Building a New Syria

As the Syrian revolution nears the two year mark the outlines of a political settlement that might form the foundation for a post-Baathist state have remain elusive. From sectarian to ideological differences, many obstacles must be overcome to bring all groups closer to a common vision for Syria. To gain insight into the elements of a Syrian political settlement, Carnegie’s Marwan Muasher moderated a discussion with opposition and former Syrian National Council (SNC) member Basma Kodmani, Kurdish activist Alan Semo, and Muslim Brotherhood and SNC member Bassem Hatahet.

A Political Vacuum

• “Opposition” vs. “Revolution”: Kodmani explained that the opposition grew out of authoritarianism and is weak and divided. It has never faced practical challenges, worked to build coalitions, or fought strategically to achieve a political goal. She emphasized, however, the importance of distinguishing between the Syrian “opposition” and the “revolution.” She stated that despite the fragmentation of the opposition, on the ground there is a true revolution that is changing Syrian society as people create new strategies to resist the regime.
   
• A Divided Opposition: Personal rivalries, incompetence, and organizational challenges have been the main factors behind the divisions in the Syrian opposition, according to Kodmani. There are no existing political structures in Syria and it is very difficult to represent a society that has no history of democratic governance.  Clear documents have been put forth by the SNC to create a political settlement, but various groups are pushing their own agendas and the regime is arming minorities to incite vengeance and breed sectarianism, Kodmani stated.
   
• Emergence of Local Councils: Kodmani indicated that one of the most promising phenomena on the ground in Syria today is the emergence of democratically elected local councils, which have organized to provide services to the Syrian people.

Foreign Support

• An Armed Revolution: According to Kodmani, the revolution spontaneously transitioned from a peaceful movement to an armed conflict as the regime began using military force against its people. As Syrians recognized the need to protect themselves against Assad’s forces, peaceful protesters picked up arms.   Hatahet added that the regime is directly responsible for the militarization of the revolution. The growing need for arms has caused the opposition and the regime to become reliant on foreign support.
   
• Islamization of the Revolution: As the conflict has dragged on the  revolution has become dependent on foreign financial support, Kodmani asserted. She explained that as Gulf States have supported the opposition, Islamic groups have become increasingly prevalent on the ground. That being said, Kodmani insisted that Syria is not experiencing an Islamic revolution but rather an “Islamic-funded resolution.” Semo echoed these sentiments, decrying foreign support and asserting that if there were no external involvement, the Syrian people would be able to successfully fight “hundreds of Assads.”
   
• Fragmentation of the Revolution: As military and humanitarian financial support comes from many different directions it has served to reinforce fragmentation among opposition groups and between fighters and political activists. The best hope for Syria’s future is to have financial support channeled through a credible and representative political authority rather than through individual brigades or armed groups, Kodmani stated. Semo added that foreign intervention has caused sectarian violence as the revolution has become a proxy war in which the Gulf States, Turkey, the West, Iran, and Russia are all supporting factions that represent their interests.

Protecting Minorities

• Renewing the Social Contract: According to Hatahet, the Assad regime forcibly fractured the Syrian social contract, leaving Kurds, Christians, and other minorities vulnerable. He stated that it will be crucial to repair that social contract and return to a Syrian state that unites minorities under an umbrella of nationalism.
   
• A Civil State: Hatahet stated that the Muslim Brotherhood wants Syria to be a civil state within an Islamic country. He asserted that Islam provides for the existence of a civil state that will represent all minority groups and give them equal protection under the law. Semo added that the Kurds want all Syrian people, including minority groups, to be able to live with dignity in a democracy. He said that a model of “democratic self-governance,” in which all ethnic and religious groups in Syria have the opportunity to govern themselves within a united Syria, would be most successful.
   
• Transitional Justice: Kodmani explained that it will be vital to implement a transitional justice agenda in order to help heal the wounds in Syrian society. Syrians must form a body legally representing all citizens that will protect and reassure minorities. Disagreeing with Semo, she stated that separate representation of minority groups will be a “recipe for disaster” and divide the country.

Economists Samer Abboud and Omar Dahi, along with Jihad Yazigi of the Syria Report, discussed the current economic situation facing Syria during its uprising and the socio-economic dynamics of rebuilding the Syrian state after the fall of Bashar al-Assad.  Carnegie scholar, Yezid Sayigh, from Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut moderated the discussion.

Before the Uprising

Yazigi explained that the uprising that began in 2011 can best be understood in the context of thirty years of deteriorating economic conditions that particularly affected the country’s rural areas, smaller towns, and working classes.

• Economic Decline in the 1980s: After two decades of sustained economic growth and state investment, Syria’s GDP was comparable to that of Turkey or South Korea. But a decline in aid and remittances from the Gulf States and the continuous growth of the state bureaucracy throughout the 1980s put a halt to these positive trends, Yazigi explained.
   
• Liberalization and Devaluation: Recognizing the dire need for reform, the government embarked on an extensive program of economic liberalization that devalued the Syrian currency. The 1980s and 1990s were marked by continuous state divestment, high population growth, and economic growth rates too low to generate new employment. The state lost its role as a social integrator and provider of services, and the Syrian middle class gradually disappeared. Although the discovery of crude oil generated new income, the government did not invest its oil revenues in economic renewal, but decided instead to amass foreign currency reserves.
   
• Bashar al-Assad: According to Yazigi, Bashar al-Assad, who succeeded his father in 2000, initiated  a renewed program of liberalization, lifting obstacles to free trade and opening the economy to foreign investment.  But Assad neglected both the agriculture and the manufacturing sectors. Major industrial areas were forced to close due to the sudden influx of foreign products and the shrinking agricultural sector pushed approximately one million workers to migrate to the cities. Yazigi concluded that these developments disproportionately affected lower-income Syrians, particularly in rural areas, who in the past had benefited from the Baath Party’s pro-poor and pro-agricultural policies.

The Syrian War Economy and Current Economic Crisis

• Estimating Costs: Abboud explained that the total cost of the conflict so far remains impossible to measure. Such costs not only include money lost and damage to infrastructure, but also the depletion of household assets. The war economy and rise of informality will further have a profound impact on Syria’s future economic trajectory.
   
• Sectors Hit by the Violence: While sanctions have targeted the oil sector in particular, the manufacturing sector has also suffered and tourism has virtually come to a halt, Abboud said. But he explained that the conflict has most profoundly affected agriculture, which had already been constrained by the regime’s policies before the current conflict. Furthermore, insecurity and fuel shortages have slowed down production and caused workers to migrate to the cities.

After the Uprising

• Opposition’s Silence: Dahi argued that the political opposition has so far missed the opportunity to critique the regime’s economic policies. Instead, they have largely excluded economic issues from current debates, treating the economy as a technical problem rather than an ideologically contested field.
   
• Inclusive and Transparent: The development of Syria’s post-Assad economic trajectory should not be monopolized by one group, but should be inclusive and participatory, or least the result of a legitimate process of negotiation and contestation, Dahi said. Transparency and a focus on local needs are also crucial to prevent Syria’s limited resources from being squandered on unnecessary or ineffective projects.
   
• Micro and Macro: Abboud added that although reconstruction processes tend to focus on macroeconomic structures, microeconomic policies are also needed.
   
• Priority Sectors: In particular, reconstruction should focus on the sectors that most Syrians depend on for their livelihoods, namely agriculture and manufacturing.
   
• Balancing the Public and Private Sector: Both Dahi and Abboud emphasized that a balance between the private and public sectors is crucial. The reconstruction experience in Iraq has shown that unregulated liberalization and privatization can decimate the public sector, with long-term negative consequences.
   
• Beyond Sectarian Cleavages: Dahi added that the current focus on sectarian divisions should not overshadow structural and economic divisions between urban and rural areas and among the country’s different regions.

Cost of Reconstruction

According to Abboud, the financing of reconstruction will depend on the future political authority. He outlined and evaluated three different scenarios for funding reconstruction, and their potential value:

• From Within: Reconstruction relying entirely on domestic resources is unlikely, he said. The current tax base is not strong enough to finance reconstruction. Currency reserves have been depleted, and oil revenues will not be sufficient.
   
• Further Liberalization: A complete liberalization of the economy focused on attracting foreign investment is likely to undermine the long-term reconstruction effort, he added.
   
• Foreign Aid: There are multiple plausible sources of aid that could be drawn on, including expatriate communities, foreign governments, and international organizations.
   

As the violence in Syria intensifies, so do fears that the country is slipping into a sectarian civil war where militant Islamist groups can thrive and oppress minorities. The Syrian regime has pointed to the rise of militant jihadi groups as proof of its fight against terrorism and to the increasing political role of the Muslim Brotherhood as evidence of a conspiracy to turn Syria into an Islamic state. In order to better understand the role of political Islam in the uprising, Carnegie invited Syrian academic and former Syrian National Council spokesperson Bassma Kodmani, journalist and researcher Aron Lund, and Sufi Sheikh Muhammad al-Yacoubi to discuss the role of sectarianism and Islamism in the Syrian uprising. Carnegie’s Nathan Brown moderated.

A Post-Assad Syria

• Immediate Concerns: If Assad were to step down now, while the country is embroiled in civil war, the most immediate concerns would be related to disarming militias and figuring out how to share s power among them, as well as protecting minority rights, Lund asserted. He added that the current state of severe instability makes it difficult to predict beyond the immediate future.
   
• Fear and Legitimacy: Kodmani stated that Syrian communities would be most concerned with issues of security and wellbeing, not simply rights. The Syrian people are now fighting two fights, she asserted. The first is against the regime and the second is against the sectarianism that has been deliberately cultivated inside Syrian society by the regime. Syrians fear what may come after Assad, as well as the regime itself, Kodmani asserted. She added that Syria is a traumatized society that needs security and safety so that more communities can join the uprising.
   
• Fear of Anarchy: Yacoubi said that the most pressing fear and concern after the fall of the regime will be anarchy. Fighters who are now with or against the regime must be able to find jobs and recognize that violence is not a profession, Yacoubi asserted. He added that he had no fears of minority repression, since he believed that there are wise people in all religious communities who value harmony over conflict, and that the best protection for all communities is the assurance of security and the rule of law.

Jihadists in Syria

• Militant Sunnis: Lund explained that the Syrian revolution did not start as sectarian conflict, but it has transformed into one as more Sunnis turned to militancy. The overwhelming majority of armed groups are Sunni Arabs, and although the jihadi groups among them are small, they may continue to thrive in the current chaos, he added. The most prominent Jihadi group is Jabhat al-Nusrah, founded in January 2012 and believed to have connections with the Iraqi wing of al-Qaida. Lund explained that Jabhat al-Nusrah rose to prominence as it carried out more “media friendly” terrorist-style attacks in urban centers. Although most Syrians are repelled by Jabhat al-Nusrah’s ideology, the group has focused effectively on becoming popular among hardcore Salafi groups, Lund added.
   
• Funding Jihadists: According to Kodmani, some foreign countries intentionally fund the most extreme Salafi Jihadi groups, which encourages militant groups to grow more radical in order to receive more funds. She added that some armed groups even claim to be Jihadi in order to receive funds. Unless the issue of funding is addressed, the balance of power may continue to tilt in the extremists’ favor, she warned. Yacoubi added that there are non-radical armed groups of Sufis, who receive no funding or support from the outside. Lund pointed out that the most extreme jihadi groups are driven by ideology and not necessarily money.
   
• Alien Ideology: Yacoubi stressed that Jihadi ideology is alien to most Syrians, who typically practice a more moderate form of Islam. He added that no religious scholars have encouraged an uprising against the ruling minority of Alawites, but rather the uprising grew out of the shared suffering that all Syrians experienced under the regime, with Sunnis facing the worst repression.. 

Guarantees

• False Sectarianism: Kodmani asserted that while sectarian concerns are real, there has been no significant sectarian fighting on the ground between religious communities. She explained that the regime utilizes force and suppression to divide Syrian society and instigate sectarian conflict, but thus far armed opposition groups have avoided sectarian retaliation. She concluded that safety from sectarian violence requires a transitional justice framework in order to avoid retaliations, and that a peacekeeping force might be necessary since the state may be too weak to enforce law and order after the regime falls.
   
• Minorities to Join the Uprising: Yacoubi said that the label of civil war is misleading. He explained that most Syrians follow religious scholars who advocate tolerance and acceptance, not political Islam, adding that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood purport to follow whatever ideology they find useful at any one time. Yacoubi concluded that the minorities can best work against any attempt by political Islamists to seize power by joining the uprising and abandon the regime.