Paper
Gilles Dorronsoro
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"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
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Source: Getty
Testimony
Afghan Elections: Where it Went Wrong and What to Do
The International Coalition should leave Afghanistan sooner rather than later, but it must first build a viable Afghan state capable of assuming control over its own territory.
Published on Nov 19, 2009
Source: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
What went wrong with the Afghan election: the election, leaving aside the fraud that took place, was also plagued by dismally low turnout.
- The Afghan electorate stayed away from the polls in part because of the security threat posed in certain parts of the country by the Taliban. An even larger contributor to low voter turnout, however, was the high degree of cynicism among Afghan voters caused by pervasive corruption in the Karzai regime.
U.S. Policy Recommendations: the Coalition should leave sooner rather than later, but must first build a viable Afghan state capable of assuming control over its territory.
- The Coalition should shift its military forces and development aid to concentrate primarily on the more peaceful northern part of the country. Doing so will reduce the rate of Coalition casualties to a politically sustainable level, buy more time for the Afghan army to expand its size and capabilities, and enable the Afghans to eventually take charge of the security situation in their own country.
- Right now, rather than growing in capacity, the Afghan state is being crowded out by the Coalition. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are taking on too much responsibility, while the Afghan National Army (ANA) and local institutions are taking on too little. This balance needs to be reversed.
About the Author
Gilles Dorronsoro
Former Nonresident Scholar, South Asia Program
Dorronsoro’s research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan. He was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne in Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes.
- Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan
- Afghanistan: The Impossible TransitionPaper
Gilles Dorronsoro
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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