to diverge as Brexit’s main benefit, it will be hard for the EU to make a deal.

Stefan Lehne

Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

The vaunted reset in EU-UK relations risks turning into a damp squib. The responsibility for this lies squarely with both sides. While the world is changing rapidly, both the UK and the EU are still struggling with the ideological baggage of the Brexit wars. The Labour government shies away from its “red lines” (no internal market, no customs union, no freedom of movement) and the EU still obsesses about cherry-picking and the indivisibility of the internal market. Strong and focused leadership should be able to overcome these constraints, but this is in short supply on both sides of the Channel. Sir Keir Starmer is fighting for his political survival, and Brussels is facing multiple challenges that many EU governments consider more urgent.

This is a pity, because the geopolitical and economic case for much closer UK-EU alignment has never been stronger. In dealing with the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, UK and EU leaders are working well together. Confronting the Russian threat needs joined-up defense efforts. The exorbitant economic cost of Brexit is now well understood in the UK, and the EU economy too would benefit from boosting economic ties across the Channel. The best solution—meaning the full return of the UK to the EU—is certainly many years away. But ramping up ambitions for broad sectoral integration and much closer political and security relations cannot wait.

Nicolai von Ondarza

Head of Research Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)

The Brexit years have been a traumatic experience, both for UK politics and the EU. Since then, first Rishi Sunak with the Windsor Framework Agreement and then Keir Starmer’s new government approach to Brussels have managed to take the UK off the EU’s list of problems. But Starmer's “reset” with the EU remains a tepid affair.

Despite some notable successes, lingering EU suspicions over UK cherry-picking and the clear red lines from London have kept interest on the EU side low, leaving negotiations to the commission. There is little in UK-EU relations so far that offers tangible benefits for national leaders in EU capitals.

To create real enthusiasm from the EU side, the UK would need to move onto the EU’s list of opportunities. For this, a leap of faith from both sides is required. From the UK, this would entail a revision of the hard Brexit red lines going back to Boris Johnson (no single market, no customs union) to explore tangible new opportunities. If the EU matches this with willingness to grant the UK more flexibility on defense cooperation with a special status, a meaningful rapprochement could be explored.

Judy Dempsey

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

EU member states have enough on their plate. Russia’s war on Ukraine, the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, inflation, sluggish economic growth, high energy costs, and the disruptive Trump factor. Frankly, the UK’s ambitions to forge closer ties with the EU are not on the minds of member states.

It’s understandable. Britain voted ten years ago to leave the EU. The margin was small.  Since 2021, about 3.2 million “Leave” voters have died, while 1.8 million “Remainers” have gone to their graves. Yet, there’s still between a quarter and a third of voters who will vote for Nigel Farage’s anti-EU Reform party.

The UK’s wish for a rapprochement is driven by interests. Yet the UK is still Eurosceptic. It opposes integration. It opposes freedom of movement. It withdrew from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It has quibbled over payments into the EU budget. There is a sense among member states that with all the crises weighting on the bloc, Britain will want to cherry pick.

The EU is not a commodity that can be exchanged or returned.  It is a complex, bureaucratic organization that demands compromise, diplomatic skills, and a strategic outlook to adapt to an extraordinarily fast-changing world. A UK rapprochement can’t be one-way.