In both the Caucasus and the Western Balkans, infrastructure and logistics will supplant normative goals such as EU membership as pathways to peaceful cooperation.
- Tedo Japaridze,
- John C. Kornblum
After graduating from the Tbilisi State University in 1971, Tedo Japaridze studied and worked in the Soviet Union Academy of Sciences. He was later appointed deputy foreign affairs minister of Georgia. He served as the Georgian ambassador to the United States, Canada, and Mexico before becoming the advisor to the president in the National Security Council of Georgia.
Throughout his career, he has presided over many public policy institutions, including the U.S.-Caucasus Institute in Tbilisi. He also published policy documents for the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars and was named the secretary general of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). In addition to this distinguished service, he worked as the alternate director general in the International Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS) and as president of the Energy Security Centre in Baku, Azerbaijan. Japaridze speaks fluent English, Russian, and Spanish.
In both the Caucasus and the Western Balkans, infrastructure and logistics will supplant normative goals such as EU membership as pathways to peaceful cooperation.
Although many today may doubt the effectiveness of his policies, because of Eduard Shevardnadze Georgia has a set of options today, being in a position that in no way resembles the reality a generation ago.
In recent years Georgia has taken every possible step to ensure that its western trajectory does not threaten to Russia. Georgia is seeking a constructive role, consistent with its values and in tune with its geography.
The West should integrate Georgia into the transatlantic security community. If it does not, Tbilisi will live under the constant threat of Russian aggression.
If Russia were able to overcome its defensive rhetoric and come up with its own version of “a good neighborhood policy,” Georgia would of course benefit; perhaps more significantly, Russia itself would benefit.
Europeanization must mean that Georgia becomes an attractive market in terms of human and infrastructural resources, a country which is a reliable contract guarantor and, thereby, a hub and a model for the region as a whole.
From Tbilisi’s perspective, deeper integration with the EU is a policy trajectory that enjoys consensual support, in a political landscape that is otherwise not prone to consensus politics. Now, the post-Vilnius challenge is to retain this legitimacy and continue to develop qualitative anchorage.
Georgia has been ready for any and every subsequent step that paves the way toward anchorage with the project of European Integration.
“Returning to Europe” is meaningful for Georgia. The Russian option is but a threat.
There is a wide scope for policy coordination amongst the leading economic and military powers on a global level. In this sense, the “G8 plus Five” format maybe more relevant at this point in time, given a “transition” in global governance.