Over the last month, there have been multiple violations of NATO airspace by Russian fighter jets and drones most likely launched by Russia. The alliance must now come up with an adequate response to this “probing” by the Kremlin and develop a sensible strategy to prevent future violations—while managing the risk of escalation. What is the Kremlin trying to achieve? How prepared is NATO to face this challenge, and what would an effective mitigation strategy look like? How will this new dynamic impact the war in Ukraine and the level of European support for Kyiv?
The transcript was automatically generated and not edited prior to publication.
Alexander Gabuev. Welcome to the Carnegie Politico podcast. I'm Alexander Gabuev, Director of Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. Today's episode is dedicated to the Russian drone threat to the eastern flank of NATO. Over the last couple of weeks, Russia has launched several incursions into NATO airspace by unarmed drones, most notably in Poland, but also in the Nordics and the Baltics. Details are still emerging, but at this point it's clear that there is a method and a message behind this attack. So, what is the Kremlin trying to achieve, and how will NATO respond? Helping to unpack it, I'm joined today by Justyna Gatkowska, Deputy Director of OSW, or Center for Eastern Studies in Warsaw. Justyna leads the Security and Defense Department of OSW and is an expert on defense policy and military cooperation in Central and Northern Europe. Welcome, Justyna.
Justyna Gotkowska. Hello. Thank you for having me.
Gabuev. It's great to have you. So, the Russian Federation has last month attacked Poland with drones. We've noticed similar incidents have been happening in the Baltic states, in the Nordics, Denmark. It's very much on everybody's radar. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, of course, has denied any Kremlin's involvement in those incidents. But based on what we know, based what has been disclosed so far by Western governments, it's clear that Russia is behind it. And all these drone incursions are hardly an accident. Rather, it's a coordinated campaign. So my difficulties start when I try to understand it. Help me to, how do you interpret that? Like, what is the Kremlin's goal here? And how do you explain the timing? Why now?
Gotkowska. Yes, well, maybe I will start with the drone incursions in Poland and how we interpreted that event back at that time. I think when we look at the three events, three incidents now - Polish, Estonian and then Danish - I think it gives us a little bit different picture than we previously thought. So, when we analyzed the drone incursions into Poland, we thought that it is in the Polish context of the new president's polarized political scene in Poland and that one of the main aims is to test the Polish reaction to increased divisions in the political elites, in society, and also to test the Polish air defense system NATO air defence system, how it functions, and of course to sow divisions among the Allies within Europe on how to react to such incidents and in transatlantic relations. But having in mind the three incidents together with Estonian ones, meaning the Russian fighter jets crossing deliberately into Estonian airspace and the recent incidents in Denmark with probably civilian drones hindering the airspace over Danish airports, I think it gives a pattern, and it's a very good question on what the Russians want to achieve. After giving it a more thoughtful analysis, I think the Russians see a new context. First, the domestic one and foreign policy. Within the foreign policy context, it's clear that with the new Trump administration, even if it's now aiming to put more pressure on Russia and encouraging countries in Europe, India and China not to buy Russian oil and gas, this Trump administration is disengaging from Europe politically and militarily. And it is clear they sent open statements that they don't want to be engaged in a conflict crisis in Europe and they put the responsibility for reaction to such crisis on Europeans. And hence, this fear of the Trump administration to be drawn into the war, I think, is inducive for Putin, for Moscow, to put additional pressure on the Trump administration and to show that this war can spill over, that this war can spill over to NATO European countries, and that the US can be involved and engage in the crisis if it does not put additional pressure on Ukraine to end this war. And I think what we are seeing in Ukraine, the increased drone and missile attacks on Ukraine, have the the same aim but towards both the Ukrainian population and elites and the US to show that Russia is mighty, is willing to escalate, and this is the time to negotiate, this is the time to put pressure on Ukraine. So this is, in my opinion, the foreign policy context seen from Moscow. But I think the other issue, the domestic one, is also important. We have seen economic data coming from Moscow. We have seen data concerning diminishing of the military budget. It is of course difficult to analyse from the outside the state the true state of the Russian economy and the ability of Russia to maintain the war effort. I think Moscow might see that the window for winning this war is closing. And in terms of of economic ability to sustain military operations in Ukraine. Hence, this is the time it would like to end this war and [it] sees possibly favourable conditions vis-à-vis the Trump administration. Hence, additional pressure applied on Ukraine, additional pressure applied on European NATO allies in order to lead to negotiations that would be in favour of Russian positions.
Gabuev. Before we continue, I would remind everybody that we would appreciate if you hit the subscribe button on whatever platform you're using to receive your podcasts. Okay, do we have any polling data already in Poland on how people react? So, if the Kremlin's goal is to fracture the Polish society, is it actually working? Is there a segment of the population that says, "oh no, maybe we should be disengaged and make peace with the Russians and let Ukrainians figure it out themselves?"
Gotkowska. I think you have a differentiated picture in Poland because of course the aim of Moscow is for our elites, for our society to concentrate on our own security in order not to further help and sustain the the military support for Ukraine, military and political support. I don't think it's working with the political elites. I think that political elites reacted quite united in Poland. So, Moscow did not achieve [sowing] political divisions. Of course, a week or two after the incident, we had discussions about whether this or that reaction was good and and necessary and we had some political infighting. But in principle, the reaction from both political camps in Poland, from the presidential one, meaning the opposition party towards the government, and the government was very united. But we saw also a huge wave of disinformation and a propaganda campaign that was linked to the Russian military operation in Poland. And it was activated in the Polish social media at the time the military campaign started. It was deliberate, it aimed to blur the picture: whether these were Russian drones, whether these were Ukrainian drones, why the Ukrainians didn't shoot them down, whether Polish armed forces reacted in a good way, whether NATO reacted in a proper manner, whether political elites reacted appropriate to the situation. And this actually had an effect on the discussions and on the stance of Polish society. And we have seen that propaganda and disinformation campaigns coming from Russia also work in Poland. We thought previously that we are sort of immune towards Russian disinformation. Yes, we are in terms - it's difficult to support pro-Russian moods in Poland - but it's increasingly possible for the Russians to increase anti-Ukrainian moods, to blur the analysis of what has happened, to question the actions that the Polish government and the Polish armed forces and NATO and the allies are taking. And I think that has an effect. I'm not aware of the public opinion polls and how Polish society assesses this incursion. But I think in general, from the talks and discussions with colleagues, with family, from the discussion on the social media, we have seen that this disinformation is working and that in Poland, different institutions, also, the one I'm heading, had to counter it, and we actually do that by our work in social media.
Gabuev. All right. What about the practical lessons learned? I saw that the Foreign Minister of Poland, Radek [Radosław] Sikorski, has discussed in the Yuan context that, yeah, probably shooting down these drones that are worth $20,000, $30,000 with munitions that are much costlier is not the best allocation of resources, and NATO's Eastern Flank is not equipped to deal with that in the cost efficient way that Ukraine is handling this problem, because Ukraine has been living with that over the last three plus years. And it's probably lessons and technological know-how to be imported for Ukraine to protect the eastern flank of NATO. So what's the discussion right now in the Polish strategic community?
Gotkowska. I think the constatation is that the Polish armed forces and NATO in general reacted in a good manner, having in mind the instruments, the measures, the capabilities we have right now to counter such drone attacks coming from Russia. I think what is important is that all drones were more or less well detected. This was due to cooperation between the Polish armed forces and a NATO assets, planes, and radars that were stationed in southeastern Poland, connected as part of the Patriot batteries coming from Germany, Polish assets. So this was a well-organized detection campaign from the Polish side, [considering] that we have had problems with detecting Russian drones and missiles in the past three years. So, we have learned, and I think this situation, this incursion, showed that the Polish armed forces have done their lessons in terms of detection, in terms of reaction, in terms of cooperation with allies. But of course, we have questions coming up [about] whether it is cost-effective to shoot down Russian drones with air-to-air missiles. Of course, with regard to armed drones, this is, I would say, justified. But [only] on some occasions. The Ukrainians are also using air-to-air missiles to shoot down Russian drones. But of course, the Ukrainians have many other systems that create a multi-layered, multi-spectrum counter-drone system. This is what we should aim for. Poland and in general NATO allies, as we see in Denmark, who is which is totally helpless towards Russian civilian drones right now and has tremendous problems in reacting - we need to invest additionally in electronic warfare systems and anti-drone systems, meaning also drones against drones. We need to invest more in detection of drones. But the problem is that we have a very long border. We have a border not only with Ukraine, but also a border with Belarus. And it's worth knowing that these drones came through Belarusian territory. So, it will be a huge effort for the Polish Armed Forces to place along the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian border first radars to detect the drones, second electronic warfare systems, anti-drone systems. That will be very costly and possibly will equal the effort that the Polish armed forces are right now achieving with shooting down and using the Air Force assets. This is an issue that is under discussion in Poland, that is under discussion in NATO and in the EU. And I think we will need to find a way to construct a more cost-effective, more complicated or comprehensive system with many different under-systems to counter such threats.
Gabuev. And then, obviously, this cost comes out of military budgets. And the trade-off is: do we invest into our own security or do we have more resources to support Ukraine? Of course, the Ukrainian argument is very easy. Give us all of this money [so] that we can protect you. But as you rightfully say, countries in the east of NATO are exposed to Russia directly. You can launch these drones from Kaliningrad, you can launch them from ships in the Baltic Sea, or you can launch them in Belarus or through Belarusian airspace. So some parts will need to be protected and Ukraine is not a solution. So, what is the debate about these trade-offs? Because to me, it could potentially be one of the driving factors behind the Kremlin's attack: to create exactly those dilemmas for policymakers and leave less resources available to Ukraine.
Gotkowska. True. As I said in the beginning, Russia aims to make us focus on our own security and not on Ukraine's in terms of political and military engagement. We don't have these discussions yet that it will be at the cost of Ukraine. I think we in Poland are aware that if the war in Ukraine ends in Russia's favor, we will have more problems. And I think that there is a general understanding that Russia will go against NATO eastern-flank countries in such a case. But as I said before, I think that we are entering an even more uncertain period here on the northeastern flank because of these two evolving contexts: this domestic/economic one from the Russian perspective and testing the limits from the Russian side and trying to pressure the Trump administration to find a solution to the Russia-Ukraine problem and the European security problem. So we need to be aware, and I think we need to generate this discussion that these more aggressive moves from the Russian side come from [a position of] inner domestic weakness and are also aimed to test us, to pressure us. And it's all about Ukraine. Only through further supporting Ukraine could our security be enhanced, and Russian failure in Ukraine will allow us to live in a more stable security situation here on the northeastern flank.
Gabuev. Then the question is, one of the options that has been on the table since beginning of the full-scale aggression was establishment of a no-fly zone over at least Western Ukraine, so that NATO assets from NATO territory will shoot down Russian missiles and drones flying over Eastern Ukraine, and that covers Lviv and a couple of other large population centers And yes, there will be debris, so people will get killed by employing active defense, but nevertheless, that will give Ukraine more protection and more economic activity that could be beneficial for the war effort as well. So far, NATO has been reluctant to do that. Have any recent drone incursions into Polish airspace or Russian fighter jets in the Estonian airspace made this option more discussed and more realistic?
Gotkowska. I think yes. As you rightly mentioned, our Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, talked about it and inserted this issue back into the discussion. We had this discussion also in the past, and then the stance of the Allies was quite clear: We would not like to be drawn into the war in Ukraine. But I think there might be a space now for discussion about about NATO shooting down Russian drones and Russian missiles already over Ukrainian airspace. I think that it will be still limited action if agreed or if discussed at all, meaning only those drones, only those missiles that are heading towards Polish-Romanian airspace. But still, that would be an interesting step in order to show Russia that Russian incursions into NATO airspace have consequences. And these consequences are those that Russia is fearing, because Russia does not want greater NATO engagement in the war in Ukraine. And that would be a first step to get more involved. And hence, from a political perspective - from a military [perspective], I'm not sure whether that would help the Ukrainian side so much, but from a political perspective, meaning that this could be a first step for NATO to be more engaged, I think that this is a debate worth having and I would personally favour such NATO discussion as I assume our foreign minister does.
Gabuev. There is also an argument that good defense requires offense, requires an offensive option. And you cannot establish deterrence if you only exercise a defensive posture. So, you need to show the Russians that you have capabilities to pay them with their own currency. Of course, from the Russian viewpoint, that's exactly what's happening with Ukrainian long-range strikes. The Russians say, "oh, wait a minute. These drones, we know, are produced in NATO countries, like, some of the production facilities are located in Poland, Czech Republic and so on, there is big technological sharing, and they're paid for by Western governments - Norway, Denmark; like, the Danish model is called a Danish model of supporting Ukraine for a reason. And then everything that we are experiencing with the disruption of air traffic in Moscow and other cities and the attacks against refineries are basically a way for NATO to launch a proxy war against us." So "we are giving you the taste of your own method" would be the Russian argument, though they don't say it that way, right? They create this ambiguity. So do you think that Poland and other countries should consider this offensive option of their own, or is it enough what Ukraine is doing, and actually the response could be: we pool more resources into Ukrainian offensive programs since they are at war with you, this is self-defense, [an] absolutely just internationally legal self-defense effort, but we don't want to escalate things on our own with you, Russia.
Gotkowska. I think this is a very valid question and debate that we should have. How to reinstate deterrence below the threshold of Article 5? I think we have a debate about that in Poland. I suppose this debate is also behind closed doors in NATO. It's clear from my perspective that defensive measures are not enough, and even if we increase NATO's presence on the northeastern flank, that might not help to deter Russian moves and actions. Hence, what is needed then to reinstate deterrence, to punish Russia for such military actions under the thresholds of Article 5? From my perspective, there are a few ways that we can go. The first one [is] further economic sanctions for such incursions. Then we also have the option you talked about, meaning more support for Ukraine and for Ukrainian offensive capabilities to target Russian drone plants, airfields and other strategically critical infrastructure and parts of the arms industry. And I think this is the way we should go. That, I think, would be the most profitable, easiest and most effective way to go. Of course, we have a debate on shooting down not only Russian drones, but Russian fighter jets in order to to stipulate an example for Russia not to test us further. This one, I think, is a tricky one because it causes controversies in the alliance about whether this is appropriate to shoot down Russian jets if there is an incursion, but without aggressive offensive goals that the Russians are pursuing. Russia, I think, might use these debates in order to stage provocations and then try to provoke some countries to go offensive this way, but on the border of what could be justifiable in order to start a debate in NATO [about] whether this was the right move or not from a NATO ally. I fear such scenarios could happen if a country were to go offensive and shoot down Russian fighter jets, manned fighter jets, not only drones, [during] incursions on the borders of their national airspace. But definitely, I suppose NATO is prepared and will be prepared to go against Russian military objects, fighter jets, drones or whatever, if they cross aggressively near the airspace and enter into NATO. So this is out of the question, I think. What will be tricky will be such cases like in Estonia, when a nation decides and then that might cause discussions and controversies in NATO.
Gabuev. Final question. There is a lot of talk about security guarantees, and we know that some governments inside NATO spend a lot of bandwidth on ah thinking what the security guarantees for Ukraine could look like. One of the pillars advocated by France and President Macron as an early enthusiast of this option and increasingly supported by the UK is to put a deterrence force or stabilization force or whatever, like, NATO soldiers, boots on the ground, inside Ukraine once there is a ceasefire or a durable peace deal as part of deterrence. And it's interesting to me that when I travel to capitals in the eastern flank, like, we are recording this conversation in Warsaw, but [there's a] similar attitude in Finland and in many Baltic countries that are on the eastern flank that have all this horrible history of coexisting next to Russia or being incorporated into Russia and are the first on the line if Vladimir Putin one day wakes up and decides to test Article 5. These countries are the most skeptical about sending their boots. All the time I'm speaking to your senior military commanders, they say, "not the Poles. We need them here on our territory." So, can you walk me through the Polish dimension of this debate? Why Poland is staunch supporter of Ukraine and has done a lot, and probably much, more than many other members of the Alliance. But nevertheless, ah sending troops there seems to be a no-go zone, even if a durable peace is achieved at some point.
Gotkowska. Yes, you rightly mentioned the Polish position of this government, of the former government. I think there is a cross-party agreement on this that we will not take part with boots on the ground in a possible stabilisation operation in Ukraine. Poland is prepared to play a huge logistical role in this operation, which will be also be tremendous effort for the Polish armed forces. But why has Poland assumed this stance? First, I think that even with the end of the war in Ukraine, if that ends, for example, this year, Russia will stay as it is. Russia will stay an aggressive country that will be willing to further, with any measures possible, undermine the peace in Ukraine, will try to influence Ukrainian politics with hybrid measures, and will be further militarily hostile to NATO and NATO Eastern Flank countries. And since we have a long border with Belarus, with Ukraine and with Kaliningrad Oblast, we need to make the eastern flank, together with Baltic states, with Finland, as equally secure as Ukraine. For this we need the military presence of our own armed forces and of our allies. Since the US will probably reduce its military presence in Europe, also possibly on the eastern flank, it will be very difficult for the Western Allies to fill these gaps at the same time [that they are] conducting or being engaged in a civilian operation in Ukraine that possibly will be without direct US engagement. We will then face a very difficult situation, because the armed forces, the military in Europe, have quite limited capabilities. Militaries in Europe are rebuilding, are growing, but we are more or less at the starting point. This also applies to Poland. We aim to spend 5% of GDP for defence. We have started a huge modernization program after 2022, and [are] also giving a lot of equipment from military active operational units to Ukraine, which means that Polish armed forces will only grow gradually with time. We are still lacking some capabilities. We are still increasing our armed forces. Hence, we will not be able to secure both national territory and be present in Ukraine. You also need to remember that the Polish military is much involved in the securing the Polish-Belarusian border, because we have had a problem since autumn 2021, meaning pre-invasion, with illegal migration steered from Moscow and from Minsk. Migrants from the Middle East or Central Asia are being brought to Belarus and pushed through the Green Border to Poland and go farther to Germany. The Polish military is very much involved in this operation, is very much involved in securing and cooperating with our Baltic and Nordic country allies. Hence doing the logistical effort of supporting military deliveries to Ukraine, of supporting a possible stabilization operation for Ukraine - I think that would be something that would already be a huge effort for the Polish armed forces. Hence, it is a consideration from the military perspective that a substantial engagement with boots on the ground in Ukraine in such a situation would simply be impossible.
Gabuev. Thank you so much, Justyna. That's very enlightening and comprehensive. I was very happy to have you.
Gotkowska. Thank you so much.
Gabuev. And don't forget to leave us your opinion, your feedback in the comment section. Also, hit the subscribe button on whatever platform you're using to receive your podcast. We will be back in two weeks.
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