The improvement in the relations between the two countries on the nuclear issue may also contribute to the search of a compromise in the Syrian crisis. Obviously, one should not expect immediate changes on this matter yet, but it becomes quite likely that the Teheran delegation will take part in Geneva-2 negotiations, which Americans had objected to.

The “reset” in the U.S.–Iran relations irritates Israel, which sees the shift in the Iranian position as a mere ploy—a tactical move that would allow Iran to relieve the pressure from the West and buy time for an accelerated development of the military component of its nuclear program. Israel is equally distrustful of Rowhani’s recognition of the Holocaust (publically denied by his predecessor).

The prospects of further normalization of the U.S.-Iran relations remove from the agenda (or postpone) the possibility of a military strike against the Iranian nuclear installations. It can also affect the U.S. relations with the Persian Gulf monarchies, although it is still too early to tell in what way.

Finally, all of this may devaluate the Russia-Iran ties, especially the intermediary role that Moscow has always tried to play in the relations between the West and Iran.