Preface
China Local/Global
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.
With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular.
Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Introduction
China’s growing presence in Central Asia—and Kazakhstan especially—has been accompanied by steady anti-Chinese sentiment. Beijing’s reputation has suffered amid protests and controversies surrounding investment projects, the treatment of local workers, and close relationships between local elites and Chinese players.
In the past, Beijing and its proxies often ignored societal views on Chinese presence in Kazakhstan, relying instead on ties of trust with elites. But in recent years, especially after massive protests in January 2022, Kazakhstani society has taken on a greater influence over Astana’s actions, including in foreign policy. Beijing has adapted by starting to intensify its soft-power efforts, developing language courses, education, and people-to-people connections aimed at reaching more deeply into Kazakhstani society, beyond the tight elite circle on which Beijing long relied. Today, we see considerable evidence of China’s adaptability in the face of changing power-to-people dynamics in Kazakhstan and in Kazakhstani policymaking.
Economic Growth and Discontent
Despite the significant increase in China’s economic power in Kazakhstan, anti-Chinese sentiments—deeply rooted in history—have not declined significantly. According to the Central Asian Barometer survey conducted in 2022 and 2023, about 70.5 percent of respondents had an unfavorable opinion of China (with 35.2 percent reporting “somewhat unfavorable” and 35.3 reporting “very unfavorable”). Although the TALAP research center found that Kazakhstanis’ overall perception of China is generally “above neutral, leaning positive,” it also reported that they hold particularly negative views of China as a source of culture and education.
Fears of Chinese expansion into Kazakhstani land are one manifestation of these sentiments. In November 2015, an amendment to Kazakhstan’s land code increased the year limit for land leases from ten to twenty-five years. By late March 2016, the announcement from the National Economy Ministry that 1.7 million hectares of agricultural land would be auctioned sparked concerns on social media that foreigners, particularly Chinese, would purchase the land. This led to nationwide protests despite government crackdowns. Although then president Nursultan Nazarbayev assured the public that only nationals could acquire land through these auctions, the protests persisted. To calm the situation, the government imposed a moratorium on leasing land to foreigners until 2026, and before it expired, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed a decree banning foreigners from owning agricultural land. Despite these measures, nearly 80 percent of Kazakhstanis remained deeply concerned as of fall 2021 that Chinese buyers might still acquire land in Kazakhstan.
Public discontent has continued to manifest—notably in 2019, when protests were fueled by rumors on messaging apps about “plans to move 55 factories from China to Kazakhstan.” These sentiments were further exacerbated by China’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic and its censorship of pandemic victims’ next-of-kin in Xinjiang. By 2021, dissatisfaction with China’s growing economic presence in Kazakhstan had reached a boiling point, leading to more demonstrations. The lack of access to complete and reliable information about China’s economic presence in Kazakhstan only worsens its reputation. Unable to hold their local or central authorities accountable, Kazakhstani citizens assume that Chinese enterprises in their country have hidden motives and selfish interests by default.
Since Kazakhstan-China ties have strengthened, the two countries’ governments and businesses are collaborating more closely. China is now Kazakhstan’s number one financial partner, responsible for 19.2 percent of all Kazakhstani trade, surpassing Russia. In September 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping chose Kazakhstan for his first international visit since the pandemic outbreak. In May 2023, Tokayev and Xi signed multiple agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation in trade, energy, agriculture, and other fields. By July 2023, the two countries had signed a trade agreement to increase bilateral trade from $41 billion to $80 billion. As a result of these agreements, there is now a growing demand among employers in Kazakhstan for Chinese-speaking workers.
Beijing continues to safeguard its economic interests, but now it also promotes a more positive perception of China among Kazakhstanis. The Kazakhstani government too seeks to improve Beijing’s reputation among the people. In a January commemoration interview, Tokayev urged Kazakhstanis not to harbor outdated fears of China, praising the country as a highly developed state and stressing the importance of cooperation with China to capitalize on the benefits of friendly relations and mutual trust. During a meeting with Chinese Ambassador Zhang Xiao, Tokayev highlighted Kazakhstan’s intent to deepen ties with China in all areas, including cultural and humanitarian exchange.
Media
One of the most visible ways Beijing is trying to improve its reputation in Kazakhstan is through the media. Chinese media has responded to the local Kazakh context by releasing promotional material in Kazakh, which has overtaken Russian to become Kazakhstan’s most widely spoken language. An online version of the People’s Daily (the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party) became available in twelve international languages, including Cyrillic Kazakh, in 2021. Along with the usual political and economic news, the Kazakh version posts content about society, culture, and tourism to inform Kazakhstanis about China and the lives of Chinese Kazakhs.
Chinese media has actively promoted business opportunities and cultural exchange between China and Kazakhstan. China Media Group (CMG), a vast broadcasting network, has produced documentaries with translations available in Kazakh about the Chinese culture and people of Xinjiang. CMG’s Kazakhstani partner, TV channel Atameken Business, has screened programs in Kazakh about doing business in China to provide Kazakh viewers with valuable insights and potential opportunities for establishing reliable partners. Top media company executives from Kazakhstan and China have agreed to shoot innovative types of media content, such as miniseries and video clips telling the stories of both countries. Interactions between Kazakhstani and Chinese media are occurring at both the national and local levels.
According to the Chinese, the Turkic Uyghur language native to Xinjiang makes the province more easily accessible to the rest of Central Asia. Xinjiang Kazakhs have facilitated translations of Chinese content into the Kazakh language to educate Kazakhstanis about Xinjiang. The Baursak Screen project—the first China-Kazakhstan film and TV cultural exchange—was launched in the Khorgos section of the Xinjiang Free Trade Zone in 2013 and aims at showcasing Chinese culture and modernization to Kazakhstani viewers. Additionally, some television series have been dubbed into Kazakh in Xinjiang. Hey, Old Man (Qairan Qarttar), a Chinese-produced movie dubbed in Kazakh, has received growing interest due to its simple and accessible stories with plotlines that resonate with modern Kazakh-speaking audiences. Historical movies about China have also received support from Kazakh-language viewers.
China and Kazakhstan do not only adapt each other’s films to their own audiences but produce films jointly. The two governments recently signed a cultural exchange cooperation agreement and launched the production of a film about the friendship between well-known Chinese musician Xian Xinghai and Kazakh composer Bakytzhan Baikadamov, who lived in Kazakhstan during World War II.
Dimash Kudaibergen, the renowned Kazakhstani singer, has emerged as a powerful cultural ambassador, with Kazakhstani tourism officials leveraging his popularity to foster Kazakhstani and Chinese friendship through music, tourism initiatives, and cinematic storytelling. The singer, known by the mononym Dimash, gained popularity after performing at a Chinese singing contest, I Am Singer (Geshou). Through Dimash, Kazakhstani and Chinese audiences have become acquainted with each other’s culture and music. Kazakh tourism officials have collaborated with Chinese counterparts to develop a Dimash-themed tour, which attracts visitors to the singer’s hometown, Aktobe, in western Kazakhstan, by showcasing his school and his earliest music teachers. In 2023, Dimash narrated a Kazakh-language mythological feature film titled The Amazing Shin-nung, which tells the story of Shin-nung, a great personality who guided the development of civilization, according to Chinese mythology.
In parallel to its closer cooperation with China, Kazakhstan is also asserting its own narratives with a focus on history and especially the Silk Road. Instead of solely focusing on its Xi’an-led inception, Kazakhstani historians emphasize that the Silk Road was a unified transport network facilitated by the steppe states and the nomadic ancestors of Kazakhstanis, who protected caravans and promoted trade. These narratives portray Kazakhstan as home to a unique synthesis of cultural elements from Europe, the Middle East, Iran, China, and India. They connect it to contemporary projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, portrayed as revivals of the Silk Road. The media arm of the Kazakhstani Presidential Administration broadcasts a television channel called Silk Way to propagate Kazakhstani culture to broader Central Asian and English-speaking audiences.
People to People
One of the most effective tools China uses for promotion of its soft power in Kazakhstan is education. With about 15,000 Kazakhstani students as of 2020, China is the second-most popular country (after Russia) for Kazakhstani youth pursuing higher education abroad, thanks to its affordability, geographical proximity, and easy acceptance. Most Kazakhstani students learn the Chinese language and attend courses taught in Chinese. Universities and governmental exchange programs are opening between Kazakhstan and China. And in 2024, a branch of Beijing Language and Culture University opened in Astana to train future simultaneous interpreters in Chinese.
Tourism is another effective tool. Although Central Asian countries have established various visa-free regimes with China, only with Kazakhstan has the PRC enacted a reciprocal visa-free agreement, signed as an outcome of the 2022 China-Central Asia Summit in Xi’an. Beijing opened up after the coronavirus pandemic to attract more foreign tourists (including Kazakhstanis) to visit China for leisure and business, with hopes of lessening the fear of an unknown China among Kazakhstanis. The Chinese government has adapted Chinese tourism initiatives and policies to suit the Kazakhstani market.
The establishment of the visa-free regime between Kazakhstan and China sparked Sinophobic sentiments among Kazakhstanis, reinvigorating the myth that Kazakhstan could be absorbed into China. Critics of the program point out that ethnic Kazakh families living in Chinese Xinjiang cannot take advantage of the visa-free policy because they either cannot move around freely or do not have passports. Activists also oppose visa-free arrangements with China, urging the removal of simplified entry procedures for Chinese citizens. However, Kazakhstani media has emphasized the significant rise in Kazakhstani tourists to China for medical tourism and education with mutual benefit for both countries.
In 2023, a fourteen-day visa-free regime for Chinese citizens visiting Kazakhstan was expanded to a mutual policy allowing visa-free visits for a total of ninety days per 180 calendar days. China has declared 2024 to be a year of Kazakhstani tourism. Chinese tourists often visit Kazakhstan and Xinjiang in one trip because of the increasing number of flight options on both sides. Another popular package is a trip to the ancient Silk Road destinations in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Frequent flights are now available between Xi’an (an eastern terminus of the Silk Road) and Almaty, which allows visiting Kazakhstanis to get a sense of Chinese culture and history. Xi’an has also established sister-city ties with Shymkent, the third-largest city in Kazakhstan, which is located in the south along the ancient Silk Road. Tourist trains are also planned between Almaty and Xi’an.
Popular Kazakhstani travel bloggers visiting China highlight hospitality, decadent cuisine, fresh air, the presence of old mosques, and halal meat. In the first nine months of 2023, more than 75,000 Chinese tourists received Kazakhstani tourist services. In the first half of 2024, about 70,000 Chinese visited Kazakhstan—a record-high figure.
Kazakhstani tourism companies also seek the business of tour groups from China, but there is a need to adjust services for Chinese people, such as by providing Chinese-speaking guides. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Tourism has spent around $100,000 for ads on Chinese social networks WeChat and Weibo to cover at least 3 million users in hopes of attracting more Chinese tourists.
A Changing Chinese Posture
These evolving Chinese strategies in Kazakhstan illustrate nuanced adaptation to an increasingly dynamic local cultural, societal, and political landscape, driven by China’s need for more favorable Kazakhstani public perception amid deepening economic ties between the two countries. Recognizing Kazakhstanis’ cautious stance toward China’s influence, China has broadened its soft power initiatives beyond mere economic collaboration.
This has included a strategic push into education, culture, media, and art, focusing on content in the Kazakh language. By leveraging language as a bridge, China aims to create a sense of cultural affinity between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, subtly highlighting shared historical and cultural ties. This approach is evident in the expansion of education programs and cultural exchanges specifically designed to resonate with the Kazakhstani audience. By showcasing Chinese culture in a way that aligns with local traditions and values, China is attempting to foster a more organic connection with the Kazakhstani public. However, apart from these efforts, China’s promotion of its soft power in Kazakhstan remains relatively limited. This cautious expansion likely reflects Beijing’s awareness of the Kazakhstani government’s sensitivity toward public perception, which is not yet fully favorable to China.
China’s gradual and calculated approach demonstrates an understanding of Kazakhstan’s unique geopolitical context, where national sovereignty and cultural identity are highly valued. As economic ties between the two countries continue to strengthen, China's ability to adjust its soft power strategy to fit the Kazakhstani context will be crucial in building long-term trust and ensuring that their partnership is viewed positively by the public. Ultimately, China’s success in Kazakhstan will depend on its ability to navigate the complexities of Kazakhstan’s societal landscape.